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 Dr. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, a leading voice in the neoconservative movement, is best known 
for her articulation of the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, distinctions between authoritarian and totalitarian 
regimes that served as the foundation for the Reagan Administration’s Latin American policies. 
Her prominence within the neoconservative movement, her impact on foreign affairs, and her 
political accomplishments in a masculine environment make her an important historical figure in 
recent American domestic and diplomatic history. This work explores her transition from liberal 
democrat to neoconservative by examining her early life and educational background, her 
publications and critiques of American diplomacy in the 1970s, along with her membership in 
neoconservative organizations. Moreover, this piece scrutinizes her efficacy as Permanent 
Ambassador to the United Nations and assesses her impact on American foreign policy 
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Dr. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, a political science professor at Georgetown University from 
1967 to 2002, was a prominent member of the neoconservative movement of the 1970s and 
1980s who became President Ronald Reagan’s Permanent Ambassador to the United Nations in 
1981, a post she retained until 1985. Kirkpatrick served on Reagan’s National Security Council, 
the National Security Planning Group, was a member of the Presidential Cabinet, and was widely 
acknowledged to be the expert within the administration on Latin American affairs. Following 
her resignation as Permanent U.N. Ambassador, Kirkpat ick remained active in governmental 
matters, serving as a member of the Presidential Commission on Space (1985-1987), the 
Presidential Blue Ribbon Commission on Nuclear Products (1985-1987), the President’s Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board (1985-1990), the Defens Policy Review Board (1985-1993), the 
Commission on Fail Safe and Risk Reduction, Departmen  of Defense (1990-1992), and 
Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Human Rights Commission (2003). Moreover, the 
political scientist helped to provide the legal justifications for George W. Bush’s war on Iraq. 
Kirkpatrick also worked for several advocacy groups including the Coalition for a Democratic 
Majority, the Committee on the Present Danger, the Committee for a Free World, Empower 
America, the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, the Jewish Institute for National 
Security Affairs, Freedom House, the Henry M. Jackson Foundation, U.N. Watch, the Center for 
a Free Cuba, the Nicaraguan Freedom Fund, and the Cuban-American National Fund, among 
others. In addition, Kirkpatrick joined the staff o the conservative think-tank, the American 
Enterprise Institute, where she remained a senior fellow until her death in 2006. Throughout her 
life, the ambassador published several books and articles, and wrote a syndicated weekly column 
for the Los Angeles Times (1985-1998). 
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The Georgetown professor is best-known for being a leading voice amongst 
neoconservatives and for her articulation of the Kirkpatrick Doctrine. The distinctions she drew 
between right-wing authoritarian and left-wing totalitarian governments served as the rationale 
behind American support for right-wing dictatorships throughout the Reagan years. Indeed, it 
was the Kirkpatrick Doctrine that caused Ronald Reagan to recruit the political scientist to be an 
advisor on foreign affairs for his 1980 presidential campaign. Following his victory, the 
president made Kirkpatrick the first female ambassador to the United Nations from the United 
States. She also became the first woman to sit on the National Security Council and the National 
Security Planning Group.  
Her prominence within the neoconservative movement, her political achievements in a 
male-dominated environment, and the importance of the Kirkpatrick Doctrine in the formulation 
of the Reagan administration’s foreign policies make Jeane Kirkpatrick a significant historical 
figure in the examination of American domestic politics, gender studies, and Cold War 
diplomacy. Despite this, the literature devoted to the former U.N. Ambassador remains rather 
slim and incomplete, in part because her papers are in ccessible at the moment.1Works that have 
referenced her tenure with the Reagan administration focus almost exclusively on her role as 
mouthpiece for the president and pay little attention o her involvement in policy-making.2 
                                                           
1 There are only two biographical accounts of her lif : Harrison, Pat. Jeane Kirkpatrick. Part of 
the American Women of Achievement Series, (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1991); 
Collier, Peter. Political Woman: The Big Little Life of Jeane Kirkpatrick. (New York: Encounter 
Books, 2012). Harrison’s account is rather brief and was written for a younger audience. 
Collier’s account, though much more thorough, suffers rom bias due to his own friendship with 
the subject. Moreover, perhaps due to his background as a journalist, Collier’s work is lacking in 
primary source research and citations.  
2 See: Gerson, Allan. The Kirkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy without Apology (New York: The 
Free Press, 1991); Hindell, Keith. “Madame Ambassador: An Appraisal of Jeane J. Kirkpatrick 
as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1981-1985” Passport, Vol. 39, Issue 3, 
January 2009; Finger, Seymour Maxwell. American Ambassadors at the UN: People, Politics, 
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Accounts written by Reagan’s staff and foreign policy elite follow suit in their marginalization of 
Kirkpatrick and their refusal to credit her with the development of diplomatic strategies.3Works 
on the rise of neoconservatism relate her transition fr m liberal Democrat to neoconservative to 
her disenchantment with the New Left and her foreign policy views; however, most gloss over 
the details of the political scientist’s studies of d mestic politics, rendering their accounts 
incomplete.4Throughout the literature, scant attention is paid to the fact that she broke the gender 
barrier that had prevented women from attaining the highest diplomatic positions, thus paving 
the way for Madeleine Albright, Condoleezza Rice, and Hillary Clinton.5  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and Bureaucracy in Making Foreign Policy (New York: UNITAR, 1992); Fasulo, Linda M. 
Representing America: Experiences of US Diplomats at he UN (New York: Praeger, 1990); 
Ostrower, Gary B. The United Nations and the United States (New York: Twayne 
Publishers/Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1998). Gerson provides an overview of his experiences 
working with Kirkpatrick as the U.N.; however, it is not a comprehensive account of the 
important issues brought up at the international organization during Kirkpatrick’s tenure. 
Hindell, Finger, Fasulo, and Ostrower focus on the ambassador’s ‘confrontational style’ and 
inexperience.   
3 See: Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries (New York: Harper Collins, 2009); Haig, Alexander. 
Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1984); 
Meese, Edwin. With Reagan: The Inside Story (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1992); 
Shultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (N w York: Charles 
Scribners’ Sons, 1993). Reagan often misspells her name, while Haig references complaints 
made by the ambassador regarding her office, limo, staff, and security detail. Meese states that 
her UN duties kept her away from the NSC and NSPG which limited her ability to influence 
policy. Shultz claims she was too ideological and confrontational to be National Security 
Advisor. In all these accounts, Kirkpatrick is a negligible figure. 
4 See: Vaïsse, Justin. Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010); Gerson, Mark. The Neoconservative Vision: 
From the Cold War to the Culture Wars (New York: Madison Books, 1996); Ehrman, John. The 
Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1994 (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1995); Hoeveler, Jr, J. David. Watch on the Right: Conservative Intellectuals in 
the Reagan Era (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991). Vaïsse provides the best 
overall analysis of Kirkpatrick’s domestic and foreign policies and their places within the 
neoconservative movement. Gerson only mentions Kirkpat ick in nine pages of his work, but he 
relies heavily on her works for his analysis of neoconservatives’ foreign policy views. Ehrman 
and Hoeveler focus on the Kirkpatrick Doctrine and neoconservative foreign policy.    
5 See: Morin, Ann Miller. Her Excellency: An Oral History of American Women Ambassadors. 
(New York: Twayne Publishers, 1995). Morin examines what it is like to be a female 
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This work will attempt to address such issues in the historical literature by providing a 
more thorough examination of Jeane Kirkpatrick’s life. Chapter One surveys the formative years 
of her life from childhood to the first years of her marriage. Throughout this period, Kirkpatrick 
refused to conform to stereotypical gender roles, bcame a loyal member of the Democratic 
Party, and received an education in the evils of totali arianism through her mentor Franz 
Neumann, his friend Hannah Arendt, and her exposure to first-hand accounts of totalitarianism in 
Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and Red China. The chapter ends with an early articulation of the 
Kirkpatrick Doctrine as laid out in her first edited work – The Strategies of Deception.  
Chapter Two focuses on three books published by Kirkpat ick in the 1960s and 1970s: 
Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society: A Study in Peronist Argentina, Political Woman, and The 
New Presidential Elite. Her dissertation – Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society – was a study 
of Argentine politics in the years following the downfall of Juan Perón which Kirkpatrick used to 
further buttress her distinctions between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. In addition, the 
publication of this work won Kirkpatrick a reputation as an expert in Latin American political 
systems. In contrast, both Political Woman and The New Presidential Elite dealt primarily with 
American domestic politics – the former constituted the first major study of women in politics, 
while the latter was an analysis of the rise of the New Left within the Democratic Party. These 
works offer valuable insight into the ambassador’s views of feminism and other facets of the 
New Left’s domestic and foreign agendas which pushed her further to the right of the political 
spectrum. 
Chapter Three concentrates on Kirkpatrick’s transition into neoconservatism through her 
membership in neoconservative organizations and her criticism of the Carter Administration’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ambassador in a male-dominated world. Her work places Kirkpatrick at the end of a short line of 
female ambassadors and diplomats. 
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foreign policies. In the late 1970s, the political scientist joined several neoconservative groups 
including the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM), the Committee on the Present Danger 
(CPD), and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Kirkpatrick was a founding member of the 
CDM, an organization dedicated to saving the Democratic Party from the influence of the New 
Left. She was also a founding member of the CPD, an organization that traced its intellectual 
origins to Paul Nitze and NSC-68. The CPD criticized détente policies for allowing Soviet 
expansion and called for increased military spending a d action on the part of the U.S. 
Kirkpatrick joined the AEI, a conservative think-tank, in 1977 as her disenchantment with the 
Democratic Party grew. In 1979, the Georgetown professor published “Dictatorships and Double 
Standards” a scathing review of Carter’s foreign policies based on her distinctions between 
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. The chapter concludes with an overview and analysis of 
the Kirkpatrick Doctrine. 
Chapter Four examines Kirkpatrick’s efficacy as United Nations Ambassador by 
concentrating on various issues discussed in the inernational body including the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and the 
occupation of Namibia by South Africa. The chapter also investigates the legitimacy of various 
criticisms of Kirkpatrick’s performance as ambassador, along with her opinions of the 
organization and her recommendations for increasing American influence therein. 
Chapter Five is devoted to Kirkpatrick’s role in the formulation of the Reagan 
Administration’s Latin American policies. It begins with an overview of her article “US Security 
and Latin America” which lays out a blueprint of sort  for successful diplomatic strategies in the 
region. The administration’s policies – providing aid to the Contras, waging covert operations 
against the Sandinistas, giving military and economic aid to the government of El Salvador 
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regardless of the regime’s human rights’ violations – all squared nicely with Kirkpatrick’s 
prescriptions for containing communism and protecting national security in America’s front 
yard. The chapter concludes with the ambassador’s analysis of the significance and intentions of 






















Chapter One: An Education in Totalitarianism  
 Jeane Kirkpatrick’s distinctions between authoritarian and totalitarian governments, her 
assertion that authoritarian regimes were capable of collapsing into approximate democratic 
states, thus warranting American support, while totalitarian governments were not, and her 
criticisms of totalitarianism and modern revolutionary liberation movements did not arise out of 
a vacuum.  Rather, the Kirkpatrick Doctrine was the culmination of years of academic study and 
life experiences. Therefore, in order to properly understand and critique her theories as they were 
utilized by the Reagan Administration and in the United Nations, one must examine her early life 
experiences and the various works that influenced th  evolution of her thought. This chapter will 
attempt to do just that through a brief investigation of her childhood, her college years, and early 
married life, culminating in an analysis of her earlier articulation of the doctrine.  
“An American Girlhood”6       
 Jeane Duane Jordan was born on November 19, 1926 to Welcher ‘Fat’ Jordan and Leona 
Jordan in the small, southwestern town of Duncan, Oklahoma.7 Her parents were both natives of 
Texas. Though born in Texas, Welcher’s family moved to Walters, Oklahoma when he was a 
young boy. There he grew up wrestling with local Native American boys, along with his seven 
brothers, and developed into an imposing athlete. Th  University of Oklahoma offered him a 
football scholarship and he happily accepted the off r, seeing athletics as a means to enable him 
to study the law. Unfortunately, he broke his leg in a preseason scrimmage and was unable to 
                                                           
6 Title is taken from Jeane Kirkpatrick’s own account of her younger days. “An American 
Girlhood” by: Jeane Kirkpatrick, The Weekly Standard, Monday, February 5, 2007.  
Article can also be found at http://www.aei.org/article/25531 Last accessed: 10/01/12 
7 Biographical information is taken from Harrison, Pat. Jeane Kirkpatrick. Part of the American 
Women of Achievement Series, (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1991); Collier, Peter. 
Political Woman: The Big Little Life of Jeane Kirkpatrick. (New York: Encounter Books, 2012); 
and Kirkpatrick, Jeane. “An American Girlhood”. 
8 
 
continue his gridiron career. Without the athletic scholarship, Jordan could not afford college 
tuition and was forced to drop out and become a laborer in the oil fields. Eventually, through 
hard work and thrifty living, he worked his way up from laborer to driller to drilling contractor.  
In 1922, while visiting a friend in Arlington, Texas, Welcher Jordan met Leona Kile.  Described 
by her daughter as “an independent woman in the flapper era”8, Leona was temporarily living 
with her sister while she took shorthand, typing, and bookkeeping courses. Leona and Welcher 
fell in love and were married in 1923, after which they moved into a rented, two bedroom house 
in Duncan, Oklahoma.  
 Duncan was located approximately forty-four miles north of the Oklahoma-Texas border 
and eighty-one miles southwest of Oklahoma City. The town was founded by William Duncan 
who took over a trade store in 1879 located near Cow reek alongside the Chisolm Trail, a 
cattle-driving route between Texas and Kansas. In 1884, Duncan opened a post office. Soon 
after, the entrepreneur heard rumors that the Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Railway had 
plans to construct a rail-line through Indian Territory which prompted him to buy land in the 
area. Through his wife, Sally, a member of the Chickasaw Nation, Duncan was able to claim 500 
acres of land, and there he laid out a site for a twn. In 1892, the promised railroad line was 
constructed through Duncan’s land and the town bearing his name was born.9 
 In 1907, Oklahoma received official statehood, andDuncan was made the county seat of 
Stephens County. By 1909, the town claimed approximately 150 commercial establishments 
including cotton gins, flour mills, a grist mill, and a farm implements dealer. In 1918, oil wells 
were opened in southeastern Stephens County and the town began to boom. In 1920, the 
                                                           
8 Kirkpatrick, “An American Girlhood”, 3. 
9 http://digital.library.okstate.edu/encyclopedia/entries/D/DU005.html 
Last accessed: 10/12/12 
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population of Duncan stood at 3,463; ten years later, it had more than doubled to 8,363. In 
response to the economic and population booms, the town leaders “prohibited the construction of 
shacks and aggressively policed other boomtown activities to ensure that Duncan grew 
substantively in an orderly, permanent fashion.”10 During the 1920s, a variety of oil-related 
industries developed in Duncan, foremost among them b ing the Halliburton Oil Well 
Cementing Company founded by Erle P. Halliburton.11 Though Welcher Jordan was acquainted 
with Halliburton, he worked for various other clients including Carter Oil, a producing company 
of Standard Oil out of Indiana.12In 1922, one year before the Jordans moved to Duncan, the town 
had its first oil refinery – the Rock Island Refinery.13 
  In 1926, after three years of marriage, Leona Jordan gave birth to the Jordans’ first child. 
It became apparent to the couple from an early age that their daughter, Jeane, was blessed with 
an intelligent and inquisitive mind. Jeane could say her alphabet backwards by the age of three, 
was reading by the age of four, and, by the age of five, she had committed to memory entire 
passages of a multi-volume set of poems, essays, and stories designed for much older children. 
Her mother instilled in her daughter a love of reading, and Jeane often lost herself in books for 
weeks on end. At the age of ten, Jeane managed to save enough of her allowance to buy her first 
book - a thesaurus. Her interest in literature and learning made her an excellent student who 
consistently ranked at the top of her class. In addition to her scholastic aptitude, Jeane was 
musically inclined. At the age of seven she started taking piano lessons and joined the Schubert 
Music Club, a group of piano students who studied the lives of composers and performed recitals 
                                                           
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 





for each other. When she was not engaged in musical or academic pursuits, Jeane spent a lot of 
time involved in what she described as “unconventional role behavior” or tomboyish activities – 
collecting arrowheads and feathers, climbing trees, and playing softball and touch football with 
the neighborhood boys.14  
 Though her childhood revolved largely around school, church, music, and play, Jeane’s 
parents made sure to introduce their daughter to the world of politics – specifically, the 
Democratic Party.  With but two exceptions – Welcher’s father, who in his youth was with both 
the Populist and Socialist Parties, and Leona’s great-grandfather, who fought on the side of the 
Union during the Civil War – both of Jeane’s parents came from a long line of Democrats. They 
were of the Southern yellow dog variety who would vote for any member of the party unless he 
had been convicted of a felony.15 According to Jeane, Franklin Delano Roosevelt “cemented the 
allegiance of everyone in my family to the Democrats;” during the depression, they regarded 
New Deal programs such as the Rural Electrification Program, the Civilian Conservation Corps, 
the Tennessee Valley Authority, and Social Security as ‘godsends’ and Roosevelt as a ‘savior’.16 
Family loyalty to the Democratic Party became even more obvious to Jeane when her father 
informed her that she could bring home a black boy or an Indian boy, but, by God, she had better 
not bring home a Republican.17 
 It was also during her childhood that the Jordans’ daughter became aware of various 
racial inequalities that existed within her hometown. Despite the Jordan family’s tolerance and 
acceptance of minorities, Duncan was not well-known for its racial tolerance or commitment to 
                                                           
14Kirkpatrick, An American Girlhood, 4. 
15 Ibid, 2. This was Jeane’s mother’s modification of the saying “I’d vote for a yellow dog if he 
was Democrat”. 
16 Ibid.  
17 Collier, Political Woman, 8. 
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social equality. Because the town boasted a large Native American population and was located 
only twenty miles from a major Indian reservation, Jeane grew up being exposed to Native 
American culture. She attended school with several Native American children and listening to 
them speak in their native tongue was her first exposure to foreign language. Jeane found them to 
be exotic and romantic symbols of a vanishing America, which prompted her to read Indian lore, 
make bows and arrows and beaded things, and imagine hers lf as an Indian girl with “shiny 
black braided hair”.18 Despite her interest in their customs and culture, Jeane’s friends and 
playmates were white children. Furthermore, Jeane’s piano teacher, Mrs. Thompson, remained 
an object of ‘curiosity’ to her students and the local townspeople for having married, and 
subsequently been abandoned by, an Indian man.19 
 Race relations between blacks and whites in Duncan were of a different nature. The Ku 
Klux Klan had been active in the town harassing both blacks and Catholics, lynching several of 
the former.20 In her reminiscences of life in Duncan, during the twilight years of her life, Jeane 
claimed that the races were not segregated in Duncan as blacks lived in white neighborhoods as 
servants. Moreover, African Americans participated in nearly all aspects of white society and 
family life, but again, as servants. In contrast to Jeane’s recollections of the lack of racial 
segregation, there were few blacks living in Duncan, and those who did reside there lived in their 
own run-down neighborhoods. Furthermore, Oklahoma had instituted Jim Crow laws beginning 
in the 1890s before the territory became a state. Though segregation was not written directly into 
the initial Oklahoma state constitution in 1907, due to fears that President Theodore Roosevelt 
                                                           
18 Kirkpatrick, An American Girlhood, 4. 
19 Collier, Political Woman, 9. 
20 Harrison, Jeane Kirkpatrick, 27. 
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would not approve it, one of the first acts of the new state legislature had been the passage of 
‘Senate Bill Number One’.  
This measure defined an African American as any person with any black or mixed 
ancestry (basically, the ‘one drop rule’), banned interracial marriages, and segregated all schools, 
public facilities, and means of public transportation. In 1915, Oklahoma made history by 
becoming the first state to segregate public pay telephone booths.21Thus, prejudice against black 
Americans permeated throughout Duncan society just as it did in other regions of the United 
States, especially in the South. Such prejudice was built into the local vernacular where “nigger 
toes” referred to Brazil nuts and a “nigger shooter” r ferred to a sling-shot.22 To a young girl, 
these words seemed perfectly ordinary; however, as Je ne matured into adolescence, she began 
to recognize the derogatory nature of such terms and how segregation and discrimination 
violated the basic ideals of equality guaranteed by the American constitution. 
 Jeane’s awareness of the inequalities that existed between the races in American society, 
along with the history behind them, was heightened by her family’s decision to move to Illinois 
when she was twelve years old. Though not a state a the time of the Civil War, many residents 
of Oklahoma, including various Native American groups, had sympathized with, and fought for, 
the Confederacy. Thus, Jeane had grown up hearing about the nobility of the Confederate cause 
in the “War of Northern Aggression”. In Illinois, she learned about the Civil War from another 
perspective. After all, Illinois had been a Union state and the home of President Abraham 
Lincoln. In fact, the first middle school she attend d in Vandalia, Illinois had been a stop on the 
                                                           
21 http://digital.library.okstate.edu/encyclopedia/entries/S/SE006.html 
10/12/12 
22 Kirkpatrick, An American Girlhood, 4.  
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Underground Railroad. After spending less than a year in Illinois, Jeane became an ardent fan of 
Abraham Lincoln and a strong supporter of the Union.23 
Regardless of her newfound sympathy for the Union cause and her recognition of the 
social and economic inequalities of her hometown, Jeane remained quite fond of Duncan, using 
it throughout her life as a model when writing about the nature of, and conditions necessary for, 
democracy. To Jeane, the culture of Duncan, Oklahom was democratic, egalitarian, and 
libertarian, all attributes that constituted the basic building blocks of a truly democratic society. 
Furthermore, Duncan was a ‘frontier town’ with an open, ‘frontier society’. “A frontier society is 
open in special ways,” Jeane wrote, “It is new – so there was unusual opportunity for individuals 
to break free of invisible chains and define themselves and make their way.”24 She went on to 
describe the fluidity of such a society, where nobody was stuck in one role, where anybody could 
be whatever they wanted to be, and where everyone was welcome. She noted, “The most 
remarkable fact about American frontier societies, surely, was that people who found themselves 
in the same area found it natural to govern themselve  by democratic means, by getting together, 
talking things over, choosing leaders, and working together to provide basic community 
needs.”25Moreover, the civic culture exemplified within such towns appeared to Jeane as the 
epitome of the American experience and political philosophy; for it was in these towns where 
initiative, optimism, determination, and the acceptance of shared responsibility dominated the 
American mentality. Much later in her life, as she transitioned from liberal Democrat to 
                                                           
23 Harrison, 29-30. 
24 Ibid, 4. 
25 Ibid, 4.  
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neoconservative Republican, Jeane often criticized lib ral democrats as embodying the opposite 
of these truly American traits.26  
 Jeane’s political transformation was far into the future when the family first moved to 
Vandalia, Illinois in 1938 before settling permanently in Mount Vernon, Illinois in 1940. Jeane 
described the family’s move as one of the two dramatic events that punctuated her childhood, the 
other being the birth of her baby brother, Jerry, when she was eight. The family’s move to 
Illinois left Jeane inconsolable for a time. Her idyllic life appeared to be at an end and she 
recalled that she thought she might die.27 Her initial loneliness and unhappiness over moving 
caused her to spend most of her time in the public li rary. There she eagerly absorbed the 
classics – Dickens, Thackeray, Dumas, Jane Austen, and George Eliot – as well as many 
contemporary authors such as Steinbeck and Hemingway. Je ne continued with her piano 
lessons, acted in school plays, fell in love with Shakespeare, and edited the high school 
newspaper. For her senior thesis, she wrote an essay on four novels by George Eliot, a British 
woman who chose to publish her works under a male pseudonym due to the prejudices of that 
time.  
 Jeane had always engaged in activities that were, for the most part, not deemed suitable 
for girls, hence, perhaps her attraction to the works f Eliot. Her parents had approved of her 
academic curiosity and were proud of her scholastic chievements, but they expected her to 
conform to prevailing gender roles after finishing hi h school which meant marriage and 
                                                           
26 This is most evident in her fiery speech at the 1984 Republican National Convention where 
she labeled Democrats as members of the ‘Blame America First’ club who had lost the initiative 
in the Cold War, the determination to fight the Cold War and stand up to the communist menace, 
and who were entirely too pessimistic about America’s strength and moral role in the world. 
Furthermore, she accused them of not accepting responsibility for the deterioration and 
demoralization of society by allowing the rise of the New Left and its ‘radical’ policies. 
27 Ibid, 5. 
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children. Jeane, however, had other ideas. After graduating at the top of her class, she requested 
that her parents allow her to go to college. Jeane wanted to attend the University of Chicago, but 
her parents preferred something less rigorous and more feminine. Thus, it was determined that 
Jeane would go to Stephens College, a two year women’s college in Columbia, Missouri. In the 
minds of Welcher and Leona, college was only a two year detour before their daughter entered 
into a normal, domesticated life. Jeane, whose ambitions at that time were to be a spinster 
teacher, did not share their view. 
An Education in Totalitarianism 
 In 1944, Jeane left home to pursue her studies. Stphens College, the second oldest 
women’s college in the United States, was established in 1833. At the time of Jeane’s arrival, 
Stephens served as both a finishing school, designed to prepare elite women for marriage and 
social niceties, and as a women’s college with a rathe  progressive curriculum. For example, the 
college offered communication classes designed to enabl  women to write effective and clear 
business and social letters. Stephens also offered a wi e variety of science courses including 
psychology, chemistry, biology, geology, etcetera, but it should be noted that these were geared 
towards women’s needs. For instance, botany classes were designed to help women plant 
gardens on the grounds of their future homes. Stephens was the first women’s college to offer 
aviation courses, but it also encouraged women to take marriage education, child-study, and 
clothing courses. In addition to history, economics, nternational relations, and sociology classes, 
young women attending Stephens were instructed in hair styling, make-up procedure, and good 
grooming.28 For these reasons Jeane described Stephens as “an unlikely place for a would-be 
                                                           
28 http://cdm.sos.mo.gov This website contains all of the yearbooks from Stephens College 
dating back to the early 20th century. I have taken course descriptions from its yearbook, the 
Stephensophia, between 1944-1948. 10/10/12 
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intellectual”; however, eschewing the majority of the finishing school aspects of the college and 
throwing herself into liberal arts studies, she found much to stimulate her academic curiosities.29 
 During her two years at Stephens, Jeane devoted herself to the study of literature, history, 
writing, and philosophy. It was there that Jeane discovered Plato and Aristotle. She read Thomas 
Hobbes and John Stuart Mill and briefly embraced Utilitarianism. She absorbed Dostoevsky, 
Virginia Woolf, George Eliot and embraced Modernism. She read Karl Marx and flirted with 
Socialism. Her exposure to Mary Wollstonecraft, Virginia Woolf, and other writers on the 
subjugation of women allowed her to articulate more clearly her “vague feeling that the 
distribution of privileges and power between the sexe  was not quite as symmetrical as it should 
be.”30  
 As her two years at Stephens began to come to an end, h r parents assumed that she 
would soon return home, living the life of a lady, playing the piano, reading, and helping her 
mother in the home until she got married. Jeane was determined to continue on with her 
education, however. Her academic prowess earned her a full scholarship to the University of 
Chicago. She was also accepted to Barnard College, which was affiliated with Columbia 
University, and one of the finest women’s colleges in the United States. Jeane opted for the 
University of Chicago. She was so excited by this opportunity that she could not wait for 
September classes to begin, and in June she moved t Chicago where she hoped to enroll in 
summer courses. Unfortunately, everything seemed to go wrong for her. First, there appeared to 
be no housing available for her near campus. Second, the university lost her student file, and by 
the time they found it, all of the courses she wanted to enroll in were full. The last straw for 
Jeane occurred while she was waiting at a bus stop when a group of men grabbed her and 
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attempted to drag her into the bushes. Jeane screamed which caught the attention of bystanders 
who scared the attackers away. At that point, she decided that Chicago was not the place for her. 
So, she spent the rest of the summer of 1946 at home in Illinois before leaving in September for 
New York City to attend Barnard College.  
 “New York was the right place to pursue big ideas,” Jeane wrote, “and it was big ideas 
that I decided to aim for in my life.”31Upon arriving at Barnard, her first task was deciding on a 
major. Though she had planned to study political philosophy, Jeane decided instead to major in 
political science reasoning that it would allow herto continue to study both philosophy and 
history. Furthermore, a degree in political science appeared to her to be quite practical. After all, 
Jeane needed a degree that might offer her job opportunities after her college education was 
complete since she had no plans for returning to Mount Vernon and settling into domestic life.32 
Accordingly, the young woman threw herself into herstudies. In addition to her political science 
courses, she began taking French classes and soon fell in love with the language and French 
culture, spending the summer following her junior year enrolled in an intensive language course 
at McGill University in Montreal.  
 The two years at Barnard College went by quickly for Jeane and in 1948 she graduated 
with a Bachelor’s of Arts degree in Political Scienc . This was quite an accomplishment for 
during that period only 6% of all women in the United States had a bachelor’s degree and only 
23% of American women had completed four years of high school.33 Because her parents (and 
most other Americans) believed that she had received more than enough education for a woman, 
the Jordans expected their daughter to at long last return to Mount Vernon. As usual, Jeane had 
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other plans. She considered attending law school, but decided instead to enroll in graduate school 
at Columbia where she would pursue a master’s degree in political science. 
 A major factor in drawing Jeane towards Columbia was the prospect of having Franz 
Neumann as her advisor. Neumann was a German Jew who had fled to Great Britain following 
the advent of the Nazi regime in 1933.34During the Weimar period, Neumann had served as a 
labor lawyer to the Builders Workers’ Union. When he was not involved in a specific case, 
Neumann delivered lectures at various German universiti s on business and industrial law. He 
completed two doctoral degrees, one in Germany where  wrote his dissertation on the 
relationship between the state and punishment, and the second on the rule of law and the 
relationship between political theories and the lega  system which he completed at the London 
School of Economics.35During World War II, Neumann moved to the United States and worked 
for the Office of Strategic Services. He later served under Justice Robert H. Jackson during the 
Nuremburg trials and helped author a new constitution for West Germany.36In 1942, Neumann 
published his magnum opus, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism. Jeane 
had read this book while attending Barnard and it was this work that prompted her lifelong 
interest in non-democratic regimes and totalitarianism, an interest that would eventually propel 
her into the national spotlight as both a public intellectual and a policymaker. 
 The first class Jeane signed up for at Columbia was a four semester course on German 
politics taught by Neumann. As a member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) during the 
Weimar Era, Neumann was a staunch defender of democratic socialism. In his writings and 
lectures he identified dual causes for the destruction of the Weimar Republic: the inability of the 
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socialists and leftist liberals to implement effective social and political reforms, and the inability 
(or unwillingness) of all the German political parties to defend parliamentary democracy from 
minority groups bent on its destruction.37 Neumann placed the blame for these problems on 
extremists from the right – the fascists, authoritarians, conservative clergy, and military – who 
had no respect for democratic institutions, and on extremists from the left – the Communists 
(German Communist Party, KPD) – who shared the right’s distaste for liberal political systems.38 
Thus, in his view, extremists from both the right and the left collaborated to cause the fall of the 
Weimar Republic while its supporters passively stood by appeasing them.  
Jeane paid close attention to the dangers posed to dem cracies from both right-wing and 
left-wing extremists. Her biographer, Peter Collier, notes Jeane recounting how Neumann’s 
description of life in the late Weimar Republic applled her, particularly stories about Nazi or 
Communist groups who took over German towns while te Social Democrats responded by 
filing law suits. By the time the courts produced a verdict, “the totalitarian party had already 
consolidated control, killed some people and smashed ome things.”39Further fueling her outrage 
toward political extremists were the Nazi government files in Neumann’s possession which he 
allowed her to read. Much of the material contained within the files pertained to the Holocaust, 
information that Jeane found chilling. “I had led a pretty sheltered life up until then,” she said, “I 
had little idea of the human capacity for evil. It was a deeply disturbing view that I acquired from 
these documents and from the sense I was getting of the magnitude of the Holocaust. It changed 
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me forever.”40 Her exposure to the inner workings of the Nazi regme, especially in relation to 
the “Final Solution”, along with the lessons she absor ed in the classroom about political 
extremism, only enhanced her desire to learn more about totalitarianism.  
Much of her fundamental understanding of the nature of totalitarian regimes came from 
her advisor’s book – Behemoth. From this work, Jeane learned how totalitarian parties took over 
all legislative and administrative functions of the state, thereby eliminating representative 
government and democracy.41Having eliminated the political power of the people through the 
disbanding of parliamentary bodies, the totalitarians then proceeded to invest legislative, 
administrative, judicial, and military power in the ands of the party’s leader. Thus, a totalitarian 
dictatorship was formed.42 Jeane learned that anxiety, periods of civil strife, religious turmoil, 
and profound social and economic upheavals could cause the “least rational strata of society” to 
turn to charismatic leaders of totalitarian movements.43Subsequently, the special, messianic 
qualities supposedly possessed by the leader were us d to foster a continued sense of 
helplessness and hopelessness amongst the people in rder to more easily abolish equality and 
substitute a hierarchical order upon a previously democratic society.44 
In Behemoth, Jeane read about how totalitarians managed to reorganize a nation’s or 
people’s society and culture. First, all private organizations and civil institutions which gave the 
individual an opportunity for ‘spontaneous behavior’ were replaced by totalitarian, authoritarian 
organizations, the goal of which was to atomize the subordinate population by destroying every 
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autonomous group that mediated between them and the state.45Thus, family, church life, work 
associations, etc. were all broken down and replaced by large bureaucratic organizations; the 
greater the size of the organization, the greater its bureaucratic power, and the less important the 
individual member.46 Even leisure time was taken away from the population via ‘Strength 
Through Joy’ programs which did nothing but glorify work as it enhanced the power of the state. 
Finally, Jeane learned that propaganda, supplemented by terror, were necessary in order for the 
totalitarian state to maintain control over the masses47.  
 The knowledge that Jeane collected from her mentor’s writings and lectures on 
totalitarianism was supplemented by her exposure to other intellectuals who were speaking and 
writing about this new political phenomenon. One such intellectual who inspired and influenced 
the aspiring student was Hannah Arendt. Neumann introduced Jeane to Arendt, and together they 
attended her lectures on totalitarianism.48 Arendt was a German Jew who had fled to Paris from
Nazi Germany in 1933. In 1941, she migrated to the United States where she became a noted 
political philosopher, publishing books and essays on totalitarianism, revolution, freedom, 
authority, and tradition. Two of her major works, The Origins of Totalitarianism, and On 
Revolution, proved to be instrumental in the development of Jeane’s political theories regarding 
the nature of modern revolutions and the evils of totalitarianism. 
 In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt expounded upon various characteristics of 
National Socialism discussed by Neumann in Behemoth and applied them to Communism in the 
Soviet Union. For example, the book described the aomization of society through the abolition 
of individual freedom, autonomous institutions, and the elimination of human spontaneity, the 
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qualities of the ‘infallible’ leader of the totalitarian party, and the use of terror and propaganda 
by both the Soviets and the Nazis. Thus, the book served to reinforce Jeane’s initial 
understanding of how such regimes functioned, while also supplying her with new information 
about totalitarianism, all of which she used later to buttress the Kirkpatrick Doctrine. In 
particular, she learned from Arendt that the goal of totalitarian regimes was global 
domination.49Though many historians have claimed that the Russian  were merely obsessed with 
defending themselves and that any talk of ‘global domination’ was purely rhetoric, Arendt 
disagreed. She claimed that having declared itself to be on the side of history and the victor of 
the war against capitalism, the communist government in the Soviet Union had to pursue global 
domination or it would lose its legitimacy.50 Jeane also learned from Arendt that despite the 
abhorrent nature of totalitarianism and its desire fo  world domination, many still found it to be 
appealing, especially totalitarianism in its communist form. Arendt blamed its appeal on the 
world’s fascination with utopian dreams of universal equality, where wishful thinking about the 
nature of communism blinded the world to its evil.51 
In addition to her writings about the evils of communist totalitarianism, Arendt also 
published On Revolution. In this book, Arendt focused on the differences btween the 
‘successful’ American Revolution and the ‘unsuccessful’ French Revolution and concluded that 
a combination of history and ‘the social question’ determined the course of these and all 
subsequent revolutions. According to Arendt, “there is nothing more natural than that a 
revolution should be predetermined by the type of government it overthrows.”52Arendt noted that 
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the American colonists had been living under a constitutional monarchy with limited 
representative government. Thus, their political history made the transition from limited 
government to democratic republic relatively easy. On the other hand, the French had lived under 
an absolute monarchy without representation; therefore, the transition from absolutism to 
democratic republic was quite problematic.53The rise of Napoleon and the failure of the 
revolution, then, were not surprising given French political history. 
 Arendt, along with her emphasis on the role of a natio ’s political history, spent much 
time analyzing ‘the social factor’ in revolutions. According to her, the American Revolution was 
fought against the political rule of Great Britain d did not involve any attempts to remake 
American society by instituting social and economic equality amongst the citizenry. Conversely, 
the French Revolution’s emphasis on equality meant that society would have to be entirely 
remodeled. This reconstruction of society would have to be brought about through the use of 
politics. The failure of the new French government to accomplish this – to solve the social 
problems in France, specifically, its inability to institute social and economic equality – caused 
the people to turn against the revolution, which resulted in the Republic resorting to state terror 
in order to maintain its control.54Thus, a comparison can be drawn between the goals of the 
communists in the Soviet Union and those of the French Revolutionaries of the 18th century. 
Both desired to remake society in the name of equality, nd both utilized an authoritarian, 
terroristic state to either achieve their goals or repress the emergence of counterrevolution when 
those goals were not realized. Arendt concluded, perhaps erroneously, that no revolution had 
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ever solved the ‘social question’ and “liberated men from the predicament of want”, and that all 
attempts to solve the social question through revolutionary means have led to terror.55 
   The knowledge Jeane gained about totalitarianism and revolution from both Neumann 
and Arendt constituted the core of what would be know  as the Kirkpatrick Doctrine. At the 
time, however, such readings only served to further arouse her interest in non-democratic 
governments and totalitarianism. Accordingly, under th  direction of Neumann, Jeane wrote her 
master’s thesis on Oswald Moseley’s British Union of Fascists. She was a hard worker, and by 
the time she finished her MA degree in 1951, she had already completed nearly all the 
coursework required for her PhD. She lacked only one seminar course and a dissertation. She 
had already begun working on her dissertation, an inquiry into the appeal of communism to the 
French middle classes, but was unable to continue with her studies when her father suddenly cut 
her off financially.56Welcher believed that his daughter had received more than enough 
education for a woman and was in danger of becoming a spinster. At this point, Jeane had two 
options: she could move back to Illinois with her pa ents or she could get a job. Not surprisingly, 
she opted for the latter. 
 Armed with letters of recommendation from her mentor, Jeane left New York for 
Washington, DC to interview for two positions in the State Department – one with Herbert 
Marcuse, another European émigré with whom she was familiar from her days in Columbia, and 
who would later be an intellectual godfather to the New Left, and one with a political science 
professor, Evron ‘Kirk’ Kirkpatrick. Both interviews went well, but Jeane, who found Marcuse 
to be a bit off-putting and pompous, chose to accept Kirkpatrick’s offer to become a research 
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analyst in the Office of Intelligence Research. Herfirst assignment was to edit and condense 
interviews of Russian citizens who had fled from the Soviet Union during World War II.57      
 The interviews Jeane read came from a variety of sources: some had been collected by 
the Nazis from Russians attempting to flee the Soviet Union during World War II, while others 
originated from Allied military personnel. No matter he source, each Soviet citizen’s description 
of life in communist Russia left Jeane horrified. The refugees talked about the series of purges, 
the show trials that were held, the millions who died from enforced famine in the Russian 
countryside, and the existence of the gulag, all of which served to keep the population in a 
constant state of terror. Jeane, of course, had heard or read about many of these things, but she 
had never been exposed to first-hand accounts of life under a communist system. Reading those 
interviews confirmed her sense that totalitarianism did nothing but create a hell on earth.58 
 Jeane worked for about a year at the Office of Intelligence Research before she won a 
fellowship to study at the Institute de Science Politique at the University of Paris in France. 
Some speculation surrounds her rather abrupt decision to move to France.  According to one 
account, Jeane had gotten bored with her work at the S ate Department and saw the French 
fellowship as a means to finish her dissertation and PhD.59However, her biographer and friend 
Peter Collier asserts that she had fallen in love with Evron Kirkpatrick, a much older man who 
was in the midst of ending his second marriage, a situ tion from which she wanted to 
flee.60Whatever the reasons behind her decision to leave, in September of 1952 Jeane boarded 
the Ile de France and set sail for Paris. 
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 When Jeane arrived in Paris, she settled into ReidHall, an international home for women. 
Despite the fact that it consistently had heat and hot water in a time when much of Paris was 
suffering from fuel shortages and a lack of utilities, the young American felt that if she stayed in 
Reid Hall she would not be able to immerse herself completely in French culture and society. 
Consequently, she rented a room in an apartment belonging to a French widow on the Rue de 
Lübeck. A routine soon developed: attending classes at the University of Paris, researching at the 
Bibliotèque Nationale, shopping in outdoor markets, ating at bistros, and drinking coffee in 
Parisian cafes.61 Various activities planned by the French government for the foreign fellows at 
the University of Paris provided some variety – Jeane went on excursions into the French 
countryside, met French politicians, and heard lectur s from French intellectuals including Jean-
Paul Sartre and Albert Camus, two men whose recent falli g out was the talk of the town. 
  The fracture of the friendship between Sartre and Camus had followed the 1951 
publication of Camus’ work The Rebel which Sartre’s Les Temps modernes had given a rather 
unfavorable review. Camus took the critique as a personal insult and responded with an angry 
letter to the paper in which he blasted Sartre’s political and philosophical points of view. This 
was followed by a series of insults and accusations between the two men, at the core of which, 
was their stance on communism. By 1951, Camus had come to the conclusion that ‘communism 
equals murder’ which caused him to reject Marxism-Leninism as a means for the reordering of 
society. Sartre, on the other hand, while not a member of the Communist Party, viewed the 
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communists as being on the side of history and the best means for bringing social and economic 
equality to France and the world.62   
   Between 1946 and 1948, both Camus and Sartre had calle  for a democratic and 
transformed Europe that would avoid war and pursue a path between communism and 
capitalism. By 1950, however, Sartre had decided that this was an unrealistic option, and, as he 
was committed to socialism and change, he accepted what he viewed to be the reality of the 
situation, that the best option for social change and progress in Europe was communism.63Sartre 
was attracted to Marxism’s stress on science and its eschatology, and was convinced that the 
communists were on the side of history and the working classes. Though Sartre was aware of the 
violence associated with the rise of communism, especially in the Soviet Union, he still regarded 
the Soviets as true proletarian leaders who would transform the world into a socialist paradise.64 
He excused proletarian violence as a justifiable means for countering violence brought about by 
the capitalists; after all, to make an omelet one must break some eggs. In Sartre’s mind, the 
violence and brutality of Russian communism confirmed how serious they were about creating a 
new society.65Camus disagreed. 
 In The Rebel, Camus sought to define the difference between a rebel and a revolutionary. 
According to him, a rebel continually struggled against a power that he viewed as oppressive 
while maintaining a respect for human life. The rebel was immersed in an ‘obscure protest’ 
involving neither systems nor reasons which was limited in scope and only a testimonial.66In 
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contrast, the revolutionary, through ‘nihilistic frustration’, sought to transform the world and 
strove to acquire the power to do so. Revolutionaries, in their zeal for total societal 
transformation, sought to do too much, which, in part, resulted in their resorting to killing in 
order to achieve their goals.67Camus deplored such acts of political violence where philosophical 
systems were utilized in order to justify murder. He described such acts as ‘crimes of logic’. In 
his mind, communism fit this model, a philosophy in which the initial impulse of the 
revolutionary for freedom and equality led to murder and totalitarianism.68To him, the creation 
of a communist world did not justify the liquidation f millions, therefore he rejected ‘Marxist 
realism’ and violence, maintaining that there were moral values which were independent of 
history. He insisted that communism was a flawed doctrine based on utopian dreams and the 
faulty belief that historical dialectics constituted the entire context of the human experience.69 
 According to Collier, Jeane considered herself very fo tunate to have arrived in Paris 
during the midst of the famous intellectual battle royale between Sartre and Camus over 
communism.70She, along with many other intellectuals, French and foreign, avidly followed their 
debate in Les Temps modernes, as it appeared to represent in microcosm the confli t between the 
Soviet Union and the West in the burgeoning Cold War. Jeane bought Camus’ work, The Rebel, 
which had inspired the debate between the two men, and read it in French. She attended a lecture 
sponsored by the University of Paris which featured Camus and was fascinated with what she 
called his ‘moral voice’. Jeane saw Camus several times in Paris and actually spoke with him on 
a few occasions. She also attended a Sartre lecture at a Parisian bookstore, and though she 
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remained impressed with his intellect, she was appalled by what she called his ‘intellectual 
delirium’ regarding the nature of communism in the Soviet Union.71  
Given Jeane’s educational background, it was not surpri ing that she supported Camus in 
his debate with Sartre. She was most impressed with “his suspicion of abstract theory and its 
friendship with totalitarianism; his elevation of the human dimension over the political one; his 
focus on the impact of ideas and the personal consequences of ideologies.”72As the Parisian elite 
increasingly supported Sartre and attacked Camus, Jeane felt as if she were watching “the 
intellectual equivalent of mob violence.”73Jeane furiously defended Camus to her French 
fellows, and in doing so, felt as if she were defending herself and her country. According to her 
biographer, the Camus-Sartre debate crystallized her view of the evils of totalitarianism and the 
righteousness of the United States’ role in the Cold War.74 
 During her ten months in Paris Jeane had perfected her French language skills, actively 
engaged with intellectuals and politicians from all over Europe, acquired a love for French 
cuisine, and finished the research for her dissertation. Only a couple of instances marred her 
otherwise heavenly time in France – the return of an illness that a French physician diagnosed as 
rheumatic fever, a condition which permanently weakened her heart, and the return of Evron 
Kirkpatrick into her life. Evron had written her lett rs throughout her stay in France, and Jeane 
considered remaining in France indefinitely in order to “outrun the moral issue Kirk 
represented.”75The issues surrounding her feelings for her former employer, however, could not 
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be avoided. Near the end of her fellowship, Evron arrived in Paris determined to woo Jeane. His 
efforts were successful and the two of them sailed home together as a couple to the United States 
in the fall of 1953. 
Life After Paris 
 Upon arriving back in Washington, Jeane felt it would be improper to return to work for 
Evron Kirkpatrick, so she got a job working for the Economic Cooperation Association. There 
she aided in the writing and publication of a book detailing the successes of the Marshall Plan. 
Jeane wrote several chapters of the book which dealt with the political aspects of the massive aid 
scheme, but when the book, The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning, was finally published, she was 
given no credit. Angry, Jeane blamed this omission on “prejudice against women.”76This 
experience made her determined to get back to work on her dissertation and finish her doctoral 
degree. Unfortunately, her mentor, Franz Neumann, was killed in a car accident in 1954 while on 
a vacation in the Swiss Alps. Neumann’s death took its toll on Jeane both personally and 
academically, for in addition to grieving for the loss of her mentor and friend, Jeane was 
informed by Columbia University that no other member of the political science department was 
qualified to guide her dissertation. As none of the faculty members were well-versed in French 
intellectual and political theory, she would have to change her dissertation topic and start her 
research anew. Momentarily overwhelmed, she decided to postpone her doctoral work and look 
for another job. 
 Jeane soon got a job at the Human Resources Research Organization at George 
Washington University transcribing interviews with communist Chinese soldiers who had been 
taken as prisoners of war in Korea and subsequently refused repatriation. The project, known as 
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“Project Tick”, was underwritten by the Defense Department and run by University of Chicago 
psychologists and sociologists as part of an effort to understand what was going on behind the 
bamboo curtain.77The interviews reminded Jeane of the Nazi files that Neumann had allowed her 
to read at Columbia along with the testimonials of S viet citizens that she had read while 
working at the Office of Intelligence Research. Thus, for the third time in a few short years, 
Jeane was again exposed to the impact that totalitari nism had on individual citizens. 
 The psychological aspects of totalitarianism – the methods used to break down 
individuals in order to create politically compliant zombies – she found quite intriguing. “It was 
perversely fascinating,” she wrote, “to watch through these interviews as a version of the New 
Man was created by the slow drumbeat of daily psychological violence.”78 Jeane read about 
doctors who were told they could no longer practice medicine, engineers who were forced to 
build bridges that they knew would collapse, and families who were forcibly separated and 
commanded to denounce each other. All of this she viewed as ‘systematic violations of the 
human being’. “I became convinced,” Jeane noted, “that a diabolical vision of the public good is 
the greatest horror and the source of the greatest evil in modern times.”79 
 When she was not engrossed in researching the real-life Orwellian nightmare that was 
communism, Jeane continued to date Evron and in 1954 he proposed.  Jeane was then forced to 
inform her parents of her decision to get married. The Jordans were somewhat uneasy about the 
match at first; after all, Evron was sixteen years older than Jeane, with three children, two of 
which were still living, from two previous marriages. However, Jeane’s parents had long wanted 
her to get married and settle into domestic life so Welcher informed his daughter that he would 
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rather her be married to a man paying alimony and chil  support than be a spinster.80He, Leona, 
and Jeane’s brother, Jerry, came to Washington over Christmas of 1954 and gave their blessing 
to the marriage. On February 22, 1955, Jeane and Evron were married in her parents’ living 
room in Mount Vernon, Illinois. The next day they left Illinois for their honeymoon which they 
spent at the annual convention of the American Politica  Science Association at Northwestern 
University.81 
 In his biography of Jeane, Collier describes Evron as “the Pygmalion who would 
intellectually sculpt” Jeane in a way that brought her fully to life.82And, in fact, many of her 
friends noted that Evron always pushed her hard to achieve academically, and as he got older, he 
increasingly urged her specifically to embrace the rol of public intellectual. As her husband, the 
father of her children, and her intellectual companion Kirkpatrick’s support and influence on 
Jeane became central to her life. 
Evron Maurice Kirkpatrick, known to his friends and family as ‘Kirk’, had been born in 
1912 in Indiana. His parents divorced when he was four years old and Evron lived with his 
mother.  Shortly thereafter, his mother married a divorced man who had a daughter named Doris. 
Though his mother was uneducated, she saw education as a means for her son to get ahead, so 
she saved money to buy her son books and encouraged him to excel in school. At the age of 
sixteen, Evron graduated high school and left home to attend college at the University of Illinois 
at Champaign. Within four years, he had finished both his Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in 
political science. In 1932, he accepted a scholarship to Yale where he received his doctoral 
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degree after two years.83While at Yale, Evron was recruited by the political science department 
at the University of Minnesota. 
 In between finishing his master’s degree at the University of Illinois and starting his 
doctoral studies at Yale, Evron was forced into marriage. His mother and step-father accused him 
of impregnating his step-sister, Doris, and a shotgun wedding was performed. Though Doris was 
not pregnant at the time of their wedding, she and ‘Kirk’ had two children together after they 
moved to Minnesota – a son named Thomas and a daughter named Mary.84Their marriage had 
problems, specifically his infidelity and her lack of education, and in 1949 they divorced. In 
1950, Evron met Evelyn Petersen, a journalist who later became the first female editor of 
National Geographic, and the daughter of a former Minnesota governor. The political science 
professor found her to be both physically and intellectually attractive and Evelyn soon became 
pregnant. The couple married in 1951. Shortly after th ir marriage, Evelyn gave birth to a 
daughter – Anna. Meanwhile, tragedy struck as Evron’s son from his first marriage, Thomas, 
died in a car accident at the age of 16. By the tim of Anna’s birth and Thomas’ death, Evron and 
Evelyn’s marriage was already on the rocks and divorce proceedings soon followed.85It was 
during this time that Evron Kirkpatrick and Jeane Jordan first met. 
 Though Jeane met Kirkpatrick when his personal life was in disarray, his professional life 
was flourishing. During his time in Minnesota, Evron – a New Dealer and loyal member of the 
Democratic Party – founded and headed Minnesota’s first chapter of the American Federation of 
Teachers. He had also published a book entitled The People, Politics, and the Politician with 
other big names in his field including V.O. Key, Stuart Chase, Harold Laski, and Charles Beard. 
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In the 1940s, Kirkpatrick, a fervent anti-communist, worked to rid the Minnesota Farmer Labor 
Party from communist influence in order to unite it w h the Democratic Party in the state. In 
addition to his teaching, writing, and political activities, he mentored the politician and future 
Vice President of the United States – Hubert Humphrey. Evron helped his mentee to get a job at 
LSU, supported his efforts to become mayor of Minneapolis, and later backed Humphrey’s 
senatorial and presidential candidacies. Kirkpatrick and Humphrey became life-long friends, and 
along with Eugene McCarthy (future Senator) and Orville Freeman (future governor of 
Minnesota) they formed a tight-knit social circle known as the ‘Minnesota Mafia’.86  
 For several years, Evron’s life revolved around his teaching and political activities in 
Minnesota. This all changed, however, with U.S. entry into World War II. Following the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he attempted to join the military, but due to a hearing 
impairment, he was turned down. Subsequently, he volunteered to serve in the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS) as a specialist in politics and political systems. During his time at the 
OSS, he became friends with the organization’s head, William Donovan.87When the war ended, 
Evron moved back to Minnesota, but by this time, public service was in his blood. Consequently, 
he wrote a memorandum proposing that the government continue to maintain contacts with 
academics whose work might be useful to the governmnt in restructuring the postwar world. 
Several months later the professor received a call from the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, 
requesting that he return to Washington and work for the State Department. In 1947, Evron 
moved back to Washington and became the deputy director of the Office of Intelligence 
Research, later known as the Office of Research and Intelligence. From this position, and later 
from his position as director of the Office of External Research, Kirkpatrick forged ties between 
                                                           




leading intellectuals and the State Department, while coordinating the intelligence community’s 
uses of scholars and research institutions such as RAND – a research and development 
organization that started as a research project under the U.S. Air Force.88 
 Shortly after Jeane and Evron’s marriage, he published a book entitled Target: The 
World: Communist Propaganda Activities in 1955.89 The following year he edited its sequel, 
Year of Crisis. Both of these works were intended to alert the American population to the 
supposed propaganda advantage enjoyed by the Soviet Union during the early years of the Cold 
War. The books discussed the organization and direction of the Communist Party in the Soviet 
Union, the various propaganda themes utilized by the party, communist-dominated international 
front groups, and propaganda activities in several areas of the world. Though the books were 
associated with the United States Information Agency and published by a private company, the 
information in them came from the Office of Research and Intelligence which was associated 
with the Central Intelligence Agency.90  
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 Evron Kirkpatrick began his book by describing communism as the official ideology of a 
movement totalitarian in nature, international in its scope, and global in its aspirations. He 
asserted that unlike traditional dictators, communist leaders have not been content with 
launching political revolutions and achieving power. Instead, the communists sought to impose a 
cultural revolution from above.91Due to the communists’ emphasis on cultural revoluti n, he 
warned, Americans must pay more attention to the ever mounting communist cultural offensive, 
i.e. propaganda, of the Soviet Union. According to him, the United States had been forced into a 
propaganda battle, a battle that the free world must win due to goal of global domination by the 
communists92. 
 Like a number of liberal intellectuals of the time, Evron Kirkpatrick likened communism 
to fascism, and labeled them both as totalitarian systems. Similar to the Nazis, the Soviets seized 
monopoly control over the mass media and communications networks, demanded conformity to 
an official ideology that dominated all aspects of life, monopolized political power, and 
organized an oppressive secret police which operated through terror. Both totalitarian regimes 
exterminated or incarcerated all political opponents, a tempted through military or political 
campaigns to subvert or capture the governments of neighboring countries, and used propaganda 
to help them achieve their goals of global domination.93The last characteristic of the communist 
totalitarian system described by Kirkpatrick – the use of propaganda in order to facilitate world 
domination – constituted the primary theme of the book. 
 According to Kirkpatrick, the communists used propaganda to hide from the world their 
ultimate goal of domination. When they joined “United Front” parties or organizations, it was 
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only to lend to themselves legitimacy in the eyes of the world. Furthermore, the communists saw 
joining with other political parties as only a temporary necessity, a means to gain some of their 
goals immediately, while waiting to consolidate total control later on.94The political scientist 
maintained that their goals were to divide and conquer, to cause confusion among allies in the 
West, and to use colonialism, a salient issue in the 1950s, to make the Western nations, along 
with their political and economic systems, appear unappealing to the Third World.95All of this, 
he claimed, was evident in their propaganda. For example, Kirkpatrick asserted that the Soviet 
adoption of a ‘soft line’ approach in 1955, their embracing of the ‘Spirit of Geneva’ where the 
Soviet Union touted itself as the promoter of world peace, was merely a propaganda tactic 
designed to make the Soviets appear conciliatory.96Moreover, he believed that Soviet opposition 
to the proliferation of nuclear weapons was nothing more than a ploy to distract the West from 
the Soviet nuclear build-up.97Finally, the offering of economic aid to developing ations by the 
Soviets, accompanied by with anti-colonial propaganda, was merely a means of ensuring the 
economic dependence of the Third World on the Soviet Union and the communist bloc, a 
dependence that would eventually facilitate a communist take-over of those states.98 In short, 
Kirkpatrick firmly believed that the Soviet Union ad all communists were extremely 
duplicitous, thoroughly untrustworthy, and bent on world domination. 
 At the time that Target: The World was published, Evron and Jeane were settling into 
married life. Following their honeymoon, the Kirkpatricks moved into a house in the 
Georgetown area of Washington, DC where Jeane continued working for George Washington 
                                                           
94 Ibid, 6-7. 
95 Ibid, 11. 
96 Ibid, 43. 
97 Ibid, 313-318. 
98 Ibid, 210. 
38 
 
University while Evron took on the Executive Directorship of the American Political Science 
Association. Outside of their work, the Kirkpatricks were at the center of a busy social network 
that included members of the Minnesota Mafia, such as Hubert Humphrey and Eugene 
McCarthy, and others of a similar political and academic pedigree. Members of the Kirkpatrick’s 
social circle in the 1950s and 1960s were committed Col  Warriors and over the years several 
transitioned into neoconservatism. 
One such person was Ernest Lefever, the husband of Margaret Briggs, an old college 
friend of Jeane’s from her days at Stephens. Lefever was a professor, a minister, and the founder 
of the Ethics and Public Policy Center.99 In 1957, he published his first major work, Ethics and 
United States Foreign Policy. This was followed over the years by several books that covered a 
wide range of topics, including United Nations policy n the Congo, arms control, violence and 
revolution, and the impact of television on national defense. These works were supported by the 
Ethics and Public Policy Center, the Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research, and the 
Brookings Institution. 
Max Kampelman was another member of the Kirkpatrick’s social circle. Kampelman met 
Hubert Humphrey and Evron Kirkpatrick at the University of Minnesota during World War II. A 
pacifist at the time, he went to the University in order to take part in a ‘starvation project’ that 
studied the effects of malnutrition in order to trea  American prisoners of war upon their release 
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from Japanese camps.100  While in Minnesota, Kampelman, already an established attorney, 
decided to get a PhD in political science. In later y ars, he worked for Hubert Humphrey while 
he was in the Senate, turned his back on pacifism, at least when it came to the totalitarian menace 
of communism, and was recruited by Ronald Reagan to head delegations to both the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1981-1983) and the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space 
Arms in Geneva (1985-1989).101  
Other members of the group included Howard Penniman, Willmoore Kendall, Sidney 
Hook, Freda Utley, and Hede Massing. Penniman was a political science professor, associated 
with the American Enterprise Institute, who published numerous studies on elections and 
electoral politics in nations around the world. Willmoore Kendall was a political science 
professor who had worked for the OSS, the CIA, and in the Office of Research and 
Intelligence.102 Kendall, a former communist, became a mentor to William F. Buckley, Jr. during 
his years at Yale and was the only ‘conservative’ mmber of the Kirkpatrick circle. Sidney 
Hook, also a former communist, was a professor of philosophy at New York University who 
became a well-known public intellectual, publishing numerous books, articles, and editorials 
until his death in 1989.  
Freda Utley was introduced to the Kirkpatricks through Hook. Utley was a well-educated 
British woman who had joined the communist party in the late 1920s. She married a Russian 
communist, and the two of them lived in the Soviet Union from 1930 until his arrest and 
subsequent imprisonment in the gulag in 1936. Utley fled from the Soviet Union after her 
husband’s disappearance, going first to Great Britain then to the U.S. The former communist 
                                                           






published several works on Japan, China, and the Soviet Union and became an outspoken 
opponent of communism and the Soviet Union.103Hede Massing, the former Austrian actress- 
turned-communist spy who testified against Alger Hiss, was introduced into the Kirkpatricks’ 
circle by Hook. 
The members of the Kirkpatricks’ social circle kept Jeane intellectually stimulated and 
politically active; however, she soon had to divert her attention to more pressing, domestic 
concerns. Shortly after her marriage, Jeane became pregnant and on July 17, 1956, she gave birth 
to her first son – Douglas. Jeane had planned on returning to work shortly after the baby’s 
arrival, but she soon changed her mind. “I think any woman who voluntarily deals herself out of 
motherhood,” she said, “is making a terrible mistake.”104 Despite such sentiments, Jeane also 
believed that women should not give up their careers ntirely, noting “If a woman declines to 
develop her intellectual, aesthetic or professional skil s, she also is dealing herself out of major 
life experiences. Why should anybody voluntarily truncate her life in such a fashion? My motto 
is ‘refuse to choose’.”105 During the next several years Jeane was both a full-time mother, giving 
birth to two additional children, sons John and Stuart, and a part-time academic, taking on 
freelance work as a research associate at Amherst College.106 Her research at Amherst revolved 
around communism in the government and was supported by a private party, the Fund for the 
Republic, an organization sponsored by the Ford Foundation.107 
Following the birth of their third son, the Kirkpatrick family bought a home in Bethesda, 
Maryland where Jeane continued to pick up freelance res arch work. In between raising her 
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children, doing housework, and researching, Jeane still managed to remain active in political 
affairs. In 1960, she and her husband campaigned for Hubert Humphrey in his run for the 1960 
Democratic Presidential nomination. Early in the primary season, Evron encouraged his wife to 
write a pro-Humphrey article about the Wisconsin primary. The article, published in the New 
Republic on April 15, 1960, pointed out that northern, urban African Americans, a strong voting 
bloc for the Democrats, tended to favor Humphrey over John F. Kennedy. Much to the 
Kirkpatricks’ chagrin, Kennedy’s popularity within the party increased throughout the primary 
season, and Humphrey was forced to drop out of the rac . Nonetheless, the Kirkpatricks attended 
the Democratic National Convention that year in LosAngeles, California where they hoped 
rumors that Minnesota governor, Orville Freeman, might receive the Vice Presidential 
nomination would prove to be true. The Kirkpatricks were with Freeman when Robert Kennedy 
informed the governor that the vice presidential nomination had gone to Lyndon Johnson.108 
Though the Kirkpatricks voted for Kennedy in 1960, neither of them demonstrated much 
love or admiration for the Kennedy Administration.  Their lack of enthusiasm arose from their 
disappointment in Humphrey’s and Freeman’s losses in the nomination process, and from 
Evron’s suspicion of the ‘New Frontier’ and Kennedy’s foreign policies, specifically his failure 
to keep communism out of Cuba. Both Jeane and Evron blamed the Cuban missile crisis in 
October of 1962 on Kennedy’s lack of leadership.109 Like many other Americans, Jeane stayed 
glued to the television throughout the crisis which she described as “the most dangerous time, the 
closest to war that we’ve come in the post-World War II period.”110 The family even considered 
building a fallout shelter in their backyard. 
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Shortly before the Cuban missile crisis, Jeane began working out of her home. With her 
youngest child finally in nursery school, she gave up freelance work and accepted a part-time 
position as an assistant professor of political scien e at Trinity College. Trinity was a small, 
women’s, Catholic college located outside of Washingto , DC where Jeane began teaching four 
days a week. In addition to her teaching duties, Jeane received an offer to assemble and edit 
various essays by leading political scientists of the day on communist tactics around the world. 
The book, Strategies of Deception: A Study in World-Wide Communist Tactics, was published in 
1963 and contained essays on communist tactics and trategies in China, India, Africa, Spain, 
France, Latin America, the United Nations. It included an essay, authored by the Kirkpatricks’ 
friend, Max Kampelman, about the communist activities in the CIO. Jeane’s introduction to the 
book constitutes the culmination of her education in the evils of totalitarianism and represents an 
early articulation of what would later be known as the Kirkpatrick Doctrine. 
In The Strategies of Deception, Jeane began by asserting that communists were not swept 
into power by the tides of historical inevitability, but rather through political contests that they 
corrupted. Except where they come to power through military occupation, the success of the 
communist party depended on the skills utilized by their leaders in order to exploit political 
opportunities. Therefore, the world was not dealing with an “amorphous historical force”, but 
with the activities of ruthless men in specific situations.111 To further buttress this argument, 
Kirkpatrick pointed out that Marxist theory had actually been disproven by history, for in 
capitalist nations, the working classes had not been k pt at a subsistence level as Marx had 
predicted. Instead of becoming more miserable and desperate, the working classes of highly 
industrialized nations enjoyed a level of prosperity “unprecedented in history” and unequaled in 
                                                           




any communist state.112Moreover, the governments of industrialized states had not become 
instruments of “fascist repression”, but had instead used regulation to eliminate the worst abuses 
of the capitalist system.113  
In addition to her critique of Marxist ideology, Kirkpatrick noted that modern 
communists had moved far away from Marxist theory. According to her, this began during the 
Russian Revolution when Lenin “emancipated communists from the encumbrance of Marx’s 
error”, by moving the party away from economic determinism and towards political 
volunteerism.114This occurred when Lenin declared that Russia could bypass the capitalist stage 
of economic development. Such a claim flew in the face of Marxist doctrine and was, according 
to Kirkpatrick, the first time that a communist leader advocated the use of state power to 
circumvent or transcend the laws of history. “Marx had suggested the communists could assist 
history,” she wrote, “Lenin proposed they outwit it.”115 The elimination of Marxist economic 
development theories from communist doctrine resultd in two consequences. First, if a capitalist 
stage of development was no longer required to bring about communism, then underdeveloped 
and colonial areas now appeared ripe for communist expansion. Second, the notion that 
communism could be brought about through the use of tate power ensured that the goal of the 
communist party would be to capture state power eveywhere.116 
The presence or absence of the proletariat now meant nothing: it was the communists 
versus the non-communists. “In the name of tactical flexibility ‘socialism’ is imposed on pre-
feudal societies; Communist parties serve as ‘vangurd of the proletariat’ in nations with no 
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proletariat, no capitalists, no industry,” Kirkpatrick observed, “military conquest, subversion, and 
coups d’état are substituted for proletarian revoluti ns; tiny elites of intellectual freebooters are 
substituted for the working masses.”117Thus, classical Marxism was absent from modern 
communism, and merely invoked to surround the communists with an aura of intellectual and 
historical validity. Moreover, Kirkpatrick contende that through its faith in the inevitable 
triumph of the movement, classical Marxism provided communists with moral justification; it 
freed the communist elite of moral inhibitions in their quest for power, justified their unceasing 
hostility towards all persons and organizations outside the movement, and sanctioned aggression 
as moral and inevitable.118 
Kirkpatrick claimed that this absolute split between theory and practice made the 
communists merely another group of elites competing for political power, an idea that has 
proven to be difficult for many to comprehend. However, she asserted that Americans must 
understand that the Marxist theory of historical development had become irrelevant to the 
communist movement. The communists had no economic base, no specific relationship with any 
class, but instead concentrated their efforts on whichever groups were the most alienated from 
the traditional power structure. Americans often failed to recognize these facts, Kirkpatrick 
argued, because the communists continued to utilize the language of Marx; for instance, when 
they labelled tribal conflicts as struggles against the bourgeoisie. 
“The notion that the communists are somehow engaged in the struggle between rich and 
poor,” she wrote, “haves and have nots, workers and employers, oppressed and oppressors leads 
to the consistent notion that communism is somehow m re democratic and progressive than its 
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undemocratic rivals.”119 According to Kirkpatrick, in all nations ruled by communists, the 
Marxists had never been elected to head the government or been swept into power by a mass 
revolt. Whenever they did receive large support from the masses, such as support from peasants, 
it was because they promised land reform, a promise they subsequently failed to deliver. 
Communists gained power by conducting guerilla warfare and terrorism against governments 
and opponents, or through military occupation. Such means to power did not suggest democracy 
or progress to Jeane.120 
Following her critiques of Marxist theory and modern communism’s abandonment of it, 
Kirkpatrick drew from her studies of totalitarianism and outlined distinctive differences between 
communism and other non-democratic regimes. One of the primary differences between the 
communists and traditional authoritarians was how they utilized power. According to 
Kirkpatrick, authoritarians were interested in maint ing the traditional social structure and 
culture. She used General Francisco Franco, a fascist, as an example, noting that he had not 
attempted to undermine the Catholic Church or despoil the large landowners. Furthermore, 
Franco and military dictators in Latin America had not attempted to alter the cultural, social, or 
economic status quo. Kirkpatrick claimed that maintaining a culture required less repression than 
the effort to radically alter it, and that though the traditional social structure found in 
authoritarian regimes may have produced hardships and poverty, its norms were internalized. 
Furthermore, traditional oligarchs and autocrats could rely on tradition to keep the masses of 
people under control, and for this reason they typically utilized coercion only to protect their own 
political power.121 Conversely, communists were more repressive than traditional dictatorships 
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because they want to restructure society, culture, and personality. This caused them to try to 
control a wide range of activities normally governed by custom and personal preference, which 
in turn, required more police, more surveillance, and more terror.122 
Conclusions 
 Jeane Kirkpatrick’s childhood, education, work, and early married life constituted 
formative life experiences that worked together to mold her into the public intellectual she would 
become in the ensuing decades. From the time of her early childhood, Jeane demonstrated that 
she was an intelligent, inquisitive, determined individual who resisted both familial and societal 
pressures to conform to stereotypical gender roles, and who chose, instead, to pursue her own 
dreams. Her independent and adaptive nature, along with her natural intelligence, allowed her to 
turn her back on traditional ideas of femininity and to embrace her own unique character. Note 
her tomboyish play as a child, her decision to ignore the finishing school aspects of Stephens 
College, her determination to go to graduate school, her decision to work, to go to Paris, and to 
marry and bear children on her own terms. This strength of will remained with Jeane throughout 
her life, enabling her to meet the challenges and pitfalls of life as a public intellectual, United 
Nations Ambassador, and American policy-maker. 
 In addition to molding her autonomous nature, the early years of Kirkpatrick’s life shaped 
her political views. Her family’s deep roots within the Democratic Party, their support for New 
Deal programs, and Jeane’s own beliefs concerning race, gender, and the Cold War caused her to 
remain a member of the party long after she became disillusioned with its platform. As late as 
1984, when Kirkpatrick, already a noted ‘neoconservative’, gave a speech in support of Reagan 
at the Republican National Convention, she was still a registered member of the Democratic 




Party.  “One’s party is a part of oneself”123, she declared, and her decision to leave the 
Democratic Party in 1985 weighed heavily upon her for the rest of her life.124 
 Not only was Kirkpatrick’s political affiliation fashioned by her early life, but her views 
on the nature of democracy itself were formed by her experiences growing up in Duncan, 
Oklahoma. Though probably romanticized, it was her vision of Duncan – a frontier town with a 
fluid, open society, where democracy, egalitarianism, and libertarianism prevailed – that 
Kirkpatrick referenced as the prime example of the nature of, and conditions necessary for, 
democracy. In later years, whether she was critiquing the changes brought to American 
democracy by the rise of the New Left, or evaluating political systems, revolutions, and regime 
changes abroad, Kirkpatrick used her hometown as a model for how democratic societies should 
function.  
 A belief in the righteousness of democratic political systems was reinforced by her in-
depth study of totalitarianism. Franz Neumann and Hannah Arendt both offered her a 
fundamental understanding of how totalitarian regimes came to power and how they functioned. 
Neumann’s analysis of the fall of the Weimar Republic, blaming it on political extremists on 
both the right and the left, provided Kirkpatrick with ammunition against the New Left whom 
she viewed as political extremists, determined to destroy the American democratic experiment in 
order to completely restructure American society and culture. Based on what she learned from 
Neumann and Arendt about political groups that sought to remake society and culture, 
Kirkpatrick later concluded that the New Left was ‘totalitarian’ in its nature. 
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 Kirkpatrick utilized other lessons that she had learn d from Arendt; for example, it was 
Arendt who first made distinctions between authoritarian and totalitarian governments, 
distinctions that Kirkpatrick would expound upon and utilize over time. Furthermore, Arendt’s 
analyses of revolutions and the ‘social question’ influenced Kirkpatrick’s views of revolutions 
abroad. Kirkpatrick believed that it was impossible to create democracy anywhere at any time, 
and often relied upon the history of a nation to determine whether a revolution in pursuit of 
democracy could be successful. Moreover, like Arendt, she believed that any attempt by 
revolutionaries to institute social and economic equality, i.e. to do more than incrementally 
change the political system, would result in totalitarianism and state terror. Finally, Kirkpatrick 
spoke often as a public intellectual about the hazards of utopian political ideologies, dangers she 
learned about from both Arendt and Camus.  
 Kirkpatrick’s education in the evils of totalitarinism was buttressed by her exposure to 
firsthand accounts of life in NAZI Germany, the Soviet Union, and communist China. 
Neumann’s Holocaust files, interviews with Russians who had fled from the Soviet Union during 
World War II, and interviews with Chinese communists who refused repatriation following the 
Korean War painted a dystopian picture of the lives of those unfortunate individuals forced to 
live under totalitarian rule. Kirkpatrick never forgot these stories; nor did she forget any of the 
horror stories that she heard from Neumann, Arendt, Freda Utley, and other persons she met 
throughout her lifetime who had fled from the totalitarian menace. Rather she utilized these 
firsthand accounts in her frequent denunciations of communism. 
 Kirkpatrick’s critiques of totalitarianism and American domestic and foreign policies 
were also influenced by her husband.  Evron provided her with a new social circle, composed of 
intellectuals, political scientists, government officials, politicians, and professors; all committed 
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Cold Warriors whose interests overlapped with those of the Kirkpatricks’. In addition, Evron 
encouraged his wife to remain intellectually and politically engaged. Moreover, his own research 
and work could not help but to influence Jeane’s intellectual evolution. Already a fervent anti-
communist prior to World War II, Evron’s research into the global propaganda techniques of the 
communists in the 1950s further cemented the Kirkpat icks’ belief in the dangerous, power-
hungry, duplicitous, and untrustworthy nature of the Soviet Union. 
 Thus, by 1963, with the publication of The Strategies of Deception, Jeane Kirkpatrick’s   
view of totalitarianism and the American role in the Cold War had been crystallized. Her 
critiques of communism and defense of traditional authoritarian regimes in the book were based 
upon all that she had learned over the years about the nature of totalitarianism from Neumann, 
Arendt, Camus, her work, and her husband, and constituted the core of what would later be 
known as the Kirkpatrick Doctrine. Over the next two decades, Kirkpatrick continued to 
expound upon her critiques and defenses of non-democratic governments, which, along with her 
criticisms of the leftward drift of the Democratic Party and her condemnation of the foreign 












 Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, Jeane Kirkpatrick’s professional life thrived. She 
completed her doctoral degree in Political Science at Columbia University, gained tenure at 
Georgetown University, and published three books - Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society: A 
Study of Peronist Argentina, Political Woman, d The New Presidential Elite. In Leader and 
Vanguard in Mass Society, Kirkpatrick continued to build upon her defense of authoritarian 
regimes, as compared to totalitarian ones, through a study of Argentine politics in the 1950s and 
1960s. The book not only served to reinforce the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, it also helped her to 
establish a reputation as a Latin American politica expert in the 1970s and 1980s. Unlike her 
work on Peronist Argentina, Political Woman and The New Presidential Elite were devoted to 
the analysis of domestic politics, namely the role of women in American politics and the rise of 
the New Left within the Democratic Party. Published in the mid-1970s, these works were 
inspired by the rapidly changing nature of American society and politics brought about via a 
rising tide of protest by women, the youth, African Americans, and anti-war advocates. Though 
providing astute assessments of female politicians and the political characteristics of delegates to 
the national conventions, the books also provided insight into Kirkpatrick’s critiques of the New 
Left. Her opposition to both the methods and goals f the New Left caused her to become 
increasingly alienated from the Democratic Party, which, in turn, pushed her further to the right 
on the political spectrum. 
 A Lousy Decade 
 The tumultuous nature of American society during the 1960s prompted the Kirkpatricks 
to label the decade as ‘lousy’.125Despite their overall unfavorable opinion of the period, the 
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couple’s careers, political activism, and family life flourished. Jeane Kirkpatrick began to gain 
renown both with the general public and in academic circles when her first book, The Strategies 
of Deception, was featured as a national Book of the Month Club. She continued to teach part-
time at Trinity College while her husband maintained his position as the Director of the 
American Political Science Association.126 In addition to their scholarly pursuits, the 
Kirkpatricks remained active in politics, specifically, party politics, and together they attended 
the 1964 Democratic National Convention. The couple was thrilled that their friend Hubert 
Humphrey was chosen to be Lyndon Johnson’s running mate, and they spent the majority of 
their time at the convention working on Humphrey’s speeches. Throughout the campaign, the 
couple continued to write speeches for the future Vice President, and Jeane analyzed polling 
data.127  
 Before the campaign, Evron had begun pressuring his wife to finish her PhD, telling her 
that in order to accomplish her goals she needed to complete her doctoral degree. By this time, 
Jeane had more free time as all three of the Kirkpat icks’ sons were enrolled in the Sidwell 
Friends School, a prestigious private institution, run by Quakers. Kirkpatrick was committed to 
finishing her doctorate, but was at a loss as to what her dissertation topic should be. Due to her 
interest in non-democratic forms of government, both she and Evron decided that Peronism in 
Argentina would be an ideal topic. Thus, Kirkpatrick made arrangements to be re-admitted into 
the Political Science doctoral program at Columbia, w s assigned a new dissertation advisor, and 
began to seek funding for her research. She first applied to the American Association of 
University Women; however, her application was rejected and a representative from the AAUW 
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informed Jeane that her children were too young for her to go back to school.128Though stung by 
this rejection, Kirkpatrick persevered and was finally ble to secure funding for her research 
through the Andreas Foundation, an organization run by Hubert Humphrey’s friend and 
campaign contributor, Dwayne Andreas.129 
 Having obtained the necessary funding, Kirkpatrick began working on her dissertation. 
As a political scientist, her research was based on interviewing and collecting data from a 
‘representative’ sample of the Argentine population between October and December of 1965. 
The majority of the fieldwork, though, was carried out by the International Research Associates 
who completed interviews with a total of 2,014 persons.  As the data was being collected, 
Kirkpatrick focused on researching the history of Latin American politics, and in particular, the 
phenomenon of Peronism. In 1968, she completed her octoral work and was awarded a PhD in 
Political Science from Columbia University130. Kirkpatrick’s dissertation was later published as a 
book entitled Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society: A Study of Peronist Argentina.131 
 Contemporary reviews of the book were mixed. In The Journal of Politics, Kenneth 
Coleman praised her analysis of Peronism as a continuation of “politics as usual”, rather than a 
“distinct political subculture”, a “radical mass movement”, an illustration of “left-fascism”, or an 
example of “working class authoritarianism”.132 Whereas Coleman commended Kirkpatrick’s 
conclusions on the nature of Peronism, other reviews were more critical. In the Political Science 
Quarterly, Eldon Kenworthy accused Kirkpatrick of failing to produce a fresh perspective on 
Peronism and adhering too often to conventional wisdom by presenting Perón’s supporters as 
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“alienated” and “psychologically predisposed to authoritarian leadership”. 133 Kenworthy 
bemoaned the fact that Kirkpatrick could not clear her mind of “working-class authoritarianism” 
and “Latin-Mediterranean” political styles which would have allowed her to project “herself 
freshly and emphatically into the lives of those whose opinions she tabulated.”134 He went on to 
criticize Kirkpatrick for hiring a polling organization to do her work, and for not spending time 
in Argentina talking to Peronists as real people instead of “isolated responses to a 
questionnaire.”135 Though acknowledging that the data in the book was useful, Kenworthy 
concluded that Kirkpatrick’s work “exemplifies that style of research from afar… that makes 
other people’s politics look far simpler than one’s own. Is not ‘condescension’ the word we 
generally apply to such behavior?”136  
 Reviews of the book in the journals International Affairs and the Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs were also uncomplimentary. J. A. Camacho criticized 
the book for being misleading, as its subtitle, A Study of Peronist Argentina, promised a study of 
the years Perón was in power, yet the bulk of the work was focused on the mid-1960s.137 In 
addition, Camacho asserted that the book failed to shed new light on the nature of Peronism, 
noting “it did not take a poll to discover that the bulk of the support for Peronismo comes from 
the working and lower middle classes”, and “a poll is hardly necessary to discover that the bulk 
of the population of Argentina is Catholic”. “Kirkpatrick’s conclusions,” he declared, “expressed 
in a manner so elaborate as to be almost obscure, are no different from those of other competent 
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observers.”138 Alberto Ciria claimed that the book did not provide a satisfactory analysis of the 
nature of Peronsim in 1965, due in part to the fact tha  the questionnaire utilized in the survey 
“reads like a superficial adaptation of North American ‘political culture’ values with obvious 
concessions to Argentine idiosyncratic features.”139 
Though apt, contemporary critiques of Kirkpatrick’s work were written before she 
became a member of the National Security Council and the United Nations Ambassador. 
Naturally, they could not examine how the book correlated either to her foreign policy views or 
the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, nor could they assess how her education in totalitarianism may have 
affected her views on the nature of authoritarian regimes in general and Peronism in particular.  
    Kirkpatrick noted in her introduction that her interest in Peronism grew out of her 
interest in non-democratic regimes, an interest that was stimulated by her tutelage under Franz 
Neumann. She claimed that traditional autocracies, political systems that tended to be neither 
democratic nor totalitarian, had been neglected by political scientists, and that despite their 
“antiquity and ubiquity”, autocratic governments were often viewed as “transitional” systems, 
political incidents on the way to becoming democrati  regimes.140 According to Kirkpatrick, 
Latin America contained a wide array of non-democrati  systems ranging from military 
dictatorships, traditional autocracies, left and right-wing movements and regimes, to 
dictatorships that had incorporated some democratic pra tices.  Peronism in Argentina, a nation 
with wealth, a large European population, high literacy rates, an industrialized economy, and a 
Latin political tradition that mixed autocratic and democratic elements, proved especially 
interesting to her as it provided another variant of autocracy. She compared Peronsim to a 
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contemporary Caesarist movement in a technologically advanced society, with Perón as a non-
revolutionary military leader supported by a mass ba e, and went on to assert that such systems 
would become more common in Latin America as technological advances were made in societies 
with autocratic systems.141  
 In her analysis of the history of the Argentine and Latin American political systems, 
Kirkpatrick noted that such systems had a long history of regime instability, oligarchy, 
democratic interludes, military coups, direct action, personalismo, and institutionalized violence. 
Argentina itself had a very limited experience with democracy, having enjoyed only twenty years 
of it since its independence in 1810. Electoral reforms were implemented within Argentina in 
1911 and 1912 that provided for a secret ballot and suffrage rights for all adult males. Such 
reforms increased the voting population of Argentina from 9% of the total male population (land-
owning, upper classes) to one of universal male suffrage. In the wake of these enfranchisement 
measures, a constitutional, democratic government remained in place until 1930 when a military 
coup toppled the regime and claimed power.142  
 The Peronist period began in 1943 when Juan Perón participated in a coup that overthrew 
the conservative, minority government in power at th t time. Perón was part of a group of 
officers (Grupo de Oficiales Unidos or GOU) who saw themselves as progressive nationalists 
and who sympathized with European fascism, specifically, that of the Italian variety. The officers 
hoped to bring to Argentina the unity, strength, progress, and discipline that they believed were 
characteristic of the German and Italian fascist state .143However, despite their calls for unity, the 
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GOU was perpetually divided. As a result, three different generals rapidly succeeded each other 
as Argentina’s leader, with Perón ultimately ascending to power in 1945.  
 In her study, Kirkpatrick was careful to distinguish Peronism from totalitarianism. 
According to her, Peronsim lacked most of the distingu shing characteristics of totalitarian 
systems; for example, there was no official ideology for re-ordering society, culture, and 
personality. Moreover, Perón did not attempt to establish total control over the political process 
or to destroy those associations such as church, family, or schools that influenced political 
practices. Furthermore, Kirkpatrick claimed that during his rule, there was not a single, mass 
party that monopolized political functions in Argentine society. Finally, no ‘ubiquitous terror’ 
was associated with Peronism.144 Instead of ‘totalitarian’, Kirkpatrick labels Peronsim as neither 
communistic nor capitalistic, but rather a reformist, “justicialist philosophy” that mixed limited 
individualism and limited collectivism.145  
In order to buttress her arguments about the nature of P ronsim, Kirkpatrick examined 
various aspects of the regime, including its class orientation, the economic and social changes 
initiated by Perón, the social characteristics of the Peronist elite, and the cultural and political 
policies of the government.  She began by noting that Perón gained a mass following from the 
working classes. In her discussion of why this was so, Kirkpatrick focused on the economic and 
social changes wrought by Perón. She devoted most of her attention to welfare measures and 
their impact on workers’ lives, describing the Peronist system as a ‘New Deal’ for Argentine 
workers that included a comprehensive system of social security that provided for old-age 
pensions, disability pay, and other benefits. In addition to social security, workers received paid 
vacations, sick leave, holidays, minimum wage and maxi um hour legislation, and child labor 
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laws. Price controls were also introduced that reinforced wage benefits. Furthermore, collective 
bargaining, the right to strike, public housing projects, and slum clearance all contributed to 
workers’ well-being. Finally, a system of free public education through college “democratized 
the distribution of skill and enlightenment”.146According to Kirkpatrick, such measures 
constituted limited social and economic change which altered the pre-Pe ón economic and social 
structures of Argentina, but did not destroy them.147 
The integration of the working classes into political life made Perón’s relations with 
Argentina’s traditional ruling classes especially interesting to Kirkpatrick. One might think that 
mass support from the working classes would lead to a dismantling of the traditional Argentine 
hierarchy; however, this did not occur. According to Kirkpatrick, Perón’s treatment of the 
Argentinian oligarchy qualified as evidence of the non-communist, non-revolutionary, reformist 
nature of his regime. The oligarchy in Argentina consisted of large-landholders, the hierarchy of 
the Catholic Church, wealthy merchants, and the upper ranks of the military. During the Peronist 
period the traditional Argentinian ruling classes managed to hold on to some of their political 
power, while new social groups were welcomed into the political arena. Under Perón, the 
political power and social status of the large-landhol ers and wealthy merchants declined, but, 
their economic status remained relatively unchanged.  Furthermore, the power and prestige of the 
Catholic Church and the military remained intact.148   
Kirkpatrick maintained that such changes in the politica  system more accurately 
reflected the transformations that had occurred within the population and economy of Argentina 
in previous decades. According to her, the economic base that had allowed the large-landholders 
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to ascend to political power in the past had been eroded by industrialization, urbanization, and 
the commercialization of Argentina’s economy. Thus, Perón attacked a segment of the oligarchy 
whose political and social status and influence exce ded its economic power, thus bringing the 
social, political, and economic power of the oligarchy into a more realistic relationship.149 
Though, for the most part, politics continued to be dominated by members of the oligarchy, 
specifically the military and the plutocracy, some governmental positions were opened to those 
who had previously been excluded from political power including trade union leaders, sons of 
immigrants, Jews, and members of the working-classes.150 
 Although Perón championed political, social, and economic reforms designed to create a 
more just and equitable society, these moves were not accompanied by protection of individual 
rights and liberties such as those enshrined in Western, liberal, democratic governments. This 
becomes quite evident in Kirkpatrick’s discussion of Peronist cultural policies. For example, 
freedom of the press did not exist in Peronist Argentina. Newspapers were prohibited from 
publishing items that were ‘contrary to the general interest of the nation or disturbing to public 
order’. In addition, the press could not publish anything that undermined Christian morals, upset 
Argentina’s relations with other states, injured government officials, or was ‘untrue’. Of course it 
was Perón who could determine what constituted a viol tion of these laws, and opposition 
newspapers, or those found guilty of breaking these laws, were harassed and ultimately shut 
down by the state. Enforcement of this legislation was possible because of a selective purge of 
the Argentine judiciary.151 
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 In an effort to distinguish these policies from siilar ones instituted by totalitarian 
governments, Kirkpatrick was quick to point out that Perón was unable or unwilling to stifle all 
opposition. First, she notes that anti-Peronist papers, though harassed by paper shortages, threats, 
and arrests still managed to print anti-Peronist editorials. Second, opposition politicians, though 
harassed and arrested, continued to criticize the gov rnment. Third, Peron allowed elections in 
1946 and 1951. Finally, though the opposition parties were debilitated by restrictive legislation, 
threats, and arrests, they were not totally destroyed. “Perón hamstrung and limited his opponents 
but did not silence all opposition,” Kirkpatrick wrote, “he did not attempt to achieve full control 
of the symbolic environment, but he dominated it through a combination of censorship, 
intimidation, and harassment.”152 Thus, she concluded that the Peronist regime constituted a 
continuation of the Argentine tradition of a hybrid government that combined democratic and 
autocratic elements.153 
 Despite the existence of democratic elements associated with Peronism, the political 
scientist asserted that it did not constitute a step on the road towards democracy. In order to back 
up this assertion, Kirkpatrick drew from Arendt’s writing on the nature of revolutions and looked 
to Argentina’s political history. She wrote, 
Given Argentine experience, it would have been extraordinary in 1955 if Argentine 
political culture had been characterized by attitudes, opinions, and, especially, 
expectations typical of developed democracies. It would have been most surprising if, 
just after the downfall of Perón, broadly aggregative democratic parties had emerged 
capable of organizing and channeling opinion, recruiting leaders, competing in elections, 
and accepting the results. It would have been very su prising if Argentines had expected 
that political decisions should, could, and would be made by majorities whose 
preferences would be peaceably expressed through honest institutions and implemented 
by officials responsive as well as responsible to the people. It would have been very 
surprising if military officers, politicized by sevral decades of participation in the 
distribution of values in the society, should have promptly eliminated themselves from 
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the political arena. It would have been surprising indeed if, after 150 years of experience 
with a different tradition, Argentina should have emerged after the fall of Perón a full-
blown, Anglo-Saxon democracy.154 
 
 Following her discussion of Peronism, Kirkpatrick examined the development of 
Argentine politics in the decade after Perón was overthrown via a military coup in 1955. She 
argued that the continued instability of Argentine politics during this period was typical of Latin 
American political systems. Despite the instability and violence inherent within the Argentine 
political system, Kirkpatrick maintained that the nation’s system was competitive, that 
competitors for power were comprised of diverse actors with diverse goals, that competition took 
place in a variety of arenas despite governmental restrictions, and that the style of politics and 
the arenas of competition changed due to the political involvement of the middle and lower 
classes.155  
 In support of these assertions, Kirkpatrick pointed out that no man or party held power 
for even four years, a fact that demonstrated that no one group possessed sufficient power to 
preempt control of the government. Instead, there were multiple groups who competed for 
political power in a variety of arenas. Kirkpatrick defines an ‘arena’ as a site of decision-making, 
and in Argentina, competition was not limited to the arenas typical of constitutional democracies.  
Groups who competed for power in various arenas included conventional political parties who 
sought power in the electoral arena; labor unions who sought power through electoral 
participation, strikes, lobbying, and violent action; movement-type parties that sought power 
through electoral politics, street demonstrations, and quasi-terrorist actions; military leaders who 
sought power through civil war, coups, and electoral politics; and the clergy, student groups, 
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industrialists, and landowners who sought power through direct action and electoral activities.156 
According to the political scientist, the interactions between such groups vying for political 
power determined the policies and personnel of the Arg ntine government. Though not all of the 
competitors were involved in interactions in all poitical arenas, each group’s strengths, methods, 
and commitments had to be taken into account at all leve s of the decision-making process.157  
 “The persistence of competition between such diverse groups and by such diverse 
methods,” Kirkpatrick noted, “demonstrates the continuing lack of agreement in Argentina about 
the legitimate sources of political authority.”158As no political procedure was recognized as the 
legitimate route to power, no group had enough power or authority to impose its political will for 
very long. Furthermore, the lack of agreement on legitimate means to power meant that multiple 
routes were acceptable, including the use of violence and military coups. According to her, the 
presence of violence in a political system, though often associated with a breakdown in the social 
order, was, in the case of Argentina and many other Latin American and autocratic regimes, 
patterned, and thus must be considered a ‘mode’ of the social order rather than a disruption.159 
Violence was an integral, regular, and predictable part of the Argentine political process, even 
during Argentina’s democratic interludes; therefore, revolutions and military coups actually 
constituted signs of continuity and stability within the Argentine system.160 
 “It seems to me,” Kirkpatrick wrote, “that a new name is needed to designate those 
political systems in which, through a substantial period of time and regardless of the legal 
structure of government, diverse and multiple actors compete for political power in diverse and 
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multiple arenas.”161Such systems may be called ‘polyocracies’, where ‘poly’ references the 
multiplicity of both political actors and arenas. Such systems tended to suffer from institutional 
instability caused by a lack of agreement about legi imate arenas of decision-making or modes of 
competition. Consequently, shifting power relations among actors are usually accompanied by 
structural changes in the political system. Political parties were the most vulnerable actors to 
such changes as their strength depended upon mass support expressed through the electoral 
arena. Conversely, the positions of military leaders, church leaders, and other political actors 
were less vulnerable to shifts between democratic and autocratic systems because their political 
activities took place largely outside of the electoral arena.162 
 Kirkpatrick’s analyses of the Argentine political system served to buttress her defense of 
authoritarian regimes in Latin America and other regions around the globe, along with American 
support for such regimes. According to her, though autocratic governments, such as Peronist 
Argentina and other Latin America dictatorships, were oppressive, they were less repressive than 
their totalitarian counterparts. Therefore, though he purged the Argentine judiciary, repressed 
opposition parties, and imposed severe restrictions on the press, Perón did not eliminate all 
opposition to his regime through mass terror as a totali arian dictator would do. Moreover, 
authoritarian regimes left in place existing allocations of power, wealth, and status, but they 
worshipped traditional gods and observed traditional taboos. Unlike totalitarian regimes, they did 
not disturb the habitual places of residence, rhythms of work, or patterns of family and personal 
relations. Furthermore, because they allowed for limited competition and political participation, 
authoritarian governments, especially those in Latin America which had a long tradition of 
mixing liberal and autocratic political styles, were more susceptible to liberalization and thus 
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capable of evolving into approximate democratic state .163 Even though the political system of 
Argentina between 1945 and 1965, like those of other autocratic states, was far from democratic, 
political action and freedom existed outside of the electoral arena as long as political actors were 
able to stage demonstrations and utilize strikes, lobbying actions, and violence in order to 
influence the political system.     
 
 In 1967, while in the midst of completing her dissertation, Jeane Kirkpatrick was hired as 
an Associate Professor of Political Science at Georget wn University in Washington, DC. She 
was offered the job by Karl Cerny, Howard Penniman’s successor as Chairman of the Political 
Science Department. Both Cerny and Penniman had been m mbers of the Kirkpatricks’ social 
circle for years. In her role as a faculty member at Georgetown, Kirkpatrick developed a 
reputation as a committed teacher who did her own work, without the aid of researchers or 
assistants. She even insisted upon grading exams herself.  Her hard work paid off, and she 
became only the second woman to gain tenure at Georgetown.164  
 Jeane Kirkpatrick finished her PhD and began working at Georgetown during a time 
when American society, politics, and foreign affairs were experiencing enormous changes. Much 
of this upheaval was due to the emergence of the New Left, a countercultural movement that 
centered on the expansion of rights to various minority groups and women, and the American 
population’s increasing disenchantment with the Vietnam War. The Civil Rights movement that 
began during World War II had garnered increasing support over the ensuing decades, and, by 
the mid-1960s, had achieved several victories for African Americans including the restoration of 
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voting rights, the integration of public schools, and the end to de jure segregation. The success of 
the Civil Rights movement for African Americans soon prompted other minorities within the 
United States, such as Native Americans and Latinos, to fight for their own rights.  Feminism 
and the struggle for equal rights for women also gained momentum during the 1960s as an 
increasing number of working and college-educated women became more willing to address the 
inequalities that existed between the sexes within American society. College students across the 
nation banded together to protest against university policies which they deemed to be repressive 
and stifling, and homosexuals began agitating for equal rights and an end to sodomy laws. In the 
realm of foreign affairs, Cold War tensions increased as the Cuban Missile Crisis reignited fears 
of nuclear war and mutually assured destruction, the Iron Curtain gained a new permanency to 
Americans with the construction of the Berlin Wall, nd the war in Vietnam escalated.  
By the late 1960s, the rise of the New Left and the growth of the anti-war movement had 
fractured both the social and cultural norms along with the Cold War consensus which had 
dominated American life in the postwar years. To many Americans, the Civil Rights movement 
appeared to have degenerated into violence with the emergence of Black Power organizations 
and urban rioting. Radical Feminist groups, labeled ‘bra burners’ by the media, began actively 
protesting events such as the Miss America pageant and calling for a war between the sexes. 
Student organizations staged sit-ins, strikes, and protests against their alma maters and managed 
to temporarily shut down universities all across America. Meanwhile, anti-war protests increased 
in number and intensity.  
The rising tide of protest within the United States r ached its zenith in 1968. During that 
year, the nation was shocked by the assassinations of two larger-than-life political figures – 
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy. Meanwhile the Tet Offensive belied the 
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government’s claims that the war was nearly won in Vietnam.  Kirkpatrick personally 
experienced the effects of the student protestors when on April 23, 1968, between 150 and 300 
members of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) occupied several administration 
buildings and the Low Library of Columbia University.165 
The SDS were protesting against the construction of a gymnasium that they labeled as 
‘racist’ as it was to be built on the site of a park that had served the surrounding black 
neighborhood. Though community residents would be abl to use the gym, they would have to 
use a separate ‘colored’ entrance. They were also protesting against the Institute for Defense 
Analysis, a Columbia University defense organization affiliated with the U.S. government which 
supported the war in Vietnam.166 In the midst of the student occupation, Kirkpatrick had to 
deliver her dissertation to the library. In order to avoid the chaos occurring on the campus, she 
had to be escorted by police through underground tunels beneath the university. Though she 
was able to avoid any direct contact with the protestors, two of her friends, both of whom were 
faculty members at Columbia, were not as fortunate. One had his office destroyed by members 
of the SDS, while the other was hit on the head by the brass nozzle of a fire hose.167 Kirkpatrick 
later described the students and their actions at Columbia as ‘fascist’.168 
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Her encounters with radical protest groups did not end with the incident at Columbia. In 
August of 1968, she, her husband, and her eldest son attended the Democratic National 
Convention in Chicago, Illinois. The Kirkpatrick family stayed at the Palmer House at night and 
spent their days at the Conrad Hilton analyzing polls f r Vice-President Hubert Humphrey. At 
one point, the police and the military were called in to respond to a bomb threat at the 
Hilton.169Then, a radical group identified by Jeane as ‘The Weathermen’ put uric acid in the air 
conditioning system at the Palmer House, causing the building to reek of vomit for several 
days.170Outside of the convention, an army of anti-war protestors and New Left countercultural 
organizations had amassed to demonstrate. Though most were there to peacefully protest, some, 
like the Yippies, were not. The Yippies threatened to poison Chicago’s water supply with LSD, 
and both the SDS and the Yippies resorted to throwing bags of urine at police.171 Chicago police 
and Illinois National Guardsmen responded with violence, beating and gassing the protestors.172 
The violence between police and protestors continued for three days. 
Tensions ran high inside the Democratic National Convention as well, as the delegates 
were divided on multiple issues, the most polarizing being the Vietnam War. The anti-war 
faction that supported unconditional, unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam coalesced behind 
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Senator Eugene McCarthy. The pro-war faction of the party lent its support to Vice President 
Hubert Humphrey who favored a negotiated settlement in which U.S. action depended upon 
reciprocal action from the North Vietnamese.173Humphrey, despite being labeled a warmonger 
by the peace faction and members of the New Left, still managed to secure the nomination. Due 
to the turbulent nature of American society, culture, and politics in the late 1960s, Evron 
Kirkpatrick had encouraged Humphrey to ask Nelson Rckefeller, a member of the Republican 
Party, to be his Vice Presidential candidate in order to run on a ‘Unity’ platform. After much 
discussion, Humphrey agreed to let Evron Kirkpatrick and Max Kampelman broach the matter to 
the New York Republican. Though he initially appeared to be in favor of the idea of a unity 
ticket, Rockefeller declined the offer174. With Rockefeller out of the picture and the nominat on 
secured, Humphrey chose the moderate liberal Edmund Muskie as his running mate.175 
The Kirkpatricks were upset by the divisions within the Democratic Party, but they were 
happy that their candidate had won the day and both w rked diligently over the next few months 
on the Humphrey campaign. Unfortunately, the “Happy Warrior” lost the election by a narrow 
margin. Nixon received 31.7 million votes to Humphrey’s 31.2 million. However, in the 
Electoral College, Nixon was able to secure 32 state , leaving 13 to Humphrey and 5 Southern 
states to George Wallace. Jeane Kirkpatrick blamed Humphrey’s loss to Nixon in 1968 on the 
rise of the New Left and on President Johnson. According to her, Johnson set the convention date 
too late, leaving very little time for campaigning. Furthermore, Kirkpatrick accused Johnson of 
not raising enough money for the Democratic Party which further hampered the campaign. 
Johnson biographer, Randall B. Woods, supports her assertions. “Unbeknown to the media, the 
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delegates, and the American public,” Woods writes, “the chief challenger to Hubert Humphrey… 
was Lyndon Johnson.”176 Johnson attempted to dominate the convention and its proceedings, 
made sure that the convention coincided with his birthday, August 27, and even tested the waters 
for his own re-nomination, despite the fact he had already announced he would not run. After 
discovering that the party would not re-nominate him, Johnson finally threw his support behind 
his Vice-President177 
Disheartened by Humphrey’s loss and the seeming disintegration of the Democratic 
Party, the Kirkpatricks decided to take a vacation fr m politics. Accordingly, Jeane Kirkpatrick 
took a sabbatical from Georgetown while her husband took a leave of absence from the 
American Political Science Association allowing thefamily to spend 1969 in France. Evron 
Kirkpatrick took a position as president of the board of trustees for the Institute of American 
Universities, an organization based in Aix-en-Provence and dedicated to helping American 
students to study abroad in France. The plan was for Evron to spend the year teaching at the 
Institute while his wife wrote. The family rented a house near Mount St. Victoire, a picturesque 
location which had been the subject of many works by the famous French painter Paul Cézanne. 
With their three sons enrolled in a local French scool for boys, the Kirkpatrick family spent the 
next year immersing themselves in French culture.178 
Jeane was especially excited about being back in Fra ce. She loved the language, the 
culture, and especially the food. In between writing a d spending time with her family, she 
began learning about local ingredients and practicing her cooking techniques. The learning 
process was not easy on the family as Kirkpatrick was frequently distracted from the kitchen by 
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intellectual pursuits. Often the kitchen resembled a disaster area: pans smoking, food burning, 
water boiling away, all while Kirkpatrick was immers d in reading a book. Despite such culinary 
chaos, spectacular dinners sometimes appeared on the table.179 
Jeane often described the family’s time in France as the best of times. On weekends, the 
entire Kirkpatrick family would go on road trips throughout the South of France. Evron labeled 
these weekend getaways “Kirkpatrick’s Follies”. The t ree boys sat in the backseat, bickering as 
siblings do, and complaining of car sickness, while their mother helped their father to navigate. 
In between giving directions to Evron, Jeane read books such as The Odyssey and The Iliad 
aloud to the family. The family enjoyed their time in France in 1969 so much that the country 
became the site for annual summer vacations. The Kirkpatricks would spend all of 1974 living in 
France and eventually bought a home in Provence.180  
A Political Woman: Jeane Kirkpatrick in the 1970s 
 As the turbulent era of the 1960s gave way to the decade of disco, the lives of the 
Kirkpatrick family began to change. Evron Kirkpatrick, now a man in his 60s, began retiring 
from the public eye. Having spent decades working in academia, for the government, in electoral 
politics, heading the American Political Science Association, and sitting on the boards of various 
organizations, Evron was ready to embrace a less rigorous lifestyle. In addition, he felt 
increasingly alienated from the Democratic Party throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Such an estrangement hastened his desire to retire f om large-scale political activism. Finally, 
Evron’s work for the government came under attack in the late 1960s as his name was associated 
with alleged front organizations for the Central Intelligence Agency.  
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In the late 1950s, Evron Kirkpatrick founded and chaired the Operations and Policy 
Research (OPR), a non-profit organization associated with the United States Information 
Agency. The OPR was staffed by American academics, primarily in the social sciences, who 
recommended books and pamphlets for distribution overseas. The organization also conducted 
political studies within the United States and abrod, specifically in Latin America. In 1967, the 
OPR was accused of being a CIA front organization.181 Max Kampelman, Vice President of the 
OPR, long-time friend of the Kirkpatricks, and friend and former aide to Hubert Humphrey, 
denied having any knowledge of the organization’s relationship with the CIA.182 Jeane 
Kirkpatrick also remained rather ambiguous about her husband’s activities within the OPR, 
stating, “I became aware that Kirk was advising the CIA on public opinion polling – sampling, 
interviewing, analyzing data – during the Vietnam War… I have no doubt that his activities were 
honorable and his purposes were good and that I would have been proud of them if I’d known 
more about them than I did.”183 
  As Evron settled into retirement, he encouraged his wife to remain active and in the 
public eye. Refreshed from her year abroad, Jeane returned to her job at Georgetown and began 
working on a new book. Shortly thereafter, her parents’ health began to deteriorate. Kirkpatrick 
had maintained close ties to her father and mother, Fat and Leona, and with her brother, Jerry, 
now a prominent attorney living in Ohio with his wife and three children. In 1974, one of those 
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ties was irrevocably broken when her father passed away. Five years later, in April of 1979, 
Kirkpatrick’s mother, Leona, died of leukemia.184 With her parents gone, her husband retired, 
and her sons reaching adulthood, Kirkpatrick felt a sense of loss, not only in her personal life, but 
in her political life as well, for like her husband, Kirkpatrick had begun to feel more and more 
isolated from the Democratic Party.  
Her disaffection began in 1968 and continued to grow throughout the 1970s. Kirkpatrick 
took issue with many of the policies espoused by various New Left groups, who she perceived as 
gaining too much power within the party, but she was especially upset by their attack on centrist 
liberalism that she and her husband believed to have been the source of American postwar 
prosperity and the guarantor of the nation’s defense and safety. Furthermore, Kirkpatrick 
resented the fact that liberals such as herself who had supported Civil Rights at home, along with 
decolonization abroad, were now labeled as ‘racists’ and ‘imperialists’ by the New Left.185 
Moreover, she found the belief of these groups that the United States was “a sick society, 
presided over by a repressive government whose motives are base, whose methods are immoral, 
and whose soul is corrupt”186 to be particularly repugnant and wholly untrue. “I deeply opposed 
attacks on the integrity of our government and culture,” Kirkpatrick said, “I always believed in 
the importance of truth, law, and authority. Military kids grow up with such values. So do 
Oklahoma kids.”187 
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Steeped as she was in the literature of totalitarianism, Kirkpatrick found the New Left’s 
cavalier attitude towards communism to be reprehensible. She was particularly offended by the 
anti-war protestors who claimed that the United States’ escalation of the war in Vietnam was 
immoral. But, in truth, such sentiments were not confined to radical anti-war protestors, as many 
of her academic associates, such as Hans Morgenthau, began criticizing the war based on both 
moral ground and the American national interest. During the late 1960s, Kirkpatrick attended a 
lecture given by Morgenthau during which he critiqued the war in Vietnam in several ways.  In A 
New Foreign Policy for the United States, Morgenthau elaborated on his views, arguing that 
communism in Vietnam was nationalistic in nature, maning a revolution would have occurred 
without the presence of communists, and that the United States was now involved in a 
counterrevolution. Morgenthau went on to assert that because the Vietnamese Communist Party 
was primarily a vehicle to achieve national unity and independence, it was different from, and 
thus irrelevant to, the containment of Chinese or Soviet communism. He pointed out that for 
centuries Vietnam had acted as a barrier to Chinese expansion, yet, ironically, American 
involvement in Vietnam was pushing the Vietnamese closer to their traditional Chinese enemies. 
In Morgenthau’s opinion, the war did not serve the national interests of the United States. 
Furthermore, the limited nature of the war was illog cal in view of the rationales put forward to 
justify U.S. involvement – that the Chinese and the Soviets were manipulating Ho Chi Minh. 
Finally, Morgenthau asserted that American objectivs in Vietnam were unattainable without 
incurring unacceptable moral liabilities and military risks.188  
In many ways, Kirkpatrick disagreed with Morgenthau’s analysis of the war. She did 
admit that there were issues with the ways in which the Johnson and Nixon administrations had 
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sold the war, stating that “One of the responsibilit es governments have to citizens is not to ask 
them to make impossible sacrifices – in this case, sacrifices ordinary Americans can’t 
understand, identify with, or accept.”189 Her problem seemed to be not with the war itself, but 
rather with the government which had not properly explained to the American public the reasons 
why Vietnam was so important. As a political scientist educated in the evils of totalitarianism, 
the Cold Warrior believed that the American cause in Vietnam was both right and moral. “I 
didn’t have a moral issue with Vietnam. I thought we ere morally right,” she said, “Kirk and I 
were never under any illusions that Ho Chi Minh was just some peasant nationalist.”190 
Following the American withdrawal from Vietnam, Kirkpatrick complained to Hubert 
Humphrey that American policies in Vietnam constituted “the most shameful display of 
irresponsibility and inhumanity in our history.”191 
In addition to her disagreements with the anti-war faction of the New Left, Kirkpatrick 
found herself at odds with the radical feminist vision that emerged in the early 1970s. Though 
she was a feminist, Kirkpatrick viewed herself as a rugged, female individualist whose 
accomplishments were of greater value since she had achieved them without the “institutional 
brace of a movement.”192 She disagreed with radical feminist assertions that men were the enemy 
and that women were the “most oppressed political caste in history.”193 Furthermore, feminist 
organizations’ refusal to respect Kirkpatrick as a woman who “made it in a male world”194 
served to further increase her indignation towards the movement. Even in the 1980s, after 
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becoming the highest ranking woman within the American foreign policy apparatus, feminists 
continued to vilify her. For example, in 1981, Vassr College held the Berkshire Conference on 
the History of Women. Though Kirkpatrick was now a United Nations Ambassador and author 
of a book on women in politics, the keynote speaker t the event, history professor Joan W. 
Scott, dismissed her as “not someone I want to represent feminine accomplishment.”195 
Just as radical feminism began to gain strength in e United States in the early 1970s, 
Kirkpatrick published her third book – Political Woman.196 As a feminist, a political scientist, 
and a political activist, Kirkpatrick began questioning the role of women in politics and 
government; specifically, why, fifty years after the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, were 
women absent from the upper levels of American politics? In hopes of gaining greater insight, 
Kirkpatrick took part in a 1972 conference for women in politics sponsored by the Center for the 
American Woman and Politics at Rutgers University. There she conducted interviews and 
handed out questionnaires to the fifty female state senators and representatives from 26 states 
who attended the conference. The politicians surveyed had all served more than one term in their 
state legislatures and were all selected for the conference by the various state organizations of the 
American Association of University Women, the League of Women Voters, and the National 
Federation of Business and Professional Women.197 Kirkpatrick took information gained from 
these women, along with similar data gathered from male legislators, to write one of the first 
major studies of women in American public life. 
Kirkpatrick began by noting that male dominance of g vernments and policy-making was 
indisputable. “Political man is a familiar figure with a long history,” she wrote,  “As chief, 
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prince, king, counselor, premier, president, dictator, chairman he has led, battled, pillaged, 
conquered, built, judged, governed. Political man hs fascinated and challenged historians and 
philosophers; he has been described, dissected, praised, excoriated and psychoanalyzed.”198 
Kirkpatrick acknowledged that women had traditionally been ignored in studies of politics due to 
the fact that they have had such a small share of political power. However, given the changes in 
the roles of women that had occurred in the 20th century, in particular, the enfranchisement of 
females, she wondered why very few women sought or wielded political power. Kirkpatrick 
noted that women were quite numerous at the lower levels of American politics – being active in 
precincts, at party picnics, getting out the vote, telephoning, and fundraising, yet “no woman has 
been nominated to be president or vice-president, no woman has served on the Supreme Court… 
no woman in the cabinet, no woman in the Senate, no woman serving as governor of a major 
state, no woman mayor of a major city, no woman in the top leadership of either party.”199 Why 
was this so? 
In order to answer this question, Kirkpatrick first examined women as a political 
category. Politics was an activity that was carried out in the name of collectivities where the 
possession and use of power is generally justified with reference to some larger good and 
demands are made in the name of a group. As time goes on, new collectivities or groups are 
created around attributes such as nationality, religion, race, income level, or gender. In general, 
once a group with such common identities had coalesced, its grievances and demands were made 
manifest. In late 20th century America, “women” had been transformed from a group possessing 
specific biological characteristics into a symbol of p litical identity.200Despite being identified as 
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a political collectivity, Kirkpatrick asserted that gender has only occasionally been used as a 
basis for common political activity by women. For example, women worked together to achieve 
voting rights, successfully organizing and agitating i  the name of their sex; however, once the 
right to vote was secured, the collective concerns of women were rarely articulated within the 
political arena. Furthermore, unlike after the enfra chisement of other categories of people, 
women’s suffrage did not affect the major social comp sition of government, as the feminine 
half of the population was seldom represented by more than five to ten percent of the members 
of any state legislature. Moreover, according to Kirkpatrick, gender has had less influence on 
political behavior than ethnic, regional, or economic identifications.201Thus, the tendency of 
women to coalesce around issues other than their gender may account, in part, for their absence 
from political power. 
Following her assessment of women as a political category, Kirkpatrick considered four 
hypothetical constraints that might also account for he low levels of political participation of 
women – physiological constraints, cultural constrain s, role constraints, and male conspiracy.  
Physiological constraints referred to the biological differences between men and women, both 
physically and mentally, and were based on the notio  that the political aspects of social life 
have evolved around power and force. Men were able to physically dominate; women were not. 
Men were programmed for leadership, decision-making, a d force; women were not. Though 
brute force was not necessary for a person to achieve political power in the United States, 
political scientists maintained that underlying modern campaigns was a continuing struggle to 
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achieve and assert dominance – a struggle that largely excluded women based on their 
physiology.202 
In addition to hypothetical physiological constraints, women also faced cultural 
constraints that could discourage them from engaging in politics. Kirkpatrick noted culture 
elaborates the psychological, moral, and social impications of biological characteristics, where 
definitions of masculinity and femininity are learned and internalized.  She noted, 
The essential elements of the cultural explanation of sex role behavior are the 
propositions that:  
1. Culture embodies norms defining the sexes and identifies behavior appropriate for 
each: these are perpetuated through the socialization process 
2. These norms determine the identity, expectations, a d demands of males and females 
3. Sex stereotypes are not necessarily derived from the physiological characteristics of 
the two sexes 
4. Norms are internalized regardless of their biological relevance 
5. In all modern, industrial societies, specifically including the United States, cultural 
norms exist which arbitrarily limit women’s personal development, social choices, and 
opportunity to share fully in the dominant values of ciety.203 
 
Thus, politics becomes an example of cultural exclusion; for though legal barriers to women’s 
participation in political life had been abolished, cultural norms have preserved the definition of 
politics as ‘man’s world’. Furthermore, cultural expectations regarding gender roles were 
complemented by a dual status system that measures women by different criteria than men where 
women gain status through excelling in sanctioned roles – nurturing, homemaking, personal 
adornment, etc. Any effort to perform roles assigned by the culture to the opposite sex is likely to 
result in a loss of status.204Though cultural norms concerning gender roles were changing, and 
the penalties of nonconformity were not as great as they had been in the past, Kirkpatrick 
predicted that traditional culture may conserve politics as a male domain for some time. 
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 Kirkpatrick argued that role constraints were more restrictive to women than 
physiological and cultural restraints.205 Both the physiological and cultural explanations viewed 
the personality of men and women, whether programmed through biology or culture, as the 
primary cause for women’s absence and men’s dominance of politics; however, personality was 
deemphasized in discussions of social roles. A role ref rs to a position in the social structure and 
its associated set of coherent norms. In most societies, roles are complementary, meaning men’s 
roles and women’s roles complement one another and provide structure for the relations between 
the sexes. Women’s primary role of wife and mother had been viewed as irreconcilable with the 
role of professional as both had been described as full-time, life-long jobs. Furthermore, two 
professions were more easily combined when they have common role requirements, for example, 
law and politics, but the nurturing skills associated with women’s roles as wives and mothers 
were not viewed as applicable to politics.206  
 Finally, there was the male conspiracy theory, or the belief that women were oppressed, 
banned from power by the ruling classes – men. From this point of view, the situation of women 
was comparable to that of African Americans, where both groups were dominated and excluded 
from power by white men. Not surprisingly, those who adhered to the notion of male conspiracy 
viewed feminine traits as similar to characteristics of subjected persons and/or oppressed groups 
– lack of education, vulnerable to peer prejudice, economic discrimination, low aspirations, more 
emotional than rational, more dependent than autonom us, and more predisposed to be governed 
than to govern.  Supporters of the male conspiracy theory held that cultural and role constraints 
served as effective instruments of male domination.207  
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 Given that the cards were seemingly stacked against female politicians – the lack of a 
cohesive political identity, physiological, cultural, nd role constraints, along with male 
prejudice – just who were the women who successfully participated in the political world? Based 
on the information drawn from interviews and questionnaires, Kirkpatrick depicted the average 
female legislator as an attractive, forty-eight year old mother of two, who, despite having a 
college education, had rarely worked outside of the home. She lived in the town in which she 
was born and was provided for financially by her husband who had supported her decision to run 
for government office. Competing for office was an extension of her many years of volunteer 
experience. Though the lives of the state legislators surveyed differed in many respects, the vast 
majority shared several key characteristics including a small town background, geographic 
stability, membership in the middle-class, participant and active parents, higher education, and 
community service.208   
 In many ways, the women surveyed were very similar to the male state legislators. The 
majority of the men examined also came from smaller towns, were college-educated members of 
the middle class, had active parents, and had participa ed in extracurricular activities and 
community volunteerism before running for political office. Where male and female legislators 
differed were in their education levels, employment his ory, age, and number of offspring. Most 
of the men were more highly educated than their femal  counterparts and had been continuously 
employed. In addition, the male legislators tended to have more children and ran for office at an 
earlier age. Whereas many of the men had children under the age of ten when they first ran for 
office, the majority of women waited until after their children were grown before embarking 
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upon a political career.209 Based on the similarities and differences between th  sexes surveyed, 
Kirkpatrick concluded that “the same social experiences seem to contribute to the development 
of politically active males and females. Many of the same personality patterns characterize both. 
Observable differences… derive more from social roles than from inherent predispositions.”210 
 Notwithstanding the many similarities between male and female legislators, the women 
surveyed were forced to adapt and survive in a male-dominated environment once they took 
office. Many of them reported being rebuffed by their male counterparts in several ways. Some 
were excluded from certain events or meetings, while others were excluded linguistically as all 
members of the chamber were referred to as ‘men’. Others reported “the most subtle form of put 
down” – being killed with kindness and treated like a helpless child.211 These women were called 
‘darlings’ of the house and the men treated them with exaggerated courtesy. Still others were 
excluded from discussions and debates that revolved around ‘masculine’ topics such as economic 
measures and were directed instead towards committees that dealt with more ‘feminine’ issues 
like education. Some were openly insulted; one state senator reported being told “You should be 
in the kitchen, not in the Senate” by a male colleague.212 Regardless of the difficulties faced by 
female politicians, the women surveyed were able to overcome male resistance through hard 
work and perseverance. Kirkpatrick wrote, “These women not only feel that it is possible to win 
professional acceptance and cooperation of their male colleagues, they are convinced that they 
have done so.”213  
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 Like Kirkpatrick, the majority of female legislators surveyed were critical of radical 
feminism.  She noted, “Approximately 60% of the legislators expressed opposition to the 
women’s liberation movement and many criticisms were l veled against the women’s liberation 
movement.”214Several of them expressed the view that the movement posited an inaccurate 
conception of women’s situations and problems. Few b lieved that women were exploited by 
men and society and very few felt that they were depriv d or denied self-fulfillment and 
freedom. Furthermore, many of the legislators disapproved of the movement’s denigration of the 
role of wife and mother. Likewise, the majority of the legislators viewed women’s liberation as 
extremist. “In the eyes of many,” noted Kirkpatrick, “women’s liberation is a branch of radical 
politics – and so is regarded with the same distaste  they regard the counter culture, the ‘new’ 
politics, student riots, dropouts and flag burners.” 215 Moreover, many labeled the movement as 
partisan. Kirkpatrick asserted that even the moderate wings of the feminist movement, which 
included the National Organization of Women, were regarded as partisans of the most liberal 
wing of the Democratic Party. Finally, many expressed the view that women’s liberation actually 
made it more difficult to be elected into office as all women seeking to do ‘men’s jobs’ were then 
being lumped together as “extremist nuts and bra-buners”.216 
 Not all of the legislators surveyed were opposed to women’s liberation. Kirkpatrick 
divided those favorable to the movement into two categories: those that found the movement to 
be too strident and ‘far out’ but saw it as useful in broadening the opportunities and rights for 
women, and those that explicitly supported and ident fi d with the movement. Approximately 
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1/5 of the women surveyed fell into each of these cat gories. 217 “Disagreements about the 
women’s movement within this group of legislators,” noted Kirkpatrick, “illuminate the problem 
of uniting women in a single, political action group.”218In fact, the only issue agreed upon by 
those surveyed as being a ‘women’s issue’ was the Equal Rights Amendment, which was 
supported by all but three of the women surveyed.  
In the conclusion of Political Woman, Kirkpatrick speculated on the future for women in 
politics. She maintained that in order for women to gain de facto political equality, both a social 
and a cultural revolution were required. Many fundamental beliefs about the nature of men, 
women, children, and government would have to be abandoned or, at the very least, revised. 
Kirkpatrick acknowledged that within the United States cultural and social changes were already 
in progress. “Current trends in mass opinion suggest a continuing and increasing demand for 
progressive inclusion of women,” she wrote, “they suggest larger numbers of professional 
women, increasing efforts to combine family and professional roles. Should they continue, 
increased numbers of women will be seeking public off e.”219 Despite these trends, Kirkpatrick 
remained cautious, observing that preferences change slowly and that change does not always 
follow the opinion of the masses, even in democracies. She stated, 
The national experience with desegregation seems to prove that, at least under certain 
circumstances, it is possible to legislate against mores. This experience seems to suggest 
that, at least under certain circumstances, coercion can be used to achieve goals (e.g. the 
end to school segregation) that do not have the support of public opinion. Can political 
power be used to bring about the full (equal) participation of women in power processes? 
Recently some men have used the power vested in their roles to procure a larger voice for 
women in politics. The “McGovern-Fraser guidelines” for the 1972 Democratic 
Convention decreed that there should be equal numbers of women and men in convention 
proceedings. The various “Affirmative Action” programs of recent years provide 
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examples of the deliberate use of public policy to achieve greater participation by women 
in various social processes from which they had been excluded.220 
 
 Kirkpatrick opposed affirmative action policies and the use of quotas to increase 
women’s participation in politics, asserting that they sacrificed important values such as equal 
opportunity, intra-party democracy, and self-governme t.221In lieu of the institution of quotas, 
she believed the government could expedite greater political participation for women in several 
ways including the appointment of more women to higher positions in government and the 
withholding of public support from universities and related institutions that discriminated against 
females in admissions, and in the awarding of scholarships, fellowships, and other types of aid. 
Furthermore, Kirkpatrick asserted that sexual discrimination in law, employment practices, 
education, and elsewhere was intolerable and that such practices had to be addressed by the 
government. “These and comparable policies can be adopted without serious violations of 
existing norms,” she wrote, “and would probably accelerate the trend towards increased 
participation of women in public power processes.”222 
 Political Woman was praised in both academic and non-academic circles. Noted political 
scientist Harold D. Lasswell called it a “landmark study…packed with beautifully analyzed 
information”.223 Following the book’s publication, Kirkpatrick developed a reputation as an 
expert on women in politics that not only boosted hr standing amongst her peers, but also 
enabled her to extend her political activities outside of the United States. In 1975, the United 
States Information Agency asked her to represent the U.S. at a conference held in West Africa. 
The gathering was part of the United Nations’ Interational Women’s Year. At the conference, 
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Kirkpatrick delivered lectures on women in public affairs and American democracy.224 Her 
foreign language skills served her well as she travelled to the former French colonies of Togo 
and Niger.225  
 Shortly after the publication of Political Woman, Kirkpatrick completed her fourth book, 
The New Presidential Elite. This work grew out of her growing disenchantment with the rise of 
the New Left within the Democratic Party. In 1972, Kirkpatrick attended the Democratic 
National Convention in Miami, Florida where she worked as a speechwriter and pollster for 
Hubert Humphrey’s doomed presidential campaign. Kirkpatrick blamed Humphrey’s loss of the 
nomination to George McGovern on changes made to the rules regarding delegate selection. In 
1968, the Democratic Party’s Commission on Party Structures and Delegate Selection, more 
commonly known as the McGovern Commission or the McGovern-Fraser Commission, took 
measures to guarantee participation of all interestd Democrats. Such measures included the 
institution of racial, gender, and age quotas for delegates which, in turn, she asserted, allowed for 
the New Left (or ‘new class’ as she labels them in the book) to dominate convention 
proceedings. Kirkpatrick’s disgust over this turn of events led to the publication of The New 
Presidential Elite and caused her to vote Republican for the first time n her life.226 
In The New Presidential Elite, Kirkpatrick utilized data gathered from mail 
questionnaires and personal interviews with delegates to both the Republican and Democratic 
National Conventions in 1972 in order to determine whether or not a new breed of political elite 
had emerged. Drawing on the data collected, Kirkpatrick described the social and personal 
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characteristics of the delegates, the various incentives that caused them to participate in 
presidential politics, the delegates’ political perspectives, and the various factions extant within 
the parties.  
Kirkpatrick began by asserting that large numbers of new men and women whose 
motives, goals, and ideas differed from those who have dominated American politics in the past 
had ascended to power. Until the late 1960s and early 1970s politicians and politics in general 
were, for the most part, pragmatic and moderate rathe  than ideological and extreme. According 
to her, such pragmatic politicians had adopted policies favorable to the electorate and had chosen 
candidates based on voter appeal. Kirkpatrick attributed the lack of such pragmatism at the 1972 
Democratic National Convention to the McGovern refoms which were themselves a result of 
many changes occurring in American politics and society. She wrote,  
The decline of party identification and the growth of split ticket voting; the appearance of 
a third party; the increased reliance on public relations techniques rather than 
organization; the decreased confidence in government and in other public institutions; the 
appearance of direct action – assassinations, sit-ins, demonstrations, draft evasion; the 
progressive breakdown of consensus on such basic values s patriotism, obedience to 
law, and compromise;  the rise of new kinds of pressure groups and new kinds of 
issues… the persistence of ‘cross cutting’ issues that cut across traditional party 
alignments; the landslide defeat of the majority party’s presidential candidate; 
‘Watergate’ and all that it implies about the decline of restraint in the use of power – 
these and many other phenomena of the recent past argue that the American political 
system is undergoing quite fundamental changes.227 
 
The changes occurring in American society had a dramatic effect on American politics, 
especially within the Democratic Party. According to Kirkpatrick, from the Great Depression to 
the mid-1960s, Democratic politics was dominated by welfare issues, “how to guard the society 
against drastic and catastrophic economic fluctuations, how to provide minimum economic well-
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being for all, how to use government’s power to stimulate economic growth, how to pay for new 
services and public activities – all without destroying the fundamental elements of the free 
enterprise system.”228 However, the issues prominent at the 1972 Democratic National 
Convention were not the bread and butter welfare state issues on which Democrats were 
relatively united. Instead, focus was shifted towards social and cultural issues, which, she 
charged, created a preoccupation with the political advantages of white males.  Accordingly, 
more attention was paid to three groups: African Americans, women, and youth.229 
Beginning in 1968, efforts were made within the party to “overcome the effects of past 
discrimination” through the use of affirmative action.230 Kirkpatrick opposed the party’s use of 
quotas, writing, “Until recently, liberals and liberal doctrines emphasized providing equal access 
to power (as to other values). It was believed that abolition of legal discrimination and of 
discriminatory practices satisfied the requirement of equal access; from that point, ability, 
ambition, hard work, and luck were expected to serve as the basis of selection.”231 In her mind, 
the use of quotas violated the hallowed American value of equal opportunity by providing 
special assistance to specific groups at the expense of others.232Furthermore, affirmative action 
policies pitted the ‘old-timers’ – those who had dominated traditional politics for decades and 
who supported traditional, ‘establishment’ candidates such as Hubert Humphrey and Henry 
Jackson, against the ‘newcomers’ – those who were stimulated by passionate concern with the 
issues of the late 1960s to enter the political aren  and who supported more radical candidates 
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like George McGovern.233 This division, she charged, crippled the party organization, 
exacerbated party divisions, weakened state parties in the recruitment process and in convention 
proceedings, and increased the importance of new constituencies at the expense of traditional 
ones.234 
Kirkpatrick asserted that the McGovern reforms were much more concerned with 
participation rather than actual representation. The political scientist pointed out that 
representing the rank and file members of a party was not the same as making sure that everyone 
who desired to influence the nominating process was able to do so. Moreover, Kirkpatrick 
disregarded the commission’s belief that the previous unequal political participation of women, 
minorities, and the youth could only be due to discrimination instead of other qualities such as 
ambition, interest, or skill.235 Thus, Kirkpatrick found fault with the convention’s adoption of the 
doctrine of demographic representation for choosing delegates over the more traditional doctrine 
of radical representation. She claimed, 
The goal of demographic theories is an assembly in which some specific physical and/or 
social characteristics are present in roughly the same proportions as their occurrence in 
the total electorate. The goal of the radical theories is an assembly that reflects the 
opinions and orientations of the electorate in its decisions on matters of public 
policy…proponents of demographic representation propose to achieve the desired 
outcome through institutional devices, notably quotas… radical representation relies on 
the dynamics of personal ambition, intraparty and interparty competition, and the 
preferences of the representd o determine the composition of the representative 
assembly… The radical doctrine… does not deny that sex or race may be importantly 
related to social positions and political views. But it does not assume that these 
characteristics have special, unique, or definitive rel vance to political perspectives, 
roles, or outcomes. It leaves the decision concerning the relevance of different statuses to 
those to be represented… The demographic approach… requires that someone other than 
voters determine which of the many statuses of a person are in fact most important: the 
McGovern Commission decided in favor of sex, race, nd age.236 
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 According to Kirkpatrick, despite its efforts, the commission failed to make the party 
truly representative of both the rank and file party members and the American electorate in its 
entirety. To prove this, she examined the age, sex, and race of the delegates of both parties. As 
the women’s movement began to grow in the late 1960s and early 1970s, both parties were 
forced to pay attention to women’s issues. This led to an increase in the number of women 
present at both the RNC and the DNC; however, based on their totals in the general population, 
women were under-represented. Forty percent of the delegates at the DNC were women, while 
thirty percent of Republican delegates were female. Kirkpatrick maintained that though more 
women were represented, many of them, specifically those belonging to the Democratic Party, 
were not representative of the majority of women in America. Instead, the majority of female 
delegates were affiliated with the women’s liberation movement, a group she described as 
‘political amateurs’ who were most concerned with feminist issues and who cared little for party 
unity.237  
African Americans, the majority of whom were Democrats, increased their influence at 
the DNC as they, like women, benefitted from the new quota system. As compared to their total 
numbers within the American population (approximately eleven percent), African Americans 
were over-represented at the DNC and under-represented at the RNC, constituting sixteen 
percent of Democratic delegates and five percent of Republican delegates. Though over-
represented, Kirkpatrick praised black delegates at the DNC for their party loyalty, noting that 
though they had distinct views on busing, crime, and welfare, their views on other issues 
resembled those of the rank and file members of the party.238 Nonetheless, black delegates who 
supported McGovern were not necessarily representative of black party members. For example, 
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many African Americans remained divided over the busing issue, with a slight majority favoring 
neighborhood schools; however, black McGovern delegates overwhelmingly favored busing.239   
Thanks to the baby boom that occurred within the United States in the postwar era, 25 
million persons became first-time voters in 1972. Accordingly, the age structure of the two 
conventions changed, most notably within the Democratic Party. Twenty-three percent of 
Democratic and eight percent of Republican delegates were between the ages of 18 and 29. 
Among Democratic delegates, those under the age of 30 were most numerous in the McGovern 
ranks. According to Kirkpatrick, these delegates were similar to the new female delegates in that 
“the opinions of that group were remote from those f rank and file Democratic identifiers of any 
age.”240 What of other age groups? Whereas persons between th  ages of 30 and 50 were 
overrepresented at the DNC, those aged 40 to 65 were overrepresented at the RNC. Those over 
the age of 65 were substantially underrepresented at both conventions: persons over the age of 65 
constituted fifteen percent of the total American population, yet Democratic delegates over the 
age of 65 comprised only four percent of the total while only nine percent of Republican 
delegates were of this age group.241  
 According to Kirkpatrick, the McGovern Commission, “for reasons known best to its 
own members, preoccupied with representation of women, blacks, and youth” paid little 
attention to the representation of socioeconomic classes.242She found the social homogeneity of 
the two conventions to be interesting, yet not surprising, noting that the vast majority of all 
delegates at both conventions boasted higher educational levels, better jobs, and made more 
money than the majority of Americans. This was trueev n of those delegates who were African 
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American, female, or under the age of 30. Although in 1970 fifty percent of American families 
had incomes under $10,000.00 per year and five percent had incomes over $25,000.00, only five 
percent of Republican and thirteen percent of Democratic delegates earned less than $10,000.00. 
Meanwhile fifty-eight percent of Republican and thirty-five percent of Democratic delegates 
earned more than $25,000.00. Contrasts in education were sharper: forty-two percent of rank and 
file Democrats and thirty-five percent of Republicans had less than a high school education, but 
only four percent of the Democratic and two percent of the Republican delegates fell into this 
category. Though ¾ of Democratic and 2/3 of Republican Party members had only a high-school 
education, sixty percent of both conventions’ delegat s held a college degree.243  
 The occupation of delegates matched their educational levels. Kirkpatrick noted that 
relatively small numbers of self-employed businessmen, farmers, and workers were present at 
the DNC as compared to previous years.244Businessmen, farmers, and workers constituted self-
interest groups that were concerned with material rewa ds and economic incentives that 
Kirkpatrick deemed as legitimate incentives for political action. In lieu of such typically 
‘democratic’ groups there was an increase in the number of middle-class professional elites, in 
particular lawyers and teachers, who were, she argued, more concerned with the symbolic 
aspects of politics. Kirkpatrick paid special attenio  to the rise to political prominence of 
professionals she termed “symbol specialists” – teach rs, advertisers, journalists, clergy, 
publishers, and commentators. Such groups were experts in the production, manipulation, and 
communication of the symbols with which persons interpret events, define goals, and attribute 
meanings. According to Kirkpatrick, symbol specialists not only communicate values and myths, 
they were also “guardians, destroyers, and creators of the collective myths that bind together and 
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rip apart communities and societies.”245 The majority of symbol specialists present at the DNC 
were critics of the traditional culture and supporters of McGovern. Therefore, they used their 
communication skills to focus attention on issues with hich they were concerned. Kirkpatrick 
noted that politics dominated by such professionals, “is likely to have a higher ideological 
content and the political process is more likely to be conceived as an arena for setting public 
agendas and resolving moral problems than as an arena for winning and compromising material 
interests.”246 
Consequently, this ‘new class’, which dominated the Democratic Convention, exhibited 
less party loyalty and deemphasized winning elections as the party’s principal and legitimate 
goal. In her studies of both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions Kirkpatrick 
found that an emphasis on winning was high among the Republicans and those Democrats that 
supported ‘traditional candidates’ such as Hubert Humphrey. According to Kirkpatrick, an 
emphasis on winning stimulated the parties’ efforts to broaden their coalitions and to harmonize 
differences between various factions. Those, such as t e ‘new class’, who did not emphasize 
winning and party loyalty, only increased controversy within the party over various issues.247  
 Kirkpatrick questioned delegates about their stances regarding a number of issues 
including authority, foreign affairs, economic issue , welfare policies, race relations, and crime 
in order to ascertain what other differences existed b tween the New Left or ‘new class’ and the 
more established party members. When it came to viewpoints concerning authority, McGovern 
supporters exhibited a higher disrespect toward it than traditional Democrats and the vast 
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majority of Republicans.248  Kirkpatrick’s interest in authority stemmed from its relationship to 
legitimacy and force – legitimate governments have the authority to utilize force to coerce 
compliance with their decisions. Members of the New Left repeatedly challenged the legitimacy 
and authority of the American government and its policies, and consistently opposed the state’s 
use of coercive power, both at home with police and national guardsmen, and abroad with the 
U.S. military. Kirkpatrick noted that a low opinion of government and authority was relatively 
new on the American political scene, at least since the New Deal and World War II, and that 
such attitudes were bound to have important effects on the political system. She claimed, 
Cynicism about government and governors can justify diverse assaults on the public 
order. The demand for radical change is one well-known response. Corruption is 
another… the belief that government is corrupt itself b comes a corrupting factor. When 
the political elite holds such beliefs, political dialogue is likely to be shrill or cynical or 
both. Redemptive zeal and cynical manipulation are the normal products of a loss of 
confidence in the political institutions of society.249 
  
Cynicism, along with the questioning of authority and the legitimate use of force, were 
also representative of the New Left’s attitudes towards American foreign relations. According to 
Kirkpatrick, several factors caused Americans to re-examine American military and foreign 
commitments in the late 1960s and early 1970s including Vietnam and the Nixon 
Administration’s emphasis on détente. Of fundamental importance was the emergence of a new 
generation who had no personal memory of either the Nazi holocaust or communist 
expansionism. Though delegates at both the RNC and the DNC remained divided on many 
foreign policy issues, in particular Vietnam and the American presence in Southeast Asia, the 
McGovern delegates were most opposed to the use of American military force and to the 
maintenance of American military superiority. Instead of force, they favored greater U.S. support 
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for the United Nations and increased economic aid to needy nations. Kirkpatrick related this 
attitude to their perception of the world, noting that if one viewed the world as a dangerous 
place, where the aggression of the great communist powers was only kept in check by the fear of 
retaliation, then it was important for the most powerful non-communist nation, the United States, 
to maintain military superiority and observe its commitment to collective security agreements 
and treaties negotiated during the postwar years. However, if one believed that the world was not 
dangerous and that communists did not pose a threat to the vital interests of the United States 
then it did not make sense to maintain the world’s most powerful military establishment. From 
this point of view, it was more appropriate to embrace a strategy of international cooperation.250 
 In addition to their lack of respect towards authority and Cold War policies, the New Left 
or ‘new class’ differed from traditional Democrats in their economic views. With the economy 
showing signs of “acute strain in shifting from a wrtime to a peacetime basis and from the 
impact of Republican economics”, economic issues – an ever higher cost of living, higher taxes, 
and increasing unemployment numbers – were considered most pressing to the American 
electorate as a whole in 1972.251 In order to establish the economic orientation of the delegates, 
questions were asked about the role of government in the economy and attitudes towards 
business interests and labor. Overall, Kirkpatrick found the results interesting, though not 
unexpected. For one, the results testified to the withering away of laissez-faire economics by 
demonstrating that, at least on the elite level, th economic ‘right’ did not exist, for nearly all 
delegates – Republican and Democrat – believed that the government should take action to 
combat inflation.252 Second, the delegates’ respective attitudes towards business interests and 
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trade unions indicated the persistence of traditional differences between the parties. Democrats 
were more favorable towards unions than Republicans, while Republicans were more favorable 
towards business interests than Democrats.  
At the same time, there were marked differences among the supporters of Humphrey, 
McGovern, and Wallace which, as stated by Kirkpatrick, demonstrated a weakening of the 
historic alliance between organized labor and the Democratic Party. Whereas Humphrey 
delegates were much more favorable towards organized labor, Wallace delegates remained 
hostile towards them. Furthermore, Humphrey delegates, while being the most pro-labor of all 
Democratic groups, were also the most favorable to business interests. The New Left’s animosity 
towards business was much higher than that of the other groups, yet this animosity was not off-
set by widespread support for labor. “Apparently McGovern delegates viewed both the major 
proponents on the economic scene,” Kirkpatrick noted, “big labor and big business, with a 
certain distaste.”253 Such distaste was acknowledged by labor when the nation’s largest union, 
the AFL-CIO, refused to endorse McGovern’s candidacy in 1972.254 
Yet another indicator of delegates’ economic orientation was their view on welfare 
policies. According to Kirkpatrick, during the early 1960s the majority of Americans agreed with 
the proposition that governments should provide public funds to help those unable to help 
themselves to achieve a minimum standard of physical well-being; however, by the late 1960s, 
welfare policies had “collided with the achievement thic”.255  President Johnson’s ‘War on 
Poverty’ defined larger numbers of people as ‘poor’, relaxed eligibility requirements for public 
relief, and increasingly abandoned policies that able-bodied recipients of welfare be required to 
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work.256 Kirkpatrick charged McGovern’s supporters with attacking the achievement ethic (or 
work ethic) by backing the use public funds to support “able-bodied but lazy persons”.257 
Conversely, the majority of Wallace and Nixon supporters were in favor of the obligation to 
work, while Humphrey delegates remained divided on welfare issues.258 
 McGovern delegates also differed from traditional Democrats, Wallace supporters, and 
Republicans in matters concerning race relations. By 1972, controversy concerning government 
action in the field of race relations centered on busing school children across district lines in 
order to achieve racial balance. “Busing children out of neighborhood schools involves mixing 
cultures and classes as well as races,” Kirkpatrick noted, “It deprives parents who must use 
public schools of control over the environment in which their children are socialized.”259 She 
went on to point out that the busing issue and civil d sobedience were examples of how questions 
of race and civil rights had become intertwined with social policy. McGovern delegates were 
overwhelmingly in favor of both busing and civil disobedience, while Wallace supporters and the 
majority of Republicans were opposed to both. Moreover, the majority of Humphrey supporters 
were able to make distinctions between civil rights and social policy by approving of civil rights 
and disapproving of busing and civil disobedience.260 
 Following its publication, the book received mixed r views. One reviewer praised the 
book for its “extremely rich and intelligently analyzed” data, yet noted that it was “too long, 
discursive, repetitive, and fragmentary, with bits of theory tacked on here and there”.261Though 
this commentator agreed with Kirkpatrick’s overall assertion that a new breed of political elite 
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had evolved, one that was motivated primarily by value concerns and issue commitments, others 
were less sympathetic. One critic claimed it was not methodologically sound to choose an 
extreme case (1972) and compare it with an arbitrarily chosen baseline (1948 and 1952). 
Moreover, it was difficult to prove that an evolution in the political elite had occurred since 
similar data did not exist for national conventions between 1952 and 1972. Finally, the author 
pointed out that the ‘new breed’ Kirkpatrick described was barely present within the Republican 
Party, thus the ‘new breed’ may well represent only a short-term phenomenon within the 
Democratic Party.262 
Overall, it is obvious that Kirkpatrick found the establishment of the McGovern reforms 
to be disastrous for the Democratic Party. Whereas some saw the McGovern reforms as a 
landmark in the struggle for party democracy, an emancipation proclamation that freed the party 
from control by bosses and entrenched interests, others viewed them as a mistaken, though well-
intentioned effort that ended up crippling party organization, exacerbating party differences, and 
making electoral victory nearly impossible. To others, the reforms constituted “a naked power 
grab by one faction that used its control of the reform commission to write rules that assured it an 
advantage in the contest for the nomination.”263It is clear from her work, especially by her 
assertion that most delegates were chosen as “supporters f particular presidential candidates”264 
that Kirkpatrick fell into the latter category. 
Conclusions 
 During the 1960s and 1970s, Kirkpatrick’s interest in totalitarianism and non-democratic 
regimes, an interest sparked during her college years and cemented by her exposure to the first-
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hand accounts of fascist and communist refugees, did not wane.  Her fascination with 
authoritarianism led her to choose Argentina during the Peronist period as the topic of her 
dissertation. In her analysis of Peronism and Argentin  politics in the decade following Perón’s 
downfall, Kirkpatrick asserted that Peronism did not c nstitute fascism or any form of 
totalitarianism; rather it was a blend of authoritarian and democratic elements, common in Latin 
American regimes. The Argentine political system, si ilar to those of other Latin American 
nations, was characterized by a limited experience i  democratic methods, an entrenched 
oligarchy, a military that often interfered with politics, the use of violence by various groups, and 
direct political action such as the use of strikes and lobbying activities. Such systems involved a 
variety of legitimate political behaviors including voting, oligarchical control, military coup, 
violence, and strikes. According to Kirkpatrick, as long as citizens were able to utilize such 
methods to influence the political system, a certain degree of political action and freedom 
existed.   
Despite this, Kirkpatrick was careful to point out that Peronism was not necessarily a 
stepping stone on the path to liberal democracy. Based on the history of Argentina, Kirkpatrick 
deemed it unlikely that the country’s political system would become a full-fledged democracy in 
the near future. Though this assertion seemed to beat odds with one of the major contentions of 
the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, namely that authoritarian regimes were capable of evolving into 
approximate democratic states thereby warranting American support, this was not necessarily the 
case. Kirkpatrick believed that it was impossible to create democracy anywhere, at any given 
time; instead, democratic values and institutions mu t develop over time. Even the United States, 
the beacon of democracy to the world, did not emerge as a mature democratic state in the late 
18th century following its independence from Great Britain; it took another two hundred years for 
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political equality to be available to all Americans. Accordingly, the U.S. should be patient and 
continue to support authoritarian regimes, especially those in Latin America whose political 
systems included some democratic characteristics. Such governments were preferable to 
totalitarian regimes, and were, with American support and encouragement, capable of evolving 
into liberal states over time. 
Kirkpatrick’s belief that political change should occur slowly was not limited to the 
evolution of democracy in nations around the world. One of her major critiques of the rise of the 
New Left within American society and politics involed the movement’s demands for 
instantaneous social and cultural change. This is particularly true of the radical feminist and civil 
rights organizations. Though she was a feminist and an advocate for civil rights, Kirkpatrick 
supported only governmental action that would guarantee political equality and non-
discrimination. Once political and social equality were guaranteed, hard work, ambition, and 
ability would determine the success of an individual. She opposed the establishment of gender 
and racial quotas due to her belief that such laws violated the American tradition of equal 
opportunity by providing special assistance to specific groups. Moreover, Kirkpatrick remained 
highly critical of legislation that went against social mores or violated existing social and cultural 
norms. She maintained that society’s attitudes towards, and beliefs about, women and minorities 
could not be changed overnight via legislation. Such changes could occur only gradually as more 
women and African Americans took advantage of availble opportunities in order to advance 
themselves within society. 
 In addition to its demand for radical change, Kirkpatrick disapproved of the New Left’s 
methods and goals. Though she condoned the use of violence, strikes, and direct action in 
authoritarian regimes as legitimate political activities that occurred outside of the electoral arena, 
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Kirkpatrick found similar actions by student protestor , anti-war activists, and black power 
organizations to be unacceptable within the United States. In fact, Kirkpatrick labeled such 
activities as ‘fascist’. American radicals were, to her, nothing less than totalitarians whose 
ultimate goal was to institute a social and cultura revolution. Though her classifications of the 
New Left as ‘fascist’ and ‘totalitarian’ were extrem  and exaggerated, based on her educational 
background, it is not surprising that Kirkpatrick viewed the New Left as political extremists, 
similar to both the fascists who had brought about the fall of the Weimar Republic and to the 
communists who had taken over Russia and China, whose g al was to destroy the American 
democratic experiment by fundamentally restructuring American society and culture. 
Given her beliefs about the nature of the New Left, Kirkpatrick was outraged by its 
increasing power within the Democratic Party. Her frustration reached its zenith in 1972 when, 
due to rule changes in delegate selection, the Democratic National Convention was dominated by 
the New Left and its various agendas. Kirkpatrick’s antipathy towards what she viewed as the 
hijacking of the Democratic Party by leftist extremist groups caused her to vote Republican for 
the first time in her life. Immediately following the 1972 elections, the political scientist, along 
with other centrist liberals, formed the Coalition f r a Democratic Majority (CDM), an 
organization dedicated to reversing the rule changes which had allowed for the New Left’s 
temporary takeover of the party. In their zealous efforts to rid the party of radicalism, many 
members of the CDM, including Kirkpatrick, were pushed further to the right, so much so, that 







 By the end of the 1970s, Jeane Kirkpatrick had become part of the burgeoning 
neoconservative movement. Though she remained a member of the Democratic Party, the 
lingering effects of the New Left’s power both within the party and upon American society had 
pushed the political scientist further to the right of he political spectrum. Her transformation 
from liberal Democrat to neoconservative was also fueled by her disenchantment with détente 
policies and the increasing American tolerance for totalitarianism such policies represented. 
Accordingly, Kirkpatrick became a member of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority – an 
organization determined to defeat the influence of the New Left within the Democratic Party in 
both domestic and foreign affairs; the Committee on the Present Danger – a bipartisan group 
dedicated to the destruction of détente policies which demanded an increase in American 
military spending; and the American Enterprise Institute – a conservative think tank whose 
members shared her distaste for détente and the New Left. As a neoconservative activist, 
Kirkpatrick was a vocal detractor of the Carter Administration’s foreign policies. Following the 
overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the Somoza regime in Nicaragua in 1979, Kirkpatrick 
published a scathing critique of the administration’s policies entitled “Dictatorships and Double 
Standards”.  The article, a summary of her evolved political philosophy, pointed out several 
distinctions between non-democratic regimes, an analysis that became known as the Kirkpatrick 
Doctrine. The piece outlined the necessary requirements for democracy, criticized the Carter 
administration’s misunderstanding of revolutions and the nature of right-wing governments, and 
denounced the administration’s utilization of modernization theory as the basis for a foreign 
policy. The article caught the eye of Republican presidential hopeful, Ronald Reagan, who 
recruited Kirkpatrick to work for his campaign and later, his administration. 
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Coalition for a Democratic Majority 
Nearly immediately following McGovern’s loss to Nixon in the 1972 Presidential 
election Kirkpatrick, along with several other like-minded liberals, formed an organization 
known as the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM). The purpose of the CDM was to 
wrest control of the Democratic Party away from the New Left by both reversing the rule 
changes instituted through the McGovern-Fraser Commission and revamping the party platform. 
Members included former Humphrey aid and Kirkpatrick family friend Max Kampelman, Civil 
Rights leader and activist Bayard Rustin, Midge Decter, Editor in Chief of Commentary 
magazine Norman Podhoretz, political scientist and future National Security Advisor Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Soviet historian Richard Pipes, and attorney and former Undersecretary of State for 
Political Affairs Eugene Rostow, among others. The organization’s manifesto, “Come Home, 
Democrats”, written by Norman Podhoretz and Midge Decter (and subsequently ‘toned down’ 
by Kirkpatrick) appeared in the New York Times and the Washington Post on December 7, 
1972.265 
 The manifesto began by claiming that Nixon’s victory did not represent a major political 
shift to the right in the United States; rather, it demonstrated the American people’s rejection of 
New Left policies. Such a decisive refutation should serve as a wake-up call for the party to 
return to its traditional roots. According to the coalition, the Democratic tradition involved the 
following: the creation of an ever fairer distribution of the fruits of the country’s vast wealth and 
productivity; a sustained effort, through compensatory action, to give those who had been 
disadvantaged either by birth or background a full opportunity to compete as equals in American 
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life; a sober but spirited assumption of America’s share of responsibility for the establishment of 
a more secure international community; a knowledge that without democratic order there could 
be no justice and without justice there could be no democratic order; a belief that democracy 
worked and that it worked because American voters were wisely and prudently aware of their 
own self-interests.266 
 The manifesto goes on to describe the various ways in which the ‘new politics’, or the 
New Left, had undermined the traditional beliefs and values of the Democratic Party. In 
particular, the CDM faulted the New Left’s neo-isolationism in foreign affairs, its depiction of 
American society as immoral and sick, its penchant for disruptive demonstrations, and its 
insistence on utilizing quotas in order to bring about social equality.  Such activities had 
marginalized traditional constituents of the party, and, worse yet, had allowed the Republicans, 
“a party so long and so accurately known as the party of privilege,” to represent themselves for 
the first time as the champions of the values and concerns that had long been a part of the 
Democratic Party’s tradition.267 “Come Home, Democrats” concludes with an appeal for like-
minded persons to join the group and support the coalition’s efforts to rescue the Democratic 
Party: 
to all who believe this society must end all forms of discrimination against some without 
recourse to discrimination against others; to all who believe in a pluralistic political 
process in which no single group or class enjoys a special moral status: to all who believe 
that, regardless of past miscalculations or failures of policy, US involvement in 
international affairs continues to be necessary to the establishment of a stable and viable 
international order; to all who believe that while our society must be vastly improved, it 
has not failed.268 
 
                                                           





Until recently, historians have paid little attention to the Coalition for a Democratic 
Majority, except to note that many of its founders and members ended up in the neoconservative 
camp.  When it has been discussed, the organization is ften dismissed as ultimately 
ineffective.269 This may have to do with the fact that the CDM was a small, underfinanced 
association which only produced newsletters and pamphlets, and then only sporadically. Despite 
these institutional deficiencies, Justin Vaïsse, author of Neoconservatism: The Biography of a 
Movement, views the Coalition for a Democratic Majority as a milestone in the evolution of 
neoconservatism and credits the group for ushering in what he calls the ‘Second Age of 
Neoconservatism’.   
In his work, Vaïsse identifies three ‘ages’ of neoconservatism, the first of which was born 
out of domestic political issues, in particular, various social policies of the 1960s that 
successfully ruptured the vital center of American politics. Members of the first age of 
neoconservatism consisted largely of New York intellectuals and former radicals who began 
criticizing the limits of the social policies largely associated with the Great Society. Vaïsse 
contends that the second age of neoconservatism was born in 1968 and solidified by 1972 with 
the creation of the CDM. This age was distinguished from the previous one by two factors. First, 
neoconservatives moved beyond purely intellectual debates over policies and became actively 
involved in the political process. And second, they expanded their interests to include foreign 
affairs as well as domestic issues.270  Those associated with the second age of neoconservatism 
were primarily Democratic Party members who were upset by the rise of the New Left. Vaïsse 
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dates the third age of neoconservatism from1995 and argues that it consisted only of right-wing 
conservatives who were concerned primarily with increasing the use of American power abroad. 
The first priority for the members of the CDM was to retake control of the Democratic 
Party; therefore, during the first two years of its existence the organization focused on 
restructuring the reforms that had allowed for the New Left to dominate the 1972 Democratic 
National Convention. Beginning in 1973, coalition me bers took part in party efforts to revamp 
the delegate selection process and involved themselves in rewriting the Democratic Party’s 
charter. Their efforts towards re-empowering party regulars and traditional party members 
through work on the Mikulski Commission were somewhat successful. The Mikulski 
Commission, also known as the Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure, 
organized in 1973 and led by future Maryland Senator Barbara Mikulski, was given the task of 
reforming the delegate selection process for the 1976 Democratic National Convention. Specific 
quotas for delegates based on race, gender, and age were shelved by the commission, along with 
the approval of a provision that allowed for greater participation by party regulars.271 
Having, it believed, rescued the party from political extremists, the CDM began turning 
its attention towards foreign policy issues. This turn away from domestic policies by the 
coalition was also facilitated by the decline of the various protest movements of the 1960s 
counterculture.  In February of 1974 the Foreign Affairs and Defense Task Force was created 
within the CDM. Jeane Kirkpatrick became a member of the Policy Drafting Committee of the 
task force, a committee that included Eugene Rostow, f rmer Undersecretary of State George 
Ball, Norman Podhoretz, former Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler, union activist Albert 
Shanker, and several academics such as Samuel P. Huntington, Robert James Maddox, Lucian 
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W. Pye, John P. Roche, and Paul Seabury.272  Vaïsse credits this task force with producing a 
neoconservative foreign policy. 
According to Vaïsse, the neoconservative foreign policy espoused by the CDM contained 
five elements: the defense of democracy, the promoti n f human rights, the assertion of 
American military power, support for Israel, and decreased emphasis on multilateral action and 
the United Nations.273 Coalition members strongly believed in the defense of democracy: the 
United States, as the only democratic superpower, had a duty to protect and support other 
democratic states.  Though skeptical of the 1975 Helsinki Accords, the CDM was a strong 
champion of human rights, primarily in communist naions. They worked with the media to bring 
about greater awareness of human rights issues and held several events and fundraising dinners 
in the late 1970s to support communist dissidents ad human rights advocates from the Soviet 
Union and the Eastern Bloc.274 Kirkpatrick and the other members of the Foreign Affairs and 
Defense Task Force were dedicated Cold Warriors, and as such they called for an increase in 
defense spending so that the U.S. military might thwart any efforts made by the Soviets to 
expand. Geopolitical concerns, such as the expansion of the Soviet Union into the Middle East, 
constituted one of several reasons why support for Israel was such a large part of the 
neoconservative foreign policy vision. Other factors, including the defense of democracy in the 
region, along with the strong ties between American Jews and Israel on one side, and between 
American Jews and the Democratic Party on the other, were also important.275Finally, members 
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of the CDM wanted the U.S. to distance itself from the United Nations and multilateral action in 
general. 
Having established a framework for the conduct of foreign relations, the task force began 
criticizing those diplomatic strategies that failed to fall under the purview of their 
neoconservative vision, namely the Nixon-Kissinger policy of détente. In July of 1974, the 
Foreign Policy Task Force of the CDM released a statement entitled “The Quest for Détente”. 
This report, issued in response to Kissinger’s call for public debate on American-Soviet 
relations, was one of the first major critiques of the Nixon Administration’s efforts at 
rapprochement.276  
In “The Quest for Détente”, the group claimed to support American efforts to achieve 
‘true’ détente – arms limitations treaties and mutually beneficial economic agreements with the 
Soviets. However, according to the CDM, three conditions were necessary in order to attain 
‘true’ détente: an end to the race for military supremacy, along with agreements on arms 
limitations based on parity; a more humane attitude by the Soviets toward the movement of 
people and ideas and toward the rule of law; and respect by the Soviets of the Charter of the 
United Nations governing the use of international force both in guerrilla and conventional 
warfare.277Not surprisingly, the coalition did not envision the meeting of these prerequisites 
anytime in the foreseeable future. “It takes two to achieve détente,” the CDM asserted, and in the 
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minds of the task force, only the United States wasseriously engaged in the process.278 Given the 
coalition’s conclusions, the organization found much to condemn in the Nixon policies. 
The CDM attacked Nixon’s claims that détente had been achieved and that a new 
relationship, one based on mutual understanding, had begun between the Soviet Union and the 
United States. The group declared these statements to be both preposterous and dangerous – 
dangerous because the belief that they were true led to ‘wishful thinking’, which had a 
remarkable power to reshape the appearance of reality, and preposterous because such claims 
were not true.  The CDM pointed out that the Soviet Union had not changed its behavior; instead 
it continued to both repress and undermine democratic movements and governments and provide 
support for terrorism, guerilla warfare, and wars of aggression around the globe. Furthermore, 
the group argued that détente was an American concept, one completely foreign to the Soviet 
Union, and that the American tendency to project its values and motives onto others was 
inappropriate. Instead of détente, the Soviets viewed American overtures as the acceptance of 
‘peaceful coexistence’ and a retreat from containmet. Moreover, according to the report, the 
Soviets believed that détente policies stemmed froman American reappraisal of its values and 
concerns, a reassessment brought about through intimida ion by the increasing military power of 
the Soviet Union.279  
Though the members of the CDM dismissed this notion that the U.S. initiated detente due 
to intimidation, the group was quick to sound the alarm regarding the growth of Soviet 
conventional and nuclear forces. The task force pointed to the recent rapprochement with China 
as evidence of the growing threat posed by Russian armed forces. “The change in relationships 
between the U.S. and China, did not arise through a c ange in the totalitarian character of the 
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Chinese regime,” the organization argued, “or through a resurgence of good will toward 
Americans that lay dormant in the hearts of the Chinese people…China ultimately approached 
the United States for one compelling reason – because it perceived a mortal threat in the Soviet 
mobilization of fifty divisions in Siberia, and in the Soviet penetration of India, Southeast Asia, 
and the South Pacific. The United States is the only power on earth that can check what China 
believes to be a genuine danger of the military power of the Soviet Union.”280 
Consequently, the group urged the U.S. government to i crease its military spending so 
that American nuclear and conventional forces would remain superior to those of the Soviet 
Union. The CDM noted that in this area the U.S. andits allies were at a disadvantage when 
compared to the Soviets and Warsaw Pact members due to differences among their political 
systems. The domestic political repercussions of détente could be controlled and regulated in 
closed, communist societies as there was no risk that the rhetoric of Soviet-American détente or 
rapprochement could cause independent-minded legislatures to cut defense spending or withdraw 
armed forces from Europe. Conversely, the rhetoric and arguments employed in Nixon’s 
proclamations of détente in the U.S. had worked to increase the public’s demand for a unilateral 
and massive reduction of American military forces.281 Thus, by pointing out the Chinese fear of 
the Soviets, highlighting Soviet interventions throughout the globe, and repeatedly emphasizing 
the growth of the Soviet military, the organization hoped to overcome the “mood of relaxation 
which President Nixon’s claims of ‘détente’ have inspired”.282 
 The authors of “The Quest for Détente” also criticized the economic dimensions of Nixon 
and Kissinger’s policies. They pointed out that the U.S. had gained nothing substantial in return 
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for its subsidized sale of grains and the extension of credit for industrial goods at low rates to the
Soviets. Though the CDM claimed to favor mutually beneficial economic relations between the 
two superpowers, it noted that this was unlikely to happen since the Soviets had very few 
resources that the U.S. needed. The Soviet Union did possess rare precious metals and large 
quantities of oil and gas, all of which they proposed to sell to the U.S. in exchange for 
technological information and capital, but the CDM opposed such trade agreements for a variety 
of reasons. First, the coalition argued that it would be unwise on the part of the U.S. to become 
dependent on the Soviets for strategic resources such as oil, for the Soviets could, at any time, 
hold these resources hostage. Second, by providing the Soviet Union with capital, the U.S. would 
be enabling the Kremlin to continue to finance its large military. After all, the group argued, the 
Soviets could finance their own industrial endeavors if they would only divert funds away from 
defense spending and towards domestic industrial production, something they consistently 
refused to do. Finally, should the U.S. provide the Soviets with advanced technology and large 
sums of money, its control over and exploitation of labor would give them an unfair advantage in 
the market.283 The CDM maintained that they would only support economic assistance and long-
term credits to the Soviets in exchange for clear, substantial political benefits, the specifics of 
which they did not describe. 
 Yet another criticism of détente made by Kirkpatrick and company centered on the 
ideological differences between the two superpowers.  In the decades following the end of World 
War II, anti-communism in the U.S. lost its fervor, so much so that ‘anti-communism’ in the 
1970s was largely associated with McCarthyism and witch-hunts. In the meantime, Americans 
had fallen prey to ‘convergence theory’ which held that as both American and Soviet 
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industrialized societies began facing similar environmental, organizational, and technological 
problems the differences between the two would subside. Nixon’s claims of having both 
achieved détente and forged a new relationship with the Soviets based upon mutual 
understanding served to further undermine anti-communist attitudes in the U.S. Conversely, the 
same could not be said of the Soviets whose belief in communism required there to be a 
bourgeois capitalist enemy. To abandon its ideological hostility to Western, capitalist nations 
would be tantamount to the rejection of communism, the belief system that gave the Soviet 
Union legitimacy both at home and abroad. Therefore, despite American efforts to ease tensions 
between the two superpowers, the Soviets would never cease to view the U.S. as their major 
ideological enemy.284 
 “The Quest for Détente” declared that it was in the national interest of the United States 
in world politics to achieve and maintain a balance of power which could effectively deter 
general war. The best way for Americans to do this would be to solidify its relationship with 
China, maintain complete solidarity with European and Pacific allies, and do ‘all that is required’ 
to deter Soviet nuclear and conventional power. The CDM acknowledged that the U.S. should 
persist in pursuing détente; however it should do so without any misconceptions concerning the 
Soviet Union. The threat of Soviet military power could not be taken lightly, for if “we allow 
ourselves to be deceived by a myth of détente, reduce o r military strength, and permit our 
alliances to erode” the safety of democracy in America could be at stake.285Despite this dire 
warning, the CDM remained convinced that the U.S. was up to the challenge. The nation had the 
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resources to do it. All Americans required was a common understanding of foreign policy goals 
and the recovery of “our confidence and our will.”286 
  As a member of the CDM’s Foreign Affairs and Defens  Task Force, Jeane Kirkpatrick 
was a major contributor to the critiques of the Nixon-Kissinger policies.   However, the political 
science professor’s denunciations of détente were not limited to those voiced by the coalition. 
Given her educational background, Kirkpatrick naturlly distrusted the Soviet Union, and 
consequently, American efforts towards normalizing relations with the communist state. She 
often referenced the work of Hannah Arendt in her criticism of détente, noting that wishful 
thinking about the nature of communism had blinded the world to its evil. “Again and again in 
our century,” she wrote, “the will to disbelieve the orrible has overwhelmed our sense of reality 
and left us unable to take prudent precautions.”287 Kirkpatrick blamed this will to disbelieve or 
‘wishful thinking’ on utopian dreams of universal equality. 
 Kirkpatrick was quite critical of utopianism which s e likened to rationalism as both 
were concerned with abstract theories rather than concrete realities. She wrote, 
The rationalist spirit assumes that human nature in the future may be qualitatively 
different than in the past. It views non-rational factors such as sentiment, habit, and 
custom as obstacles that can and should be overcome. It views each situation as a tabula 
rasa on which a plan can be imposed and views experi nc  in other times and places as 
having no relevance… Because it assumes that man and society can be brought to 
conform to a preferred plan, the rationalist orientation tends powerfully to see everything 
as possible and prospects for progress unlimited.288 
 
Such utopian or rationalist thinking had been projected upon the Soviet Union by those who had 
instituted détente. According to Kirkpatrick, policy-makers had ignored the fact that the nature of 
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the Soviet system was a totalitarian one, derived from a tradition of oriental despotism and from 
a tsarist synthesis of economic, social, and bureaucratic state power.289 Thus, the American 
expectation that the proliferation of economic and cultural ties and rewards would serve as 
incentives to restrain Soviet expansionism was based upon the Nixon Administration’s 
willingness to ignore and disbelieve historical realities and to substitute rationalism for realism. 
Based on such flawed theories, “unprecedented incentives were developed; yet unprecedented 
aggression nonetheless occurred.”290 
 Kirkpatrick also criticized détente because of the policy’s basis in stimulus-response and 
frustration-aggression theories. According to these theories, American military superiority served 
as a provocation to the Soviets which, in turn, stimulated countermeasures such as the Soviet 
military build-up. Should the United States exhibit restraint in its own military build-up, this 
would quiet Soviet fears and produce reciprocal restraint allowing for arms limitations treaties to 
be signed and a relaxation of tensions all around. Kirkpatrick declared that such theories were 
ludicrous: it was unrealistic to believe that the United States could control the actions of other 
nations, especially the Soviet Union, by merely taking care not to be threatening. Furthermore, 
Kirkpatrick maintained that frustration-aggression and stimulus-response theories placed danger 
into a psychological rather than military category, causing the global environment to appear to be 
less threatening. Thus, the utopianism and rationalism of détente provided Americans with a 
subjective sense of security that ignored the totali arian, revolutionary, irrational, and 
expansionist nature of the Soviet Union.291 
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 Many neoconservatives, including Kirkpatrick, also viewed détente as the revival of 19th 
century European realpolitik policies where nations jockeyed for position and influence within a 
stabilizing equilibrium, balanced and measured by professional diplomats. CDM members 
maintained that such a view did not accurately describe the U.S. and Soviet rivalry for it missed 
the ideological qualities inherent in modern global politics. Therefore, détente or realpolitik 
constituted the “vulgar substitution of expedience for principle,” which caused the nation to 
sacrifice its moral principles for a cynical appeal to national self-interest.292 Kirkpatrick 
maintained that U.S. foreign policy must always serve moral goals. “The notion that foreign 
policy should be oriented toward balance of power politics, or realpolitik,” she wrote, “ is totally 
foreign to the American tradition and, in fact, foreign to the American scene today. All of our 
wars…were justified in terms of the protection and extension of universal human rights.”293 In 
her mind, and in the minds of the neoconservatives, the extension of American power and 
influence in the world amounted to a human rights program in and of itself. For despite any flaws 
in the American system, liberal capitalism, with its emphasis on freedom, liberty, and equality, 
was morally superior to communist totalitarianism. 
The Committee on the Present Danger 
Shortly after the publication of “The Quest for Détente” in 1974, Eugene Rostow called 
for the formation of a bipartisan foreign affairs lobbying group that came to be known as the 
Committee on the Present Danger (CPD). According to Vaïsse, the most important precursor to 
the Committee on the Present Danger was the CDM.  Rostow, along with other members of the 
CDM, felt that the coalition’s foreign policy task force was not as effective in the fight against 
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détente as it needed to be.294 Consequently, the CPD was created. The organization that was 
formed in 1976 was inspired by both a previous version of the CPD that was active in the early 
1950s, and by the findings of Team B – a group of outside ‘experts’ sent to ‘re-evaluate’ the 
CIA’s intelligence reports on Soviet missile and military capabilities in the mid-1970s. Several 
members of the CDM became members of the CPD, including Jeane Kirkpatrick who was 
invited to join by family friend, Max Kampelman. Other ties existed between the groups as 
several CDM members, including Richard Pipes, Paul Nitze, and Paul Wolfowitz, were members 
of Team B. Furthermore, both CPDs could trace their intellectual origins to Nitze, either through 
NSC-68, or the reports of Team B.295 
 In September of 1976, the Committee on the Present Da ger drew up its rules of 
operation. The purpose of the CPD would be to facilit te national discussion of foreign policy 
issues. The organization claimed it existed only to educate the public and that its judgments were 
based on a full, fair, and objective factual foundation.296 In order to educate the masses about 
national security issues, the CPD planned to conduct and participate in seminars and 
conferences, publish pamphlets and articles, and advertise its findings through all forms of 
media. The group pledged to stay out of electoral politics and to refrain from supporting or 
opposing nominees for appointive offices. The committee declared that it was concerned only 
with broad principles and policy objectives. “It is not within our purview or our competence to 
comment on the intricacies and complexities of short-range tactics or maneuvers,” the group 
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maintained, “Our concern is with strategies and goals… not with all of the ramifications and 
details of its day-to-day implementation.”297 
 Having established what the CPD would and would not do, committee members focused 
on drafting the organization’s manifesto ,“Common Sense and the Common Danger”, which was 
released at a press conference in Washington, DC on November 11, 1976.298 In its manifesto, the 
CPD warned that the primary threat to the United States, to world peace, and to human freedom 
was the Soviet drive for world domination and the unparalleled military build-up orchestrated by 
Kremlin during the previous decade. The group declar d that such a massive military build-up 
could not be explained or justified by reasons of national defense; rather it was intended to 
enable the Soviet Union to play a more dominant role on the global stage. This increase in Soviet 
power, Kirkpatrick and her colleagues argued, threatened the political independence of 
America’s allies, fair access to raw materials, andfreedom of the seas.299 The U.S. must meet 
this challenge by increasing military spending, which was at an all-time low according to the 
committee, on both nuclear and conventional forces and research and development. Only from a 
strong foundation could the U.S. “pursue a positive and confident diplomacy”. 300 Should the 
U.S. ignore the Soviet danger and not opt for military preparedness,  
… we shall become second best to the Soviet Union i overall military strength; our 
alliances will weaken; our promising rapprochement with China could be reversed. Then 
we could find ourselves isolated in a hostile world, facing the unremitting pressures of 
Soviet policy backed by an overwhelming preponderance of power. Our national survival 
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itself would be in peril, and we should face, one aft r another, bitter choices between war 
and acquiescence under pressure.301 
 
 In 1976, as the United States celebrated its bicentennial, Kirkpatrick and the Coalition for 
a Democratic Majority began preparing for the Democrati  National Convention and the 
forthcoming election season. The group threw its support behind Senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson 
for the Democratic nomination. Vaïsse devotes a significant amount of attention to Jackson in his 
work, noting that the second age neoconservatives were often referred to as “Scoop Jackson 
Democrats”.302 Jackson’s attitude toward the Soviet Union was relentlessly hawkish; he had 
consistently fought for increased defense spending si ce the 1950s, and, in the 1970s, had 
successfully undermined Nixon and Kissinger’s détente policies with the passage of the Jackson-
Vanick Amendment. This initiative made favorable economic and trade agreements between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union dependent upon the liberalization of emigration policies by the 
Soviets for Russian Jews.303 Jackson’s Senate staff which included Richard Perle, Paul 
Wolfowitz, Elliot Abrams, and William Kristol ,was labelled a ‘neoconservative nursery’ by 
Vaïsse.304  
Jeane Kirkpatrick referred to Jackson as both a mentor a d a friend and praised him for 
his consistency and integrity.305 In addition to analyzing polling data for him, she travelled with 
Jackson across the country during his campaign as oe of the Senator’s ‘issue’s people’. 
Disappointed by Jackson’s loss to Carter, Kirkpatrick and fellow CDM members Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan and Ben Wattenberg focused their attention on the Democratic Party Platform. Their 
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hope was to achieve a moderate platform, one that was strong on national defense and did not 
give in to the New Left. For the most part, they were successful. The platform included much of 
what the CDM and Jackson wanted, so much so that one paper reported that Jackson may have 
lost the nomination, but he had won the policy war.306 
Following Jimmy Carter’s electoral victory in November of 1976, tensions between the 
CDM and the new president began to rise. According to Vaïsse, one of the reasons for the 
‘falling out’ had to do with the personal relationship between Carter and Jackson, or rather, the 
lack thereof. The two men had not gotten along wellb fore the presidential primary and the 
relationship soured further in the wake of Jackson’ failed presidential bid.307In addition, the 
group gave two separate lists of personnel recommendations labeled ‘CDM’ to Tony Lake, 
advisor to future Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. As only a couple of their recommendations 
received nominations, the CDM felt as though it hadbeen blacklisted by the new administration. 
Lake later claimed to have misplaced the CDM’s recommendations; however the coalition did 
not believe him. Regardless of what may or may not have happened to the lists, Vaïsse points out 
that Carter owed nothing to the CDM which had provided only lukewarm support during the 
electoral campaign.308  
Jeane Kirkpatrick was featured in both of the recommendation lists sent to Lake. She was 
suggested for an ambassadorial appointment and for Assistant Secretary of State for Educational 
and Cultural Affairs; however she was passed over by the Carter Administration for both.309 
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Kirkpatrick’s biographer and friend Peter Collier claimed that this was providential, for if she 
had been selected she would have “labored for a year or two in obscurity and been so tainted that 
Ronald Reagan probably would never have chosen her for his administration.”310 
 
By the time of Carter’s victory, Kirkpatrick had reached middle age. Her focus remained 
where it had been for the past two decades – on her family, academia, and politics. Kirkpatrick’s 
family life, though, was experiencing some changes. For one, she had lost her father and her 
mother would soon follow. For another, her husband was settling further into retirement while 
her children – John, Douglas, and Stuart were all growing up. According to friends and family, 
Kirkpatrick had always characterized her family life, along with her roles as a wife and mother, 
as positives. Though she may have felt occasionally left out as the only woman of the family, 
Kirkpatrick was a proud mother, one who often repeated, and possibly embellished upon, the 
things her boys would say. For example, she loved to tell the story of how, when asked by his 
first grade teacher about his family’s ethnic background, little Douglas responded “Democrat” 
when all of the other children were answering “Irish” or “French” or “Scottish”.311 Another story 
involved how the Kirkpatricks punished their sons whenever they misbehaved. Normal 
punishment involved the boys being sent to their rooms to write an essay about what they had 
done wrong and why they would never do it again. Stuart supposedly became exasperated by this 
and declared that he wished he and his brothers could get spankings like other kids.312 
Kirkpatrick desperately wanted her sons to follow in their parents’ footsteps and become 
intellectuals. For this reason, she often helped thm too much with their homework. This help 
                                                           





continued once the boys entered college as Kirkpatrick both allowed them to take her courses at 
Georgetown and gave them all very high scores. In truth, none of the boys were as intellectually 
or academically-minded as their parents. Furthermore, trouble seemed to visit them, usually in 
the form of cars, girls, and alcohol. Kirkpatrick once remarked to a friend that she wished there 
were “some sort of ritual like the Indians did where you could send your sons out to kill a bear or 
something and they’d come back men.”313  
One of the most overwhelming family issues faced by Kirkpatrick was her eldest son’s 
alcoholism. Douglas’ drinking, which had started in h gh school had escalated heavily very 
quickly after he reached young adulthood. By the time he graduated from high school, family 
members were constantly finding empty bottles hidden under his bed and in other parts of the 
house.  Over the years, the problem only grew worse. At one point Jeane and Evron sent him to 
live with her brother, Jerry, in Ohio who persuaded his nephew to seek help. According to 
friends and family members, Douglas was in and out of rehab for over 20 years, costing the 
family a little over $1 million dollars. Moreover, in addition to the monetary toll it took on the 
Kirkpatricks, Douglas’ alcoholism caused a rift in the family as the other brothers resented his 
behavior and the fact that their mother always continued to support him.314 
Adding to her familial struggles, Kirkpatrick’s husband’s health began to decline. In the 
spring of 1977, Evron contracted Legionnaire’s Disease and nearly died. He had travelled to 
Bloomington, Indiana in order to receive an honorary degree where he first became sick. Evron 
initially thought it was the flu, but in a matter of days, his health had deteriorated to a dangerous 
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degree. Legionnaire’s disease was a form of pneumonia that had only been discovered the 
previous year, and the newness of the illness, combined with his initial negative prognosis, made 
Kirkpatrick fear for her husband’s life. She spent a great deal of time researching the disease 
before moving Evron to a better hospital where he eventually recovered.315 
While Evron Kirkpatrick was recuperating, his wife was approached by William 
Baroody, the president of the conservative think-tank, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), 
and asked to join the organization. Feeling increasingly alienated from her fellow liberal 
Democrats, Kirkpatrick jumped at the chance to work with colleagues who shared her policy 
views, specifically those concerning national security and foreign affairs. Accordingly, she took 
a one year sabbatical from Georgetown University in order to devote herself to study at the AEI. 
While there, Kirkpatrick ran into several of her fellow CDM and CPD members including Irving 
Kristol, and fellow Democrats Michael Novak, Penn Kemble, and Ben Wattenberg. She also met 
figures such as former President Gerald Ford, future Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, and 
former solicitor general Robert Bork. In addition, Kirkpatrick learned more about Latin America 
as the AEI staged conferences dedicated to the region’s issues. At one such conference she met 
José Napoléon Duarte, the future president of El Salvador.316 
Over the next couple of years, Kirkpatrick’s standing as a public intellectual began to 
grow.  She had published three books of her own alog with an edited volume and several 
journal articles. She continued teaching at Georgetwn and remained an active member of the 
CDM, the CPD, and the AEI. Consequently, in 1979, Kirkpatrick was invited by the United 
States Information Agency to go on a speaking tour in India. While there, she took part in the 
dedication of a new building for the American Studies Research Center in Hyderabad, India. The 
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center was home to a 100,000 book library and served as a resource facility for Indian and Asian 
scholars who taught or researched American subjects. To mark the dedication, the Center hosted 
a three day seminar on “American Studies in Cross-Cultural Perspectives” in which Kirkpatrick 
took part. Other participants of the conference came from India, the United States, Nepal, South 
Korea, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Thailand, Japan, and Hong Kong.317 
Criticizing Carter 
Before her visit to India, Kirkpatrick, along with others affiliated with the CDM and 
CPD, had become much more vocal in criticizing the Carter Administration’s policies and in 
warning of the increasing dangers posed by the Soviet Union. “Although we had supported 
Scoop in 1976, almost no one expected that Carter would turn out as bad as he did,” Kirkpatrick 
wrote.318In fact, she viewed Carter as a second George McGovern, another politician who 
embraced the flawed worldview of the New Left. She summarized this new liberalism as 
embodying the beliefs that ‘weak is strong’, ‘vulnerable is safe’, ‘rich is guilty’, ‘hostile is 
neutral’, and ‘friendly is suspect’.319 Fellow neoconservative, Daniel Patrick Moynihan agreed, 
noting that with the exception of National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter had 
surrounded himself with McGovernites who were not, he claimed, representative of the 
mainstream Democratic Party.320  
Opposition to Carter from the CDM, and the CPD in particular, centered on arms 
limitations agreements. The Committee on the Present Da ger became obsessed with what it 
viewed as “unfavorable trends in the US-Soviet military balance” and made it its mission to alert 
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Americans to the increasing dangers of the “ominous Soviet military build-up”.321 The urgent 
tone of the various works of the CPD came from the committee’s belief that the CIA had 
consistently underestimated the massive Soviet miliary effort.322This belief was based on the 
findings of Team B. In the spring of 1976, CIA director George H. W. Bush appointed a team of 
analysts to review the agency’s intelligence estimates of Soviet military capabilities. Critics like 
the neoconservatives and Republican presidential hopeful, Ronald Reagan, had been charging 
the agency with underestimating Soviet power. Three T am A’s and Team B’s were organized, 
with Team A’s consisting of CIA analysts, while Team B’s were drawn from outside of the 
agency. The first teams dealt with Soviet anti-aircr ft systems, the second with the accuracy of 
Soviet missiles, and the third with ‘Soviet intentio s’. It was the third Team B under the 
leadership of CDM and CPD member Richard Pipes, an anti-Soviet Polish immigrant and 
historian, which would become famous. The team also included other neoconservative figures 
such as Paul Nitze and Paul Wolfowitz.323  
According to Team B, the Soviet military build-up was occurring at a pace comparable to 
that of Nazi Germany in the 1930s. This surge had occurred despite the signing of SALT and 
subsequent American ‘restraint’ in developing and deploying nuclear strategic forces. The Team 
asserted that unless the U.S. increased its military spending, the Soviets would gain nuclear and 
strategic parity, if not superiority, by the early 1980s. Furthermore, the group maintained that the 
CIA had underestimated Soviet capabilities because it failed to take into account the Kremlin’s 
intentions, or the ideas, motives, and aspirations behind Soviet capabilities, namely its goal of 
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achieving global hegemony. The majority of Team B’s findings were leaked to the press between 
October and December of 1976, and then published by the CPD in April of 1977 in a pamphlet 
entitled “What is the Soviet Union Up To?”. This, Vaïsse asserts, began a neoconservative 
pattern that would endure: “a commission of experts warns decisionmakers about strategic 
dangers that have previously been underestimated, most notably by the CIA. These warnings are 
always accompanied by leaks to the press designed to launch a polemic and to reach a large 
public audience.”324 
Though the press began to pay attention to the portentous warnings of the 
neoconservative groups, the Carter Administration appe red to ignore their concerns. 
Accordingly, both the CDM and the CPD launched attacks against the administration’s efforts at 
arms control. First, the CDM attempted to prevent the Senate confirmation of Paul Warnke as 
head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and chief SALT negotiator. The 
neoconservatives had several reasons for opposing Warnke’s confirmation: one, he had been an 
advisor to George McGovern in the 1972 presidential campaign; two, he had denounced the arms 
race as absurd, costly, unnecessary, and dangerous, which was, of course, anathema to the 
members of the CDM and CPD; and three, the neoconservatives were opposed in principle to 
another round of SALT agreements.325Though ultimately unable to prevent Warnke’s 
confirmation to both posts, Nitze’s testimony against him in Senate confirmation hearings 
garnered much wanted media attention for the group and their cause. 
Subsequently, both the CDM and the CPD endeavored t prevent the Senate ratification 
of SALT II agreements signed by Carter and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in 1979. Prior to the 
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signing of the agreements, the CPD had published pamphlets and held press conferences 
outlining their opposition to SALT, all of which gained attention from the press. CPD opposition 
to the treaty’s ratification coalesced behind Henry “Scoop” Jackson, the leading adversary of 
SALT in the Senate, and members of the group testifi d against the treaty seventeen times before 
various congressional committees. Their efforts, combined with the Carter Administration’s 
lackluster attempts at defending the treaty and various foreign policy blows suffered by the 
administration in 1979, forced the president to give up on ratification and withdraw the treaty 
from the Senate.326 
Kirkpatrick’s own critiques of Carter began almost immediately after his election. Not 
only did she oppose his support for détente, she also found fault with other aspects of the 
administration’s foreign policies. In a commencement speech delivered at the University of 
Notre Dame in May of 1977, Carter outlined the multiple components of his foreign policy, 
highlighting the administration’s emphasis on human rights. For one, the president declared that 
the U.S. should have a democratic foreign policy, one based on the nation’s fundamental values 
which meant using American power and influence for humane purposes such as the support for 
human rights.327 Such a policy would serve as an example for those nations around the world 
who doubted the merits of liberal capitalism or the int ntions of the United States. Furthermore, 
Carter stated that the U.S. was at long last free of rabid anti-communism, the intensity of which 
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had caused the nation to embrace any dictator who shared our fear and to utilize the tactics of our 
enemies, tactics which failed to live up to the nation’s liberal values.328 
Carter declared that a new world had emerged, one nt dominated solely by the Cold 
War. The end of colonialism was fostering a fresh sense of national identity in newly 
independent nations across the globe. Accordingly, U.S. policies should be based on five 
cardinal objectives: the promotion of human rights around the world, cooperation with the 
industrial democracies of the world, the improvement of American relations with the Soviet 
Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in order to decrease the threat of war, an 
increase in economic aid to developing nations, and a focus on international cooperation on 
global issues such as the threat of nuclear war, environmental concerns, racism, the arms race, 
hunger, and disease. 
 In addition to these general principles, Carter spoke specifically about the 
administration’s goals in achieving a settlement betwe n Israel and Egypt in the Middle East, the 
expansion of trade with the PRC and developing natio s, decreasing arms sales around the 
world, and a peaceful settlement to issues in Southern Africa based on majority rule and 
democratic principles. Altogether, Carter maintained, such policies were based on the historical 
vision of America’s role, derived from a larger view of global change, rooted in our moral 
values, reinforced by the United States’ material wealth and military power, and designed to 
serve all of mankind.329 
In response to the president’s speech, Kirkpatrick wrote a short essay entitled “On the 
Invocation of Universal Values” which outlined her concerns with Carter’s policies. Kirkpatrick 
praised Carter for accentuating human rights in foreign affairs as such an emphasis served as a 





reminder to Americans that the nation’s identity and purpose had always been deeply involved 
with the assertion of human rights. Kirkpatrick declared that there were three positive 
consequences of such a policy. First, it broke the anti-establishment, or New Left’s, monopoly on 
moral rhetoric. Second, it reassured Americans and others around the world that U.S. policy is 
guided by a vision of the public good. Third, it affirmed the idea that there were universal human 
rights that persons were entitled to, and that these ought to be respected by governments. In a 
reference to détente, Kirkpatrick noted that people could not live on pragmatism and profits 
alone. “For having recalled Americans to historic moral imperatives and for having placed 
individual rights back on the agenda,” Kirkpatrick wrote, “I applaud Carter.”330 
Nonetheless, the political scientist questioned many other aspects of Carter’s foreign 
policy. For instance, Kirkpatrick expressed doubt that the example of democracy would actually 
help to spread liberal political systems throughout the world because as history had 
demonstrated, democratic governments were rare and difficult to maintain. She pointed out that 
there were a number of pitfalls and perils that confronted those nations attempting to construct 
governments limited by law, based on majority rule, and guaranteeing political competition and 
respect for minority rights. “One may hope that the example of freedom provided by the Western 
democracies will reinforce the human appetite for liberty, “ she wrote, “but there hardly seem to 
be adequate grounds for confidence that their example will be compelling.”331 Her emphasis on 
‘hope’ implied her belief that Carter had fallen prey to that utopian rationalism which was 
causing many Americans to ignore the reality of globa  politics. 
Kirkpatrick also took issue with Carter’s stance on the arms race, his goal of normalizing 
relations with the People’s Republic of China, and his African policies. Carter’s description of 
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the arms race as ‘morally deplorable’ naturally aroused the ire of the dedicated Cold Warrior. 
Kirkpatrick questioned what exactly he meant by that st tement: was it immoral to spend money 
on weapons regardless of the context? Did not the moral quality of an arms race depend on the 
consequences of arming or not arming?332In addition, she posed many questions about Carter’s 
insistence on establishing true diplomatic relations with the PRC: why was it so important to do 
so? Did the president truly believe that the future of the Sino-Soviet split depended on the title of 
the American emissary in China? In reference to previous Cold War happenings and traditional 
American support for Taiwan, Kirkpatrick questioned whether normalization was “more 
important that demonstrating the fidelity of our commitments.”333  
Finally, Kirkpatrick found fault with Carter’s determination to bring majority rule to 
southern Africa. She did not doubt his sincerity in advocating a democratic system in Rhodesia 
and other parts of southern Africa, nor did she believ  that Carter’s insistence on majority rule 
meant ‘black rule’, or that he ‘covertly’ desired to replace white oligarchies with black 
dictatorships. However, she found his emphasis on the region to be problematic. She wrote, 
…if a white oligarchy does not seem to him more obnoxious than a black 
dictatorship, on what principle did the President deci e that it is more important to 
establish majority rule and minority rights in southern Africa than, say, in Uganda, or 
Tanzania, or Zaire, or Togo, of Ghana, or Nigeria, or Benin, or Kenya, or Buinea-Bissau, 
or Niger, Upper Volta, Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia, Senegal, Sierra Lone, Camaroons, 
Mozambique, or Angola? Or for that matter, how did he decide that it was more 
important to have majority rule and minority rights in southern Africa than in, say, Cuba, 
Cambodia, North Korea, or the Soviet Union, or than in Chile, Paraguay, or Panama?334 
 
According to her, this question demonstrated the difficulties that could be encountered by a 
government when it attempted to invoke universal moral rules as the justification for a policy 
which would necessarily be selectively applied. Carter and his administration should, in her 
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opinion, move beyond the invocation of universal values to the difficult business of applying 
them in an imperfect, intractable world.335 
 Kirkpatrick’s most compelling critique of the Carte  administration occurred in 1979 with 
the publication of “Dictatorships and Double Standards” in the November issue of Commentary 
magazine. The article was written following the overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua 
and the fall of the Shah of Iran. The publication of this article would have a profound effect on 
Kirkpatrick’s life. The article was widely-read, advancing her reputation as a public intellectual. 
One reader, Republican Presidential hopeful Ronald Reagan, was so impressed by her foreign 
policy analysis that he began actively recruiting her to aid in his campaign. In addition to 
garnering attention in political and academic circles, Dictatorships and Double Standards 
outlined various distinctions between non-democrati governments and their relation to 
American foreign policy which became known as the Kirkpatrick Doctrine.  
 Kirkpatrick began by claiming that President Carter’s sole foreign policy achievement 
was in laying the groundwork for the transfer of the Panama Canal to a “swaggering Latin 
dictator of a Castroite bent”.336 Indeed, Kirkpatrick claimed that his administration’s policies 
were riddled with failures. For one, she asserted, there had occurred a dramatic Soviet military 
build-up which had been accompanied by the stagnatio  of the American armed forces, and 
together, these phenomena had resulted in a dramatic extension of Soviet influence in Africa, 
Afghanistan, and in the Caribbean. For another, in one year alone, the United States had suffered 
two major blows – the loss of two long-time allies, Nicaragua and Iran. In both cases, 
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Kirkpatrick charged Carter with actively collaborating in the replacement of moderate autocrats, 
friendly to American interests, with less friendly ones of extremist totalitarian leanings.337 
 According to Kirkpatrick, there were several similarities that existed between Nicaragua 
and Iran, similarities also shared with other American allies. Neither Iran nor Nicaragua was a 
democracy; rather both nations were ruled by autocra s. Despite this, the leaders of both nations 
tolerated limited opposition including the existenc of oppositional newspapers and political 
parties. Moreover, both the Shah of Iran and Somoza in Nicaragua were faced with radical, 
violent revolutions which threatened their power and the political stability of their respective 
states. The violence wrought by revolutionaries caused both leaders to “sometimes” invoke 
martial law and to arrest, imprison, exile, and occasionally, “it was alleged”, torture their 
opponents.338 Though the Shah had attempted to create a technologica ly modern society in Iran, 
and Somoza had tried to introduce modern agricultural methods in Nicaragua, neither leader had 
attempted to reform their societies based on abstract ideals of social justice (which she viewed as 
euphemisms for communism) or political virtue, and neither had altered significantly the 
distribution of goods, status, or power in their resp ctive nations. Both men were trying to bring 
modernity to traditional societies.339 
 In addition, Kirkpatrick found the course of events in Nicaragua and Iran to be similar to 
those that had unfolded in China, Cuba, Vietnam, and A gola. In each case, she maintained, the 
American effort to impose liberalization and democratization on a government confronted with 
violent internal opposition not only failed; it actually assisted the coming to power of new 
regimes in which ordinary people enjoyed fewer freedoms and less security. More important, the 
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new regimes were hostile to American interests.  In Ira  and Nicaragua, autocracies that had 
established friendly relations with the United States were attacked by insurgents, some with ties 
to communist states, whose arms were provided nearly ntirely by communists. The Carter 
Administration had ignored or minimized the ‘Marxist’ presence among the insurgents on the 
grounds that it was the American support for the dictator that left the revolutionaries with little 
options than to search for arms elsewhere.  
Over time, violence had spread throughout the two natio s, and rhetoric utilized by the 
revolutionaries reminded Americans of their nation’s own revolution against autocratic and 
imperial rule, increasing sympathy for the rebel forces. In the meantime, requests for help from 
the besieged dictators remain unheeded. The U.S. had announced its determination to stay out of 
the conflicts as American involvement supposedly “confirms our status as an agent of 
imperialism, racism, and reaction; is inconsistent with support for human rights; alienates us 
from the ‘forces’ of democracy; and threatens to put the US once more on the side of history’s 
losers.”340 Only after the insurgents had come to power and anarchy had spread throughout the 
nation would it be noticed that the new rulers had no significant following, no experience at 
governing, and no talent for leadership. Meanwhile, Kirkpatrick contended, the United States 
would have helped to replace an erstwhile friend an lly with a government hostile to American 
interests and policies. “At best we will have lost access to friendly territory,” she wrote, “at worst 
the Soviets will have gained a new base.”341  
 Kirkpatrick acknowledged that not all situations conformed exactly to the sequence of 
events described above. For example, in the case of Iran, Carter had continued to support the 
Shah for quite some time, and at no point did he call for the Iranian leader to be deposed. 
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However, as the revolution in Iran gained momentum, the Carter Administration expressed its 
dedication to non-intervention, a principle that proved more important to Carter, Kirkpatrick 
charged, than American strategic interests in the region or national pride. For, instead of sending 
in marines to protect an ally and maintain stability n the region, Carter and his staff decided that 
the course of the revolution had to be determined by the Iranian people.342 The situation in 
Nicaragua was different as the role of the communists in the insurgency was much clearer and 
more significant than in Iran. Furthermore, Kirkpatrick accused American officials of actively 
working to get rid of Somoza. “In a manner uncharacteristic of the Carter Administration,” she 
wrote, “which generally seemed willing to negotiate nything with anyone anywhere, the US 
adopted an oddly uncompromising posture in dealing with Somoza.”343 Thus, the scenario in 
Nicaragua conformed nearly exactly to the described pattern. 
According to Kirkpatrick, Carter’s unwitting assistance in bringing to power regimes 
hostile to American interests occurred due to several misperceptions about what was actually 
going on in Iran and Nicaragua. First, the administration mistakenly believed that a democratic 
alternative to the incumbent government existed within he opposition. Second, Carter and his 
staff erroneously assumed that it was impossible to continue the status quo in both nations. 
Finally, Washington was operating under the misguided belief that any political change in the 
two nations was preferable to the current regimes.344 
Despite enormous evidence to the contrary, Kirkpatrick contended, Americans, including 
President Carter, mistakenly believed that it was po sible to democratize governments anytime, 
anywhere, and under any circumstances. In doing so, Americans were ignoring the lesson of 
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Vietnam which had presumably demonstrated the dangers of trying to be the world’s midwife to 
democracy, especially when the birth was to occur in the midst of a guerilla war.345 In fact, 
Kirkpatrick insisted, democratic institutions were difficult to establish and preserve under any 
circumstances; democratic regimes make heavy demands on their populations, and they were 
dependent upon complex social, cultural, and economic conditions. For democracy to work, a 
substantial number of persons must consider themselves participants in the decision-making 
process and not just subjects bound by laws. Second, lea ers of all sectors of society must agree 
to pursue power only by legal means and, in doing so eschew violence, theft, and fraud. 
Competitors for office must also be able to accept defeat when necessary and be skilled at 
finding and creating common ground among diverse points of view and interests; indeed they 
must be willing to compromise on all but the most basic of values. Third, democratic 
government required institutions strong enough to channel and contain conflict. Finally, 
Kirkpatrick pointed out that the development of democracy took time.  In nations where 
democratic governments did exist, it had taken several decades, and in most cases, centuries for 
the people to acquire the disciplines and habits necessary for democracy to thrive.346 Based on 
these assessments, Kirkpatrick determined that neither Iran nor Nicaragua possessed the 
fundamental preconditions necessary for democracy. 
Kirkpatrick went on to point out the difficulties that ensued when rapid political change 
occurred within autocratic systems. According to her, the longer a dictator has held power, the 
more dependent upon him a nation’s fundamental institutions became. Because of this, the fabric 
of authority could unravel quickly once the power and status of the autocrat has been 
undermined or eliminated, leading ultimately to the collapse of society as a whole. Kirkpatrick 
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noted that the speed with which armies collapsed, bureaucracies abdicated, and social structures 
dissolved once the autocrat was removed surprised Americans who were used to public 
institutions based on ‘universalist norms’ rather than ‘particularistic relations’.  The failure to 
understand the relationship between a dictator and his nation’s infrastructure, Kirkpatrick 
charged, was one cause for the failure of American policies in recent administrations.347 
Furthermore, in the cases of Nicaragua and Iran, as in the previous instances in China, Cuba, 
Vietnam, and Angola, the American government had failed to properly understand the nature of 
the opposition. The United States had overestimated th  political diversity of revolutionary 
nationalism, believing that moderate, democratic elem nts were in the majority, while at the 
same time underestimating the power of the radical groups. “When US policymakers and the 
liberal press interpret insurgency as evidence of widespread popular discontent and the will 
toward democracy,” Kirkpatrick wrote, “the scene is set for disaster.”348 
 Kirkpatrick declared that many of Carter’s errors in Iran and Nicaragua stemmed from 
his conviction that political change in autocracies was inevitable, desirable, and in the American 
interest. In part, this was because of the administrat on’s embrace of modernization theory, 
otherwise known as development theory. According to Kirkpatrick, modernization theory 
involved more than simple industrialization or liberal political development; it was the process 
through which a traditional or pre-technological society passed as it became transformed into a 
society characterized by machine technology, rationl a d secular attitudes, and highly 
differentiated social structures.349 Development theory hypothesized an ongoing process of 
change that was complex – due to the fact that it encompassed all dimensions of human life; 
                                                           
347 Ibid, 32-3. 
348 Ibid, 34.  
349 Ibid, 36.  
134 
 
systemic – because its elements interacted in predictable ways; global – because all societies 
would eventually pass make the transition from tradi ional to modern; lengthy – because the 
process was evolutionary; phased – in that all modernizing societies would pass through the 
same stages; homogenizing – modernity would lead to the convergence and interdependence of 
societies; irreversible; and progressive in the sense that it was desirable, providing in the long-
run significant benefits to all people. Thus, rather than viewing events through the lens of 
American national interest, the administration insisted on viewing them in what Kirkpatrick 
termed as “a contemporary version of the same idea of progress that has traumatized Western 
imaginations since the Enlightenment.”350 
Because modernization theory encouraged the view that revolutions and coups were 
manifestations of deep, historical forces that could not be controlled, Kirkpatrick firmly believed 
that it was wholly inadequate as a foundation on which to base foreign policy. When faced with 
such complicated, inexorable, impersonal processes, Kirkpatrick queried, what could one do? If 
revolutions were not caused by human conditions but by ‘forces’, then they could not be stopped 
by human efforts. The best any government could hope t  do would be to serve as a midwife to 
history, helping events to move where they were alrady headed. Consequently, 
developmentalists believed that the function of foreign policy under these conditions was to 
understand the process of change, and, like the Marxists, to align the United States with history, 
in hopes of contributing a bit of stability along the way.351 Never mind, she pointed out, that the 
invasions, coups, civil wars, and political struggles around the world did not seem to be incidents 
of a “global personnel search for someone to manage the modernization process” or that the 
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persons involved in these struggles did not appear to know that they were “searching for viable 
forms of government capable of managing the process of modernization.”352  
Finally, Kirkpatrick indicted the administration for failing to understand the differences 
between right-wing and left-wing revolutionary (totalitarian) autocracies. She pointed out that 
the very nature of traditional right-wing authoritaan governments was offensive to Americans.  
Americans disliked the notion that public affairs in such systems are ordered on kinship, 
friendship, and personal relations as this stood in stark contrast to the objective, rational 
standards utilized in liberal democratic systems. Furthermore, the preference for stability over 
change in autocracies also bothered Americans whose entir  national experiences rested on the 
principles of growth, change, and progress. Extremes of wealth and poverty in such nations were 
also offensive to Americans, especially since the powerless are often very poor while the rulers 
are very rich. Moreover, Americans were offended by the lack of concern on the part of 
authoritarians with the poverty, ignorance, and disease of their subjects. When confronted by 
such regimes “our vaunted cultural relativism evapor tes and we become as censorious as Cotton 
Mather confronting sin in New England.”353 
Whereas the politics of authoritarian regimes appeared ntithetical to the American 
system, the rhetoric of left-wing revolutionary and totalitarian regimes was not. Kirkpatrick 
maintained that Americans tended to sympathize withsocialist revolutionaries because they 
spoke the language of the Declaration of Independence. After all, she pointed out, socialism and 
communism were ideologies rooted in the same values that sparked the Enlightenment and the 
various democratic revolutions of the 18th century, including the American Revolution. 
According to her, Marxist revolutionaries spoke thelanguage of a hopeful future, not an 
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unattractive past. They emphasized egalitarianism rathe  than hierarchy and privilege, liberty 
rather than order, activity rather than passivity, all of which, Kirkpatrick wrote, was “highly 
congenial to Americans at the symbolic level.”354 
Thus, Kirkpatrick charged, the Carter administration’s foreign policy failed because of its 
lack of realism concerning the nature of traditional versus revolutionary autocracies and the 
relation of each to the American national interest. According to her, traditional autocracies were 
less repressive, more susceptible to liberalization, and more compatible with American interests 
than revolutionary nationalism. Kirkpatrick offered as evidence the fact that the communist 
governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam were much more repressive than the autocratic 
regimes that preceded them, that the PRC was more rep ssive than Taiwan, and that North 
Korea was more repressive than South Korea. Furthermor , Kirkpatrick argued that there were 
systemic differences between right-wing and revoluti nary left-wing autocracies. In general, 
traditional autocrats tolerated social inequities, poverty, and brutality, whereas revolutionary 
autocracies (totalitarians) created them. Traditional autocrats left in place existing allocations of 
wealth, power, status, and other resources, but they allowed for the worship of traditional gods 
and the observation of traditional taboos. They did not disturb the habitual rhythms of work and 
leisure, places of residence, or patterns of family and personal relations. Because the miseries of 
traditional life were familiar, Kirkpatrick maintained, they were bearable to ordinary people who, 
growing up within the society, had learned to cope with its difficulties from an early age. Such 
societies, Kirkpatrick asserted, did not create refug es.  
Conversely, revolutionary communist regimes created refugees by the millions because 
they controlled and changed all aspects of society, culture, and politics in their efforts to create 
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socialist utopias.355Due to the repressive nature of such regimes, Kirkpat ick claimed that there 
was not any evidence that totalitarian governments could transform into liberal, democratic 
states. “At the moment there is a far greater likelihood of progressive liberalization and 
democratization in the governments of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile,” she wrote, “than the 
government of Cuba; in Taiwan than in the People’s Republic of China...”356 This was due to the 
fact that traditional autocracies, unlike totalitarian systems, permitted limited contestation and 
participation. Therefore, according to Kirkpatrick, it was not impossible that American policy 
could effectively encourage the process of liberalization and democratization in autocratic 
systems, provided that the effort was not made at the ime when the incumbent government was 
fighting for its life against violent adversaries, and that proposed reforms were aimed at 
producing gradual change rather than perfect democracy overnight.357 
Though Kirkpatrick acknowledged that it might not alw ys be easy to differentiate 
between democratic and totalitarian ‘agents of change’ in revolutionary situations, she claimed 
that it was not impossible. Should revolutionary lead rs describe the United States as the enemy 
of freedom-loving people, or as the perpetrator of imperialism, racism, colonialism, genocide, or 
war, then they were not authentic democrats. Kirkpatrick maintained that such groups had 
defined themselves as enemies and should be treated accordingly. She concluded, 
 The US is not, in fact, a racist, colonial power, it does not practice genocide, it does not 
threaten world peace with expansionist activities… We have also moved further, faster in 
eliminating domestic racism than any multiracial society in the world or in history. For 
these reasons and more, a posture of continuous self-abasement and apology vis-a-vis the 
third world is neither morally necessary nor politically appropriate. Nor is it necessary or 
appropriate to support vocal enemies of the US because they invoke the rhetoric of 
popular liberation. It is not even necessary or appro riate for our leaders to foreswear 
unilaterally the use of military force to counter military force. Liberal idealism need not 
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be identical with masochism, and need not be incompatible with the defense of freedom 
and the national interest.358 
 
 With the Kirkpatrick Doctrine’s incorporation into government policy in the early 1980s, 
“Dictatorships and Double Standards” became the subject of some scrutiny from historians. 
According to J. David Hoeveler, Jr. Kirkpatrick’s distinctions between authoritarian and 
totalitarian regimes constituted the “most influential contribution to foreign policy discussion in 
the conservative literature of two decades.”359 Her analysis, he argued, provided authoritarian 
states with a safety valve of tradition, history, and continuity by which one could measure them 
against the rending of social fabric caused by leftist revolutions and the total control over all 
aspects of life in communist states. Mark Gerson notes that Kirkpatrick’s article served as a 
reminder that there were degrees of evil in the world, and authoritarian regimes were the lesser 
of two evils when compared to governments of the totali arian variety.360 Others argued that the 
article provided a rationale for ignoring bad behavior from right-wing dictators around the world 
as long as such leaders were anti-communist.361 John Ehrman asserted that Kirkpatrick’s work 
turned conservatives’ gut feelings into theories and demonstrated how conservative the 
neoconservative foreign policy views had become.362 
 Each of these analyses had merit, as far as they went, but there were other problems with 
the Kirkpatrick Doctrine. Though she theorized that authoritarian regimes could evolve into 
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democratic systems, Kirkpatrick failed to offer any guidelines, prescriptions, or illustrations for 
how the United States could help to facilitate such political change. Indeed a number of her 
assertions regarding the nature of democracy made it appear as though facilitating in the 
development of democratic systems was beyond the capabilities of any one nation, including a 
superpower such as the United States. For example, the history of authoritarian regimes which 
lack experience with democracy, the amount of time required for persons to develop habits and 
customs necessary for a functioning democracy, and the political, social, and economic 
instability that occurs when a dictator is removed all appear to indicate that a democratic 
progression in authoritarian states is unlikely to occur. 
 Vaïsse credits “Dictatorships and Double Standards” for pointing out the double standard 
in Carter’s policies, namely the American insistence that right-wing authoritarians liberalize and 
democratize while not demanding the same from left-wing totalitarian regimes.363 However, 
based on Kirkpatrick’s own contentions on the nature of totalitarianism, it was impossible for 
such regimes to undergo liberalization. If, as she insisted, there was no evidence that 
totalitarianism could evolve into some form of democracy, then any efforts by the United States 
to encourage such changes would constitute exercises in futility. Therefore, though her 
distinctions squared nicely with her opposition to détente, they failed to buttress her arguments 
regarding the inconsistencies inherent within the Carter administration’s policies.  
Historian Walter LaFeber contends that instead of ev lving into approximate democratic 
states, authoritarian regimes sometimes become more rep ssive and restrictive. He maintains 
that many authoritarian dictators, through their actions of repression, brutality, and exploitation, 
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bring revolutions upon themselves.364 Ergo, authoritarians were not always as benign as 
Kirkpatrick implied in her article with her assertion that they ‘sometimes’ invoked martial law 
and ‘allegedly’ tortured dissidents only when faced by violent revolutions. Moreover, it stands to 
reason that despite being born into and having adjusted to what Kirkpatrick described as the 
‘miseries of traditional life’, many persons may find such miseries unbearable and, in the face of 
intractable leaders, opt for revolution. After all, just because certain institutions, practices, 
customs, or governments are steeped in tradition does n t mean that they are not exploitative, 
damaging, demeaning, and destructive towards their peoples. 
 Shortly after the publication of “Dictatorships and Double Standards”, the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan. This, combined with the ‘losses’ of Nicaragua and Iran, caused the Carter 
Administration to take a more confrontational stance towards communism in general and the 
Soviet Union in particular. Worried about how such foreign policy issues might affect his bid for 
re-election, the president attempted to establish better relations between himself and the more 
hawkish members of the Democratic Party, namely the Coalition for a Democratic Majority. To 
this end, Carter requested National Security Advisor and former CDM member Zbigniew 
Brzezinski and Vice-President Walter Mondale to set up he meeting with Max Kampelman. 
 Before the meeting, which was scheduled to take place on January 30, 1980, Kirkpatrick, 
Ben Wattenburg, Max Kampelman, Elliot Abrams, Norman Podhoretz, and Midge Decter met 
over coffee to work out their strategy. The group deci ed to have Austin Ranney, a political 
scientist and friend of Evron Kirkpatrick, serve as their spokesperson. Upon arriving at the White 
House, the group was ushered into the Roosevelt Room where they were soon joined by Carter 
and Mondale. By all accounts, matters did not go well. According to the neoconservatives, Carter 
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remained tense and defensive throughout the half-hour meeting. He reportedly interrupted 
Ranney’s introductory presentation, refused to accept riticism of his policies, ignored the 
group’s recommendations on specific policy matters, and responded to the groups’ questions in 
an often ‘incoherent’ manner.365 After thirty minutes, the president departed rather abruptly, 
leaving Mondale to attempt to smooth over relations between the White House and the CDM. 
 According to Vaïsse, for many of the members of the CDM, the meeting with the 
president represented the last straw. The encounter e ded the sentimental loyalty that several still 
felt towards the Democratic Party, thus paving the way for them to move into the Republican 
camp.366Kirkpatrick was among the defectors. Though she remained a nominal member of the 
Democratic Party at that time, she told Midge Decter on their way out of the White House that 
day that she did not yet know who she would support for the presidency, but it would not be 
Carter. Less than a month after the disastrous meeting at the White House, Kirkpatrick received a 
letter from Republican presidential hopeful Ronald Reagan praising her for “Dictatorships and 
Double Standards” and requesting a meeting. Shortly thereafter, Richard Allen, future National 
Security Advisor to Reagan, called Kirkpatrick and i vited her to join the California governor in 
a discussion of American foreign policy. She accepted, he talks went well, and was soon 
followed by another meeting. Kirkpatrick subsequently agreed to act as a foreign policy advisor 
for the Reagan campaign.367 
Conclusions  
 Kirkpatrick’s article, “Dictatorships and Double Standards”, represented the culmination 
of years of higher education, political activism, and academic study. Beginning with her years at 
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Columbia, Kirkpatrick embarked upon a study of non-democratic regimes that would last 
throughout her entire life and eventually propel her into the national spotlight. Under the tutelage 
of Franz Neumann, and later Hannah Arendt, Kirkpatrick learned of the evils of both fascist and 
communist totalitarianism. This knowledge was supplemented by her exposure to Nazi 
Holocaust files, interviews with Soviet and Chinese xpatriates who had fled from communist 
regimes, and her personal connections with individuals who had escaped the totalitarian menace. 
Her education in the evils of totalitarianism left Kirkpatrick convinced that whether it was 
communism or fascism, any diabolical vision of the public good was the greatest horror and the 
source of the greatest evil in modern times.  
 Drawing from the works of Arendt and Camus, Kirkpatrick identified communism as a 
utopian philosophy, a set of ideas based upon wishful t inking and blind optimism rather than 
history and experience. She likened utopianism to rati nalism noting that both failed to 
distinguish between the domains of thought and experience, both were more concerned with the 
abstract rather than the concrete, and both cared more about the possible rather than the probable. 
Kirkpatrick took the comparison further, noting that there was an affinity between utopianism 
and rationalism on the one hand, and rationalism and tyranny on the other. “There is a powerful 
tendency to move from the conviction that one k ows the public good,” she observed, “to the use 
of power to impose that good.”368 Thus, the totalitarian impulse was grounded in the rationalist’s 
search, through power, for virtue, solidarity, perfect unity, the end of conflict, and the end of 
exploitation of man by man. Such goals were unachievabl , but the utopian rationalist could not 
accept this, and in his zeal to transform society h resorted to terror and murder. Kirkpatrick 
wrote, 
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When an unrealizable goal becomes the operational aim of an elite endowed with 
coercive power and a sense of righteousness, tragedy becomes more probable than 
progress. Historians may contemplate the irony of liberating revolutions that enslave, of 
brotherhood that ends at the guillotine, of equality enforced by a maximum ruler; the 
people, on the other hand, are left to suffer.369 
  
 According to Kirkpatrick, the dangers posed to the United States from utopian 
rationalists, or totalitarians, were not restricted to foreign affairs and issues of national security. 
The political scientist also associated utopian ration lism with the New Left and the rise of the 
counterculture within the U.S. during the 1960s and1970s. She viewed their attacks on the basic 
beliefs and institutions of American society, their challenging of the morality of the American 
experience and the legitimacy of American national i terests, and their utilization of disruptive, 
sometimes violent protest methods as a threat to democracy and the American way of life. 
Kirkpatrick compared the Nazi assault on the Weimar Republic to the New Left’s assault on 
American society: in the case of Weimar, the moderates had stood passively by while extremists 
destroyed democracy. Kirkpatrick’s refusal to stand by and watch the same thing happen in the 
U.S. led her to assist in the formation of the Coaliti n for a Democratic Majority. She had no 
doubt that the New Left, intoxicated with a utopian vision of society, sought to take over the 
state in order to extend the jurisdiction and coerciv  power of government over all institutions 
and aspects of life.370 
 Though the New Left failed in its bid for power, it had left an indelible mark on 
American foreign policy, paving the way for détente and Soviet expansion. Kirkpatrick 
maintained that the New Left’s assault on the American experience, namely their belief that the 
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U.S. was a sick, immoral, and corrupt society, had un ermined national security. “As long as the 
United States was perceived as a virtuous society,” she wrote, “policies which enhanced its 
power were also seen as virtuous.”371 However, if the U.S. were an immoral state, then the 
pursuit of American power must also be immoral. This assumption prompted the New Left to 
call for a decrease in American military power in the face of a well-armed international 
communist community. This crisis of confidence, inspired by the New Left, infected various 
segments of the population, including the American n tional security apparatus, opening the door 
to negotiations with totalitarians and a policy of détente. To Kirkpatrick, a committed Cold 
Warrior and believer in American exceptionalism, this was intolerable. Consequently, she joined 
the Committee on the Present Danger in hopes that the organization could inform both the public 
and the government of the dangers of détente before it was too late. 
 According to Kirkpatrick, the New Left and the forces of international communism were 
tacit allies. She maintained that the U.S. was being seduced by Marxist rhetoric due to the 
philosophy’s relation to Enlightenment thought and communism’s ‘perverse’ usage of 
democratic lexes. Drawing from her study of totalitarianism and from her husband’s work on 
Soviet misinformation, Kirkpatrick was adamant in her assertion that the language of Marxism-
Leninism was nothing more than propaganda. “By calling ‘autonomous’ that which is powerless, 
‘federated’ that which is unitary, ‘democratic’ tha which is autocratic,” she charged, “by 
systematically corrupting language to obscure reality, the communists have made inroads into 
our sense of political reality.”372 Kirkpatrick labelled the communists’ appropriation f liberal 
language ‘verbal imperialism’ and bemoaned the fact that Americans had begun to believe that 
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the communists were engaged in the struggle between th  rich and the poor, the haves and the 
have-nots, the workers and the employers, and the oppressed and the oppressors.  
 Kirkpatrick insisted that the communists had, in fact, strayed from the classical Marxist 
tradition.  Lenin’s revisionism dispensed of the prrequisite capitalist phase of socialist 
development in favor of political power, or the imposition of socialism from above. Such heresy 
proved that the primary goal of the communists was the capture of state power, and that Moscow 
and Beijing viewed colonial and underdeveloped state  s suitable targets for communist 
expansion. Marxism was invoked to surround the communist drive for political power and global 
domination with an aura of morality and science, and to provide moral justification for the 
terroristic methods they employed in their efforts to mold societies and cultures into socialist 
utopias.  
The popular utopian rationalist faith in the perfectibility of mankind, the crisis of 
confidence in the American system due to the rise of the New Left, and the language utilized by 
leftist revolutionaries and communists had caused Americans to turn a blind eye to the iniquitous 
nature of totalitarianism, all of which led to the expansion of communism and the enlargement of 
Soviet military power throughout the 1970s. Making matters worse, according to Kirkpatrick, 
was the Carter Administration’s acceptance of modernization theory, its misguided belief that 
democratic states could be created from without, and its misunderstanding of the nature of right 
versus left wing autocracies. Taken together, these mi perceptions had alienated traditional 
American allies, facilitated the expansion of communism in Latin America, and contributed to 
the destabilization of authoritarian regimes friendly to American interests.  In order to retake the 
Cold War initiative, the U.S. must acknowledge the obdurate nature of communist totalitarianism 
and dispense with détente and those policies grounded in utopian rationalist theories. 
146 
 
Furthermore, the U.S. must continue to provide aid to its anti-communist allies, whether those 
allies were fellow liberal democrats or authoritarian dictators. Finally, Americans must regain 























Chapter Four: Madame Ambassador  
In 1980, Americans went to the polls to elect a presid nt. Though initially ahead in the 
polls, Carter’s advantage over his Republican opponent began to dwindle by September. Ronald 
Reagan, former actor and Governor of California, was a captivating public figure who took 
advantage of the foreign policy and domestic disasters that had occurred under Carter’s watch. 
From a domestic standpoint, Reagan focused on the economic downturn of the 1970s and asked 
Americans if they were better off in 1980 than they were four years previous. Many Americans 
were not, and they responded positively to Reagan’s promise of tax cuts and new economic 
policies. Moreover, in an effort to stem the tide of what Reagan saw as defeatism that had 
plagued the American spirit following U.S. defeat in Vietnam, the former California governor 
spoke often of America’s greatness, its exceptionalty. Reagan the Cold Warrior reminded 
Americans repeatedly that the U.S. was a force for go d in the world and promised to restore 
American military and economic superiority. 
As Reagan’s foreign policy adviser, a member of the CPD, and a critic of Carter, 
Kirkpatrick supported the Republican nominee wholeheartedly.  Other neoconservatives joined 
her, along with members of the northern working classes, former Democrats who felt abandoned 
by their party through its embrace of affirmative action policies and whose economic status had 
declined throughout the 1970s. The neocons and northern working classes were joined in their 
support for Reagan by the social conservatives and the religious right which were attracted to 
Reagan’s stance on issues such as abortion and school prayer, along with fiscal conservatives 
and supporters of supply-side economics. This new coalition of voters allowed Reagan to win 
51% of the popular vote compared to Carter’s 41%.  
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Jeane Kirkpatrick was unabashed about Ronald Reagan’s triumph in the 1980 
Presidential election, declaring his victory to be a watershed event in American history. 
According to her, Reagan’s inauguration signaled the end of one major postwar epoch and the 
beginning of another. Kirkpatrick claimed there were three distinct periods in the postwar era. 
The first, known as the Cold War Era, began at the end of World War II and lasted until 
approximately 1968. She described it as a “relatively happy respite during which free societies 
and democratic institutions were unusually secure. Th  west was united, strong, and self-
assured”.373 The second period, the Era of Détente, began with the rise of the New Left in the 
late 1960s and lasted until the election of Reagan in 1980. Unlike the previous era, this one was 
marked by the relentless expansion of Soviet military and political power and a corresponding 
contraction of American influence. It featured the rise of the Third World dictators espousing 
anti-American and anti-Western ideologies and the em rgence in Western Europe of a neutralist 
position. Throughout this period, an attitude of defeatism and self-doubt prevailed within the 
United States. Kirkpatrick maintained that Reagan’s victory marked a new beginning for 
America, one that would correct mistakes made during the era of détente, restore faith in the 
American way of life, and increase American power throughout the world.374  
 With the election of Ronald Reagan, many members of ne conservative groups, such as 
the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM) and the Committee on the Present Danger 
(CPD), were appointed to government positions allowing them the opportunity to influence and 
shape policy. CDM members who supported Reagan and subsequently worked for his 
administration included: Ben Wattenberg – Vice Presid nt of Radio Free Europe, Max 
Kampelman – Ambassador to the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe, Eugene 
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Rostow – director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Elliot Abrams – Assistant 
Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.375 Due to the fact that Ronald 
Reagan was a member of the CPD, several of its committee members were also given prestigious 
government jobs including: George Shultz – Secretary of State, Richard Allen – National 
Security Advisor, William Casey – CIA Director, John Lehman – Secretary of the Navy, Richard 
Pipes – Director of East European and Soviet Affairs, Donald Rumsfeld – Special Envoy to the 
Middle East, and Richard Perle – Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 
Policy.376  
A member of both the CDM and the CPD, and foreign policy advisor to Ronald Reagan 
during the 1980 election, Jeane Kirkpatrick was named Permanent Ambassador to the United 
Nations, a position given Cabinet level ranking andmade part of the National Security Council 
by President Reagan. As U.N. Ambassador, Kirkpatrick was responsible for articulating and 
advocating the Reagan Administration’s positions on various international events. As U.N. 
Ambassador she served largely as a mouthpiece for the administration, but Kirkpatrick had 
opportunities to influence policy thanks to her inclusion within the NSC and the National 
Security Planning Group (NSPG). Furthermore, Reagan’s fo dness for and admiration of the 
ambassador allowed her direct access to the president, which, in turn, enabled her to bypass 
normal diplomatic channels between the U.S. Mission at the United Nations and the State 
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Department. Thus, did Kirkpatrick the academic, intellectual, and party activist become 
Kirkpatrick the ambassador and policymaker. 
  During Kirkpatrick’s tenure at the United Nations, the institution dealt with hundreds of 
issues ranging from budgetary concerns, refugee cris s, and public health alarms to issues 
affecting women and disabled persons, economic development, decolonization, and war. Indeed, 
a cursory glance at the resolutions voted on within t e General Assembly and Security Council 
in any given year of Kirkpatrick’s time as ambassador can seem overwhelming due to their sheer 
numbers. Among those that she and the Reagan Administration deemed to be the most important 
were: Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict; El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Central America; the 
Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan; the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia; and 
Namibian independence and South Africa.377  
Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
 The Reagan Administration’s policies towards the Middle East had two primary goals: to 
maintain the special relationship between the United States and Israel and to prevent the 
expansion of Soviet influence in the region. More oft n than not, the administration’s support for 
Tel Aviv exacerbated tensions in the region, causing more difficulties in the bilateral 
relationships between the United States and other Middle Eastern nations. Tensions also rose 
between the U.S. and Israel, for despite America’s steadfast support for its Middle Eastern ally, 
Tel Aviv often acted on its own accord: in December of 1981 Israel ignored American appeals 
for restraint and annexed the Golan Heights, and in 1982 Tel Aviv invaded Lebanon despite 
American protests. These actions garnered global condemnation of both Israel and the United 
States and brought about a brief withdrawal of American military aid to Tel Aviv. Nonetheless, 
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America continued to back up its anti-communist ally; after all, Israeli targets in Lebanon – the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Syria – had ties to the Soviet Union. Indeed, the 
Reagan Administration sent troops into Lebanon, a move that resulted in the deaths of American 
diplomatic and military personnel, yet failed to bring peace to the region.     
Throughout her tenure as Permanent Ambassador to the United Nations, Kirkpatrick 
demonstrated an unwavering support for the state of Israel.378 In a speech before the Conference 
of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations in New York City, she noted that her relationship 
with the state of Israel began in her college days. “I remember vividly the bells on the Riverside 
Church ringing on the day in 1948, the establishment of Israel,” she related, “I was in philosophy 
class at Barnard and Harry Truman had taken a strong and marvelous stand.”379In subsequent 
years, Kirkpatrick’s sympathy for Israel and the Jewish people grew, especially following her 
exposure to the Nazi Holocaust files and her friendships with various German and European 
Jews who had fled from the Nazis. Though sympathetic to Israel, her relationship with the 
organized Jewish community of the world did not begin until she became the U.N. Ambassador 
and was exposed to what she described as the “obsessive anti-Israel campaign that dominates the 
agenda of the UN.”380 
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 Kirkpatrick’s introduction to the ‘anti-Israel obse sion’ of the United Nations began in 
June of 1981 when the Security Council met to discus  the June 7th Israeli bombing of a French-
made nuclear reactor in Iraq. In her address to the Security Council, Kirkpatrick noted that the 
Middle East was combustible region, similar to the Balkans before the outbreak of World War I. 
She pointed out that there were many issues that plagued the region including the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan, the war between Iran and Iraq, the terrorist state of Libya and its occupation of 
Chad, the territorial violations of Lebanon by its neighbors, and, the most recent crisis – Israel’s 
attack on the nuclear reactor in Iraq. Though acknowledging that Israel had not exhausted all 
diplomatic means before acting, and that its actions had damaged the peace and security of the 
region, Kirkpatrick maintained that Israel’s actions should not be taken out of context. The 
ambassador noted that Iraq had refused to acknowledge the existence or legitimacy of the Israeli 
state, and thus the Israeli attack was essentially a defensive maneuver or preemptive strike 
against an enemy state armed with weapons of mass destruction. Kirkpatrick declared that the 
United States was a proud friend and ally of Israel and that it would not approve of any decision 
made by the U.N. that would either harm Israel’s baic interests or be overly punitive.381  
Wielding the threat of a Security Council veto, Kirkpatrick was able to mitigate the 
language of the resulting resolution. Resolution 487 strongly condemned the Israeli attack as a 
violation of the U.N. Charter, called for Israel to b th refrain from such attacks in the future and 
to place its own nuclear facilities under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
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and maintained that Iraq was entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction brought about by 
the attack.382  
Though she was successful in toning down the language of the Security Council’s 
resolution regarding the Israeli attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor, Kirkpatrick was unable to do the 
same when the General Assembly began discussions of a resolution entitled “The Situation in the 
Middle East”. By a vote of 109 in favor, 34 abstentio s, and 2 opposed (the U.S. and Israel), the 
General Assembly passed a resolution that expressed support for the Palestinian people and other 
Arab nations in their struggle against Israeli ‘aggression and occupation’. The resolution went on 
to condemn Israel’s occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories, along with its treatment 
of peoples in those areas. The General Assembly’s white paper declared that the strategic 
cooperation between the U.S. and Israel only encouraged the latter to pursue aggressive and 
expansionist policies. The resolution called upon all st tes to put an end to the flow to Israel of 
any military or economic resources that might encourage its aggression.383 
 In an address before the General Assembly, Kirkpatick strenuously objected to the use of 
the word ‘aggression’ and insisted that Israel’s actions should be taken within the proper context. 
Kirkpatrick also questioned why the resolution called for nations to desist in giving aid to Israel, 
yet failed to condemn those nations supplying arms to I rael’s enemies. She declared that the 
ongoing debate and its subsequent resolution were frivolous and served to divert attention from 
the pursuit of peace and stability in the Middle East.384 
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 The day before she delivered her address to the Unit d Nations, The New Republic 
published an article by Kirkpatrick entitled “Dishon ring Sadat”. The piece celebrated the 
bravery of the Egyptian leader in signing the Camp David Accords with Israel and called for 
other Arab leaders to follow his lead. Kirkpatrick was inspired to write the piece when American 
and foreign pundits began questioning the outcomes of foreign policies that depended or 
appeared to depend on the survival of a ‘strong man’. Many were comparing Sadat’s death to the 
fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 – both were powerful authoritarian leaders, important to the 
United States, whose governments rested upon personal p wer, and who were abruptly removed 
from the scene.  
 Though many liberals continued to express doubt concerning the wisdom of relying on 
agreements with authoritarian regimes, Kirkpatrick argued that the political realities of the 
Middle East forced the U.S. to do just that. The U.N. Ambassador pointed out that the tradition 
of paternalistic authority was strong in the region. She wrote: 
The truth is that we cannot control the governments of he area or choose the rulers. We 
cannot structure their institutions or transform their beliefs. We have no magic wand to 
turn the Moslem states that stretch from North Africa to South Asia into replicas of 
modern, secular, democratic nations living harmoniously with one another. We must deal 
with them as we find them: authoritarian, traditional, deeply religious, subject to the 
kinds of instabilities characteristic of personal autocracies. These last include periodic 
rebellions, chronic succession crises, and complicated personal rivalries, all of which 
have culminated repeatedly in war.385 
 
Although the governments of the Middle East shared many similarities, Kirkpatrick was quick to 
point out that the Arab states remained heavily divided: Iraq was at war with Iran, Libya was 
exporting terrorism throughout the region, Syria was destabilizing Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia 
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and Jordan were experiencing internal turmoil due to radical politics associated with the PLO. 
Meanwhile, Soviet expansionism threatened the entire region.386 
 “In need of a unifying factor – beyond language and religion,” she wrote, “many Arabs 
have associated themselves with the cause of radical Palestinian nationalism. This cause is 
closely related to… hostility to the state of Israel.” 387 Kirkpatrick maintained that it was not 
surprising that Israel had become a special object of hatred in the region; after all, it was a 
modern, democratic, egalitarian, Jewish state in the midst of traditional, authoritarian, class-
based, Moslem societies. According to her: 
The PLO wins acceptance from modern Arab nations because their leaders have been 
persuaded that the link between faith and politics calls for the destruction of Israel, and 
the PLO is the group most militantly dedicated to that cause… the ideological appeal of 
jihad – which provides a certain sense of Arab unity – is re nforced by terror, selectively, 
effectively, and ruthlessly employed. The ideology that links faith, politics, the 
destruction of Israel, and Palestinian nationalism i  continually reinforced by violence 
and fear. Note, however, that the same linkage covertly commits traditional Arab rulers to 
strengthening the radical forces, which are carriers of revolutionary politics hostile to 
their own survival. The PLO thus enlists traditional Arab rulers in their own destruction. 
Never has the dialectical ‘cunning of history’ operat d more clearly to enlist the powerful 
in the struggle for their own undoing.388 
  
 Kirkpatrick declared that there were three urgent problems that American foreign policy 
needed to address in the region. First, the U.S. should work to prevent the Soviet Union from 
invading, occupying, or incorporating by other means dditional Arab lands into the Soviet 
sphere of influence. Second, the U.S. should strength  those regimes friendly to, or compatible 
with, American interests. Kirkpatrick maintained tha  reinforcing moderate Arab governments 
would enhance regional order and help prevent the transformation of such regimes into threats. 
Third, the U.S. must protect Israel against its sworn enemies. The political scientist declared that 
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the United States was tied to Israel though security interests, common democratic political 
systems, by honor, and by a mutual membership in anancient community of values (Western 
Civilization and Judeo-Christian heritage).389 
 Overall, Kirkpatrick contended, the primary obstacle to peace had been the refusal of the 
Arab governments to recognize Israel’s right to exist. Sadat, she claimed, embodied the solution 
to all of the problems facing the U.S. in the region. He was a devout Muslim, a revolutionary 
leader, and a friend of the United States and Israel; he was a serious Muslim who was both 
dedicated to the Arab cause and committed to finding a solution to the Palestinian issue. She 
noted: 
Anwar Sadat struck out in new directions… he insisted that his separate peace did not 
imply indifference to Palestinian aspirations and well-being. He insisted that the PLO 
was not the custodian of Palestinian aspirations; that Israel’s existence was not 
incompatible with Arab self-fulfillment; and that frank friendship with the U.S. was the 
route to regional order, national independence, and economic development in the Middle 
East. What is most needed now is that other Arab leders match Sadat’s courage, 
originality, and tolerance.390 
 
In December of 1981, less than a month after Kirkpatrick published “Dishonoring Sadat”, 
the Arab-Israeli conflict again resurfaced as a topic f debate within the General Assembly. By 
this time, the ambassador had become noticeably frustrated with the body’s ‘obsession’ with 
Israel and the refusal of the Arab states to follow Sadat’s lead. In an address before the General 
Assembly entitled “Perpetuating the Arab-Israeli Conflict”, the ambassador criticized the U.N. 
for passing resolutions that both repudiated the Camp David Accords which she described as ‘the 
sole existing framework’ for bringing about a settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbors, 
and enhanced the status of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), an organization that 
                                                           
389 Ibid, 8. 
390 Ibid, 9. 
157 
 
refused to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist. “The adoption of these resolutions by the General 
Assembly,” she stated, “diminishes the ability of the United Nations to further the cause of peace 
in the Middle East.”391  
Noting that the title of the debate was “The Situation in the Middle East”, Kirkpatrick 
called upon the world body to discuss the numerous issues that threatened the peace and stability 
within the region such as the Iran-Iraq War, the destabilization of Lebanon, Libya’s subversion 
and terrorism, and the threat of Soviet expansion.392 “All of these issues should be of vital 
concern to this Assembly,” Kirkpatrick stated, “instead, the focus of this debate has again been 
on one item and one item alone: the Arab-Israeli conflict.” 393 The ambassador pointed out that 
nothing was accomplished by the endless stream of criticism directed at Israel. “What are the 
people of my country to conclude,” she queried, “when they witness year after year these 
condemnations of Israel, a friend and fellow democracy?”394 Rather than focusing on the Arab-
Israeli conflict, the American ambassador urged the U.N. to devote its energies towards a non-
partisan effort to achieve a permanent peace in the Middle East. 
On the same day that Kirkpatrick was defending America’s ally to the General Assembly, 
Israel passed legislation annexing the Golan Heights, territory initially seized from Syria in 1967.  
Tel Aviv’s action prompted an investigation by the U.N. Security Council which was followed 
by debate within the General Assembly. On January 20, 1982 Jeane Kirkpatrick addressed the 
Security Council and stated her country’s opposition o a pending resolution criticizing Israel’s 
actions. She claimed that the resolution was an aberr tion and a perversion of the purpose of the 
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Security Council. According to her, the Council had the responsibility to first deal with activities 
that threatened world peace and security, and second, t  prevent an aggravation of a situation. 
Kirkpatrick declared that the proposed resolution would only exacerbate tensions in the region. 
The ambassador maintained that the U.S. would never approve of Israel annexing the Golan 
Heights, and claimed that there was doubt in Washington that such an annexation had even 
occurred. Instead of focusing on a non-event, the U.N. should direct its attention towards other, 
more pressing issues. “What an extraordinary institution this is that, in the more than a month 
since the massive, brutal repression of the people of Poland got under way,” she stated, “there 
has been no mention here of the violations of their uman rights.”395 
With the U.S. veto blocking any action by the Security Council on this matter, the 
General Assembly called an Emergency Special Session to discuss the Golan Heights. Not 
surprisingly, the Assembly passed a resolution against Israel despite American opposition.  “The 
Situation in the Occupied Arab Territories” regretted that one vote from a permanent member of 
the U.N. Security Council prevented that body from doing its job in dealing with Israel in 
January. It went on to strongly condemn Israel for its actions in the region, declared that it was 
illegal for the state to take over the Golan Heights, and that its decision to do so constituted 
aggression. Moreover, the resolution claimed that in order for there to be a comprehensive and 
just peace in the Middle East, there must be the total and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli 
forces from Palestine and other Arab territories which had been occupied since 1967. Finally, the 
document stated that Israel’s actions made it clear that it was not a peace-loving state and the 
Assembly called on all member states to refrain from selling weapons to Israel, to suspend 
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economic, financial, and technological assistance and cooperation with Israel, and to sever 
diplomatic, trade, and cultural relations with the Jewish state.396 
Kirkpatrick was outraged by the tone and text of the resolution. In a speech entitled “This 
Miserable Resolution”, the United States Ambassador noted that her country opposed both the 
ends and the means of the resolution because it called for unreasonably punitive measures in 
order to get revenge and retribution. Kirkpatrick declared that the U.N. should be devoted to 
building peace and security instead of deepening divisions and exacerbating conflicts. According 
to her, the resolution undermined the integrity of the U.N. and demonstrated that any institution 
could be made to serve purposes remote from its raison d’etre – the United Nations, conceived as 
a palace of reason, was now being used to polarize nations and spread hostility.397 
Though the ambassador had previously denied that an nnexation had occurred, 
Kirkpatrick now claimed that the U.S. had called upon Tel Aviv to rescind the decrees 
incorporating Golan Heights into Israel and to reaffirm its commitment to a negotiated settlement 
in the region. She declared that Israel had acquiesced to American requests and that the only 
constructive role for the U.N. at this point was to facilitate such negotiations. The ambassador 
maintained that Israel had not committed an act of aggression as “no shots were fired, no soldiers 
were brought into place.”398 She also objected to the “barely veiled attack on the United States” 
in the paragraph referencing the negative vote of a permanent member of the Security Council 
and defended the right of the U.S. to use its veto to block actions that it deemed seriously 
flawed.399 
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 The American ambassador continued her defense of Israel in the following months as the 
Assembly refused to budge and convened another special emergency session. In a speech entitled 
“War by other Means” she stated: 
But who among us sincerely believes that the exercis  in which we are now engaged – 
this ‘resumed’ emergency special session – will take us closer toward the goal? Who 
among us believes that the cause of peace is served by still another round of bitter 
denunciation of Israel? Who among us – I wonder – believes that peace is even the goal 
of this assembly? This Assembly can repeat its famili r and unbalanced charges, it can 
issue flamboyant ultimata, and adopt ever harsher resolutions, all with the usual 
predictable effect. That effect will be to increase – not reduce – tensions; to inflame – not 
to calm – passions; to widen – not to narrow – divisions; and to make war more, not less, 
likely to take place. The fact that this institution, conceived to resolve conflicts is thus 
used to exacerbate and embitter divisions among nations is the cruelest of ironies.400 
 
Kirkpatrick concluded that the ultimate goal of theresolution was to delegitimize Israel. By 
claiming that Israel was not a peace-loving state and that it had violated several provisions of the 
U.N. Charter, the resolution was laying the groundwork to expel Israel from the institution. “This 
special session and its accompanying draft resolutions are one more clear example of a strategy 
whose goals and tactics are clear,” she declared, “use a United Nations body to make ‘official’ 
demands incompatible with Israel’s security and survival.”401 Thus, when Israel failed to comply, 
members could ‘prove’ that Israel was an international law-breaker and unworthy of membership 
in the community of peace-loving states.402 
 Over the next three years, the Arab-Israeli conflict continued to be discussed in the 
United Nations. Each time the subject was broached, Kirkpatrick came to Israel’s defense. The 
American representative likened the General Assembly’s ongoing indictment of Israel as 
representing the justice of Alice in Wonderland – where the Assembly (Queen of Hearts) had 
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repeatedly found Israel (Alice) guilty of numerous offenses without thoroughly investigating the 
situation and ignoring the context in which events occurred.403 She continued to defend the 
United States’ alliance with Israel and refused to accept the Assembly’s charges that American 
aid to Israel allowed the nation to continue to ignore U.N. resolutions.   
 The ambassador often criticized the United Nations f r its treatment of Israel, especially 
to Jewish organizations. In October of 1982, Kirkpatrick spoke of her disillusionment with the 
U.N. to the B’nai B’rith International, an organization founded in 1843 to protect and advocate 
for Jews around the world.404In her speech, entitled “An Unrelenting Assault”, the ambassador 
noted that both the U.N. and the state of Israel were born out of World War II and the fight 
against Nazism. She then lamented the fact that the U.N. was now involved in an assault against 
the one state that served as a haven for the survivors of Nazi persecution.  
Indeed, Kirkpatrick appears to have bought into the notion that opposition to Israeli 
policies was proof of prejudice against Jews. The American ambassador declared that the United 
Nations had become a hot-bed of anti-Semitism. Such sentiment had increased after a 1975 
General Assembly resolution declared that Zionism was the equivalent of racism. Kirkpatrick 
pointed out that over 150 anti-Israel resolutions had been passed within the United Nations since 
1945, and 25 of the 60 U.N. Security Council meetings in 1981 alone had dealt with Arab 
complaints against Israel. Moreover, anti-Semitism had spilled over into the specialized agencies 
of the United Nations, turning UNESCO, the WHO, the U.N. Conference on Women, and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency ‘anti-Israeli platforms’.405 According to Kirkpatrick, this 
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effort was being spearheaded by the Arab states and the Soviet Union, who, in order to get a 
majority within the U.N., made a deal with the African bloc: the Arabs and the Soviets promised 
to support the African position against South Africa f the Africans supported the Arab position 
against Israel. Such an agreement between blocs allowed for the Arab position against Israel to 
have an automatic majority within the General Assembly, along with power within the 
specialized agencies. 
In Kirkpatrick’s mind, the campaign within the United Nations against Israel was part of 
“a systematic, totalitarian assault on language and meaning”406 comparable to both the pre-
Holocaust German ordinances that dehumanized and discrim nated against Jews and the signs of 
impending German aggression in Europe in the 1930s.  This totalitarian assault on language and 
meaning, “inspired by the Soviets, elaborated upon by Arab speakers hostile to Israel, and now 
freely used by anti-Israel militants,”407 redefined Palestinian Arabs as ‘the Jews of the Arab 
world’ and Israel as the Nazis of the Middle East. Indeed, according to Kirkpatrick, the entire 
discourse within the U.N. had been appropriated by totalitarian verbal imperialism so that 
despotic governments were called ‘democratic’, policies intended to incite war were deemed 
‘peaceful’, measures imposed by terror were termed ‘popular’, and where reactionary tactics 
were called ‘progressive’.408 This type of rhetorical perversion, which served to invert the 
meanings of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, was especially clear to Kirkpatrick in the institution’s treatment of 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The ambassador noted that on the same day in 
1975 that the General Assembly  passed the ‘Zionism is Racism’ resolution, it also affirmed the 
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legitimacy of the PLO and endowed it with the rights of a member state, going so far as to 
establish a permanent committee with a large budget to promote the interest of the PLO. Now 
declared a ‘national liberation movement’, the PLO could ‘legitimately’ use force against Israel; 
meanwhile Israel’s use of force to defend itself against the PLO would be characterized as 
aggression.409 
Kirkpatrick was adamant that the U.S. was determined to see Israel receive fair treatment 
at the United Nations; however, she conceded that such a goal was most likely utopian for no 
matter what Israel did, it was unlikely to get fair play in the international arena.410 Nonetheless, 
the ambassador assured her audience that the United States would never support U.N. resolutions 
or statements that characterized Israel as aggressive or not a peace-loving state, as these were not 
consistent with American policies.411 
The Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan 
 Given Kirkpatrick’s education in the evils of totali rianism, along with the Reagan 
Administration’s emphasis on containing communism, it is not surprising that she spoke out 
frequently and adamantly in the United Nations against the activities of the Soviet Union, most 
notably, its invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. When the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan in 1979, Carter had initiated limited covert aid. Reagan increased American military 
aid; however, despite his anti-communist rhetoric, he did not dramatically increase assistance to 
the mujahidin until 1985. Whereas the United States often stood alone in its opposition to 
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resolutions passed by the General Assembly involving e ther Israel or South Africa, the 
superpower received widespread support for resolutions denouncing the Kremlin. Indeed, other 
nations assisted the administration in providing covert military aid to Afghani  
“freedom fighters” including communist China, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Though Russia’s 
status as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council allowed it to veto any resolutions 
that criticized its actions, each year throughout Kirkpatrick’s tenure, the General Assembly 
passed resolutions condemning the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. And each 
time the subject was broached, Jeane Kirkpatrick was there, reminding the U.N. of the plight of 
the Afghan people, the atrocities committed by the Red Army, the dangers of totalitarianism, and 
the bravery of the Afghan “freedom fighters”. 
 Kirkpatrick first spoke of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in November of 1981. In her 
address to the General Assembly, the ambassador described the incursion as a momentous event 
that altered the climate and course of world politics.412 The ambassador described the invasion as 
a grave violation of the United Nations’ Charter that shook the very foundations of world order. 
Soviet aggression shattered the prospects for stability in South Asia and the Persian Gulf, 
severely aggravated tensions between East and West,and, more than anything, marked a 
“watershed in the postwar era, bringing to a definitive conclusion a period of optimism 
concerning the evolution of Soviet policy and intentio s.”413 Of course, as a member of the CPD 
and a Cold Warrior, Kirkpatrick had been warning Americans of the danger of the Soviet Union 
throughout the détente era or ‘period of optimism’, long before the 1979 attack on Afghanistan.  
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 In her ongoing indictment of the Kremlin, Kirkpatrick observed that nearly three million 
people, roughly 1/5 the population of Afghanistan, had been forced to flee from their country. In 
addition to the large numbers of refugees, thousands of people had been killed. Whole villages 
were being destroyed, mosques had been desecrated, religious leaders imprisoned or murdered, 
schools turned into centers of political indoctrinat on, and Afghanistan’s economic infrastructure, 
power and communication networks, and hospitals had all been severely damaged. According to 
the ambassador, the significant economic and social progress that had accompanied the decade of 
‘democratic freedoms and representative government brought about by the 1964 constitution’ 
had been totally undone.414 
 The Soviets, she charged, had worked hard to prevent th  world from seeing just how 
destructive their occupation had been to the Afghan people. They sealed the country off from 
journalists and other foreign observers and banned e trance to humanitarian organizations such 
as the International Red Cross. Meanwhile, the Soviets utilized thousands of booby-trapped 
mines disguised as ordinary household items or toys against the Afghan people despite the fact 
that they had previously signed an international convention prohibiting the use of such weapons. 
According to Kirkpatrick, such actions demonstrated the true character of the Soviet Union.415 
 In addition to noting the suffering of the Afghan people at the hands of the Red Army, 
Kirkpatrick made it her business to deconstruct any justifications offered by the Soviets for their 
invasion and occupation of the Middle Eastern state. Th  ambassador maintained that it was 
impossible for them to justify their actions based on any meaningful interpretation of 
international law. Kabul had not attacked the Soviet Union, and historically, it did not pose a 
threat to the Kremlin. Indeed, the two states had peacefully coexisted for decades. In fact, 
                                                           




Afghanistan was a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, a group of states determined to stay 
out of the Cold War. Moscow stated that it felt threatened by the turmoil inside Afghanistan, but 
aside from student riots in 1965 and a brief period of unrest following a coup in 1973, 
Kirkpatrick proclaimed that tranquility had reigned throughout Afghanistan until the 
Communists violently seized power in 1978. The Soviet Union claimed to fear the rising tide of 
Islamic fundamentalism in the region which might eventually infect the Soviet Empire, but 
Kirkpatrick argued that the Afghan people were not fundamentalists and were tolerant of other 
faiths.416 
 The Soviet’s primary justification for entering into Afghanistan was that they were 
invited in by the Kabul regime which had invoked its right to self-defense. Kirkpatrick claimed 
that this, too, was a lie as not a shred of evidence had been produced to support such allegations. 
Moreover, she claimed that the Soviet invasion preceded the institution of the regime that 
professed to have invited the Soviets in. Furthermore, the ambassador maintained that the Kabul 
regime had no legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people as it existed only by virtue of Soviet 
actions. Evidence of this could be found in the fact that large numbers of Afghani freedom 
fighters continued to resist the Red Army and the puppet regime. According to Kirkpatrick, the 
Kabul regime was nothing more than an appendage of Moscow, maintained in power by the 
presence of 85,000 Soviet troops that allowed for the Soviets to direct all aspects of 
Afghanistan’s administration, its military, and the nation’s natural resources.417The American 
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ambassador called upon the assembly to support the resolution against the Soviet Union which it 
did with an overwhelming majority.418 
 In November of 1982, 1983, and 1984 debate over the Soviet invasion and occupation of 
Afghanistan resurfaced within the General Assembly. Each time that the matter was broached 
within the Assembly, the American ambassador delivered lengthy addresses denouncing the 
Soviet Union. Kirkpatrick provided details of the atrocities committed by the Red Army against 
the Afghan people, including specific instances of rape, torture, murder, the destruction of 
villages and infrastructure, and the use of chemical we pons. On every occasion, she praised the 
struggles of the Afghan freedom fighters and urged th m to continue their fight against 
incorporation into the Soviet empire. Kirkpatrick continued to insist that the Afghan struggle had 
a much broader meaning. “If a small, relatively defenseless, nonaligned country like Afghanistan 
is allowed to be invaded, brutalized, and subjugated,” she stated, “what other similarly 
vulnerable country can feel secure?”419  
 The American ambassador warned members that totalitari nism was once more on the 
march. “With the Soviet invasion of 1979,” she stated, “a totalitarian, one-party state ruled by the 
Afghan communists has given way to a totalitarian apparatus completely controlled by the Soviet 
Union.”420 According to Kirkpatrick, the communist totalitarin drive to totally restructure 
society was already underway inside Afghanistan. She stated: 
Perhaps the most significant is the Soviet effort t reshape Afghan culture and to replace 
the decimated intellectual and middle classes with a new elite trained in the Soviet mold. 
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Thousands of Afghans, including even children betwen the ages of six and nine, are 
being trained in the Soviet Union and other bloc countries, while the Afghan educational 
system itself is being restructured along Soviet lines. The Sovietization of Kabul 
University is made evident by the presence of Soviet advisers at all levels of 
administration and instruction and in the preference given to party activists in admissions. 
The curriculum of Afghanistan’s primary education system has been redrawn to promote 
indoctrination in Marxist-Leninist ideology and to prepare young Afghans for further 
study in the Soviet Union.421 
  
Kirkpatrick asserted that the ‘Sovietization’ of Afghanistan was accompanied by the terror and 
repression characteristic of totalitarian states. Scret police terrorized the Afghan population, and 
the number of political prisoners only increased as time went on: arbitrary arrests, detention, and 
torture were common tactics used by the secret police and the Red Army. Meanwhile, the 
government had destroyed freedom of speech, press, and political expression.422 
 As usual with Soviet foreign policy, ideology had been married to long-standing Russian 
strategic objectives. According to Kirkpatrick, the Soviet Union constituted a contemporary 
embodiment of the Russian Empire as it existed under tsarist rule. Since the time of the tsars, 
Russian leaders had pursued the dream of a warm water port on the Indian Ocean; therefore, 
domination of Afghanistan was essential to the fulfillment of Russian historical territorial 
aspirations.423 “The Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan is a clear and blatant example 
of imperialist expansion,” the ambassador declared, “the fulfillment of a long-standing Soviet, 
and before that Tsarist, goal.”424Should it be successful in the annexation of Afghanist , the 
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ambassador argued, the Soviet Union would then havea geopolitical access to Iran and 
Pakistan.425  
The Vietnamese Occupation of Cambodia 
 On December 25, 1978, exactly one year before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, 
the communist government of Vietnam had invaded the neighboring state of Cambodia. Whereas 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan constituted the first instance of the Soviets using direct 
military force outside of the Soviet bloc since World War II, the Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia was the first and only extended war between two communist nations. Though the 
Reagan Administration repeatedly expressed opposition to communist expansion, the uniqueness 
of this situation, the American defeat in Vietnam, previous U.S. actions throughout Indochina, 
and the complicated ties and rivalries that existed b tween Vietnam, the Soviet Union, China, 
and Cambodia inhibited Washington’s ability and will to act. Accordingly, covert aid to 
‘freedom fighters’ in Cambodia remained quite limited throughout Reagan’s tenure. For one, 
there was a large, disparate coalition of insurgents, i cluding the Khmer Rouge, fighting against 
the Vietnamese. American policymakers were concerned that military aid might fall into the 
hands of the Khmer Rouge, allowing them to regain co trol in Cambodia. For another, despite 
the administration’s assertion that previous efforts at containing communism in Indochina had 
been morally right, nobody in Washington was eager to launch another intervention in the 
region. For these reasons, Kirkpatrick did not deliver as many forceful addresses to the United 
Nations regarding this situation even though the United Nations General Assembly debated the 
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issue and passed resolutions against Vietnam nearly ver  year throughout her tenure.426 
Furthermore, Kirkpatrick was not an expert on Asian politics. In her own collection of state 
documents, she included her speeches regarding Cambodia in the chapter devoted primarily to 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This was most likely done because the political scientist 
considered Vietnam to be a puppet of the Soviet Union and believed that the Soviet Union was 
behind Vietnam’s actions in Indochina.  
 In October of 1981, Kirkpatrick addressed the General Assembly stating that it had been 
nearly three years since the “Socialist Republic of Vietnam, supported and financed by the 
Soviet Union” first invaded and occupied Cambodia; meanwhile, nearly 200,000 Vietnamese 
troops still occupied the country.427Kirkpatrick noted that the people of Cambodia had suffered 
greatly in previous years, having been “ravaged by a succession of horrors, including three 
decades of war and the savage destruction of Pol Pot”; if that weren’t enough they were now 
enduring conquest and occupation by their historic adversaries.428 Despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese had overthrown the hated Khmer Rouge regime and were welcomed by some 
Cambodians as liberators, the American ambassador claimed that the Vietnamese occupation of 
Phnom Penh not only victimized Cambodians, but alsol f the peoples of Southeast Asia, and 
that the entire region was suffering under the oppressive tyranny of Vietnam. “The pursuit of an 
unpopular war has caused widespread misery within Vietnam,” she argued, “and imperialist 
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adventures have necessitated escalation of the already scandalous level of oppression inside 
Vietnam.”429 
 As in the case with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Kirkpatrick attacked Vietnam’s 
justifications for invading its neighbor. Vietnam claimed that it had entered Cambodia at the 
request of the Heng Samrin regime. This justification, according to Kirkpatrick, was absurd, 
especially as that regime did not even exist at the im  of the Vietnamese invasion.  “In this as in 
other respects,” she stated, “the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea is strikingly, tragically 
analogous to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.”430 Furthermore, the Vietnamese professed 
themselves to be the liberators of the Cambodian people. This, too, was a lie, she argued. For 
one, Kirkpatrick insisted that it was Vietnam that d brought the Pol Pot regime to power. She 
continued along this theme in future addresses before the Assembly, arguing that the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam “must bear a full measure of responsibility for the tragic tyranny of the 
Khmer Rouge. Vietnam’s support was critical to the Khmer rouge victory in 1975… Vietnam 
only deposed Pol Pot when it became apparent that it could not dominate and control the Khmer 
Rouge.”431 Moreover, Kirkpatrick blamed Hanoi for using Cambodia in its war against South 
Vietnam, a move that resulted in massive destruction throughout the country. Therefore, 
Vietnam’s contention that its invasion of Cambodia was prompted by a concern for the human 
rights of the Kampuchean people “constituted a falsehood that was as offensive as it was 
egregious”.432 
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 Kirkpatrick implored the Vietnamese and their Soviet patrons to join in negotiations to 
resolve the tragic plight of the Cambodian people. She also expressed support for a resolution 
calling for a U.N. supervised withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia. It also contained 
provisions for the security needs of Cambodia, had safeguards to ensure that armed political 
factions would be unable to disrupt, intimidate, or c erce the outcome of free elections, and 
emphasized the need for an independent Cambodia to remain neutral. The resolution also called 
upon Vietnam to participate in the negotiation process. The General Assembly adopted the 
resolution by a large majority.433 
Namibian Independence and South Africa 
 With the exception of the Arab-Israeli conflict, no issue dominated the United Nations’ 
agenda throughout Kirkpatrick’s tenure more than that of Namibian independence. Because the 
U.N. viewed South African rule over Namibia as illegal, discussion of Namibian independence 
almost always led to the vilification of Pretoria.434 Many member states viewed South African 
rule as a vestige of European colonialism and spoke out frequently against its policies of 
apartheid. Though the United States had gone on record favoring the establishment of an 
independent Namibia, its ties to South Africa often l ft Kirkpatrick standing alone in support for 
Pretoria. Due to historic ‘ties’, the United States and South Africa could sometimes count on the 
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support of Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany; but, as was the case with 
Israel, the U.S. was often the sole nation within te United Nations overtly defending the 
interests of Pretoria. This put Kirkpatrick in the position of appearing to support European 
colonialism. 
 The Reagan Administration’s policy in regards to South Africa and Namibian 
independence was known as ‘constructive engagement’. Constructive engagement, a method in 
which pressure could be brought to bear on countries o improve their human rights records 
while maintaining cordial diplomatic relations and profitable economic contacts, represented an 
attempt to reconcile two ideals of American foreign policy – the spread of democracy and the 
containment of communism. As was the case with other regions, American policies towards 
southern Africa were dominated by Cold War concerns. A communist regime, maintained in 
power by the presence of thousands of Cuban troops, g verned Angola, a state that shared a 
border with Namibia. Despite the racist, imperialist nature of South Africa, it was an anti-
communist state that fought against various communist regimes in the region. Moreover, its 
occupation of Namibia was seen as a bulwark against communist expansion. Thus, Reagan and 
company were reluctant to apply pressure to Pretoria in the name of either Namibian 
independence or the end of apartheid. Indeed, constructive engagement linked Namibian 
independence to the total withdrawal of Cuban troops in neighboring Angola.  
 In a speech before the Overseas Press Club, Kirkpatrick laid out the administration’s 
goals and policies towards Namibia and South Africa. Why was the United Nations obsessed 
with Namibia, she queried, why not deal with the Libyan invasion of Chad, or the Soviet threat 
to Poland, the destruction of Lebanon, or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? Kirkpatrick 
asserted that the reason that the U.N. was ‘seized’ with Namibia was because it was an institution 
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that specialized in certain kinds of issues, most ntably ‘decolonization’.435Furthermore, she 
claimed that the U.N. liked to deal with issues that were not of serious concern to the major 
global powers. Thus, the issue of Namibian independence and its occupation by South Africa 
was ‘safer’ to focus on than the illegal occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. 
 Kirkpatrick characterized the socio-economic make-up of the African state as a large, 
ethnically heterogeneous territory, rich in minerals, nd poor in political experience. Similar to 
South Africa, Namibia’s population was predominantly black, with a small minority of white 
Europeans. The black population was dominated by the Ovambo tribe – predominantly poor, 
with only a very small middle class. Thus, wealth was concentrated primarily in the hands of the 
Afrikaaner, German, and English (or white) population. Kirkpatrick described Namibia’s ruler, 
South Africa, as a medium-sized power that did not constitute a major threat to any state within 
the international arena except to its immediate neighbors and “some of its own population.”436 
 Kirkpatrick maintained that the principal goal of the Reagan administration was to see 
Namibia achieve independence; however, since Namibi had the world’s largest uranium 
deposits, a concomitant goal of the U.S. was to prevent the mineral-rich territory from falling 
into the Soviet sphere of influence. Furthermore, th  administration was determined not to sour 
its good relations with surrounding African states (South Africa) in its dealings regarding the 
issue of Namibian independence. Complicating matters was the presence of approximately 
30,000 Cuban troops in neighboring Angola. Kirkpatrick gave no credence to the notion that the 
Cuban troops would leave once Namibia was independent and South Africa’s troops were pulled 
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away from the border of Angola. Instead, the U.S. asserted that the Cubans would use Angola as 
a base of operations to spread communist influence throughout the region.437 
 The number of political actors involved in the issue, including SWAPO, DTA, South 
Africa, the United Nations, Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, further 
complicated any attempts at negotiating independence for Namibia. The South West Africa 
People’s Organization (SWAPO) was the oldest, best-established coalition dedicated to 
Namibian independence. Though dominated by the Ovambo, SWAPO was, according to 
Kirkpatrick, a mixed bag: some were nationalists and some were enthusiastic supporters of 
Marxism-Leninism and closely tied to the Soviet Union. There were minor parties in Namibia, 
but Kirkpatrick only named one – the Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), a predominantly white party 
tied closely to South African government. Though she acknowledged that the DTA appeared to 
not be as ‘strong’ as SWAPO, the ambassador claimed that “one cannot accurately estimate the 
popular strength of a group in the absence of either fre  elections or careful opinion polls.”438 
 In addition to political parties inside Namibia, one of the major actors involved in this 
issue was, of course, South Africa. Kirkpatrick described South Africa as a democracy on top 
and an authoritarian system on the bottom – meaning that its white population enjoyed all of the 
rights and protections of citizens living in a democracy, while the majority of its population, non-
whites, suffered under authoritarian rule. According to the ambassador, South Africa’s white 
population identified with Europe, considered itself to be an heir to Judeo-Christian, Western 
Civilization, and was deeply concerned about being accepted as such by the Western world. This 
desire to be accepted, she claimed, constituted an important factor in the equation as they might 
eventually submit to Western pressure to end apartheid. Moreover, though racist, the South 
                                                           
437 Ibid. 
438 Ibid, 305. 
176 
 
African government featured a rule of law which was “of course, a protection to the population, a 
restraint on government, and a lever for peaceable change.”439 
 In addition to SWAPO, the DTA, and South Africa, the United Nations and Western 
European nations were also political actors involved in the Namibian equation. According to 
Kirkpatrick, the United Nations’ decision to recognize SWAPO, a national liberation 
organization comprised of communist elements, as the sole authentic representative of the 
Namibian people demonstrated partisanship and “tarnished its credentials” as a fair mediator in 
Namibia.440 As for Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, Kirkpatrick 
noted that they had large investments in Africa which gave them a ‘special stake’ in the 
region.441 
 The United Nations, she proclaimed, was ‘seized’ with obtaining Namibian independence 
via Resolution 435. This resolution was passed in 1978 and called for the following: the 
withdrawal of South Africa’s illegal administration of Namibia so that power could be 
transferred to the people of Namibia, and the establi hment of a U.N. Transition Assistance 
Group (UNTAG) which would remain in place for one yar in order to ensure free elections 
under the supervision and control of the U.N. It welcomed SWAPO’s cooperation in signing and 
observing a ceasefire during this transitional period, and called upon South Africa to cooperate 
with the U.N. in this endeavor.442 Kirkpatrick maintained that the U.S. was in favor of this 
resolution, but that it had many ‘gaps’ that the Reagan Administration was concerned about. For 
one, it failed to envision what kind of regime would emerge following elections; for another, it 
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failed to state who would govern Namibia in the interim. The ambassador asserted that the U.S. 
would only support the resolution if such issues were r solved, if it included a provision for the 
protection of minority rights in Namibia, and if it provided a framework that would protect 
Namibian independence once it was won.443  
 In her first year at the United Nations, Kirkpatrick spoke before the General Assembly 
and the Security Council about Namibia and South Africa on multiple occasions. In March of 
1981, the General Assembly attempted to revoke South Africa’s credentials. Kirkpatrick was 
angered by this move, and in a speech before the Ass mbly she pointed out that according to the 
U.N. Charter, a member state could only be suspended or xpelled upon the recommendation of 
the Security Council. With the U.S. strongly opposed to this action and having permanent veto 
power, South Africa could not be forced out of the U.N.444 The following month, Kirkpatrick 
chastised the Security Council for its unwillingness to hear from representatives of the DTA. 
“We do not purport to know how many Namibians support this party or any other party. We will 
not know the answer to that question unless or until free elections are held in that country,” she 
stated, “we only know that some Namibians support this party.” Should the Council refuse, then 
the fundamental principles of fairness, democratic spirit, and evenhandedness upon which the 
United Nations was founded would be violated, thus damaging the organization’s capacity to act 
as a peacemaker and impartial mediator.445 
 In April of 1981, the Security Council passed four different resolutions regarding the 
occupation of Namibia by South Africa, all of which were vetoed by the United States, the 
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United Kingdom, and France.446 Kirkpatrick mounted a vigorous defense of the Western powers 
in debates. “There have been charges that the Western countries… have failed to achieve the 
goal of an independent, stable, self-governing Namibia,” she proclaimed, “It has been suggested 
that because the Western Contact Group… have substantial economic relations with South 
Africa, they are somehow responsible for the continuation of repression in South Africa.”447This 
was not true, the ambassador declared. Moreover, in an effort to distance her country from such 
charges, Kirkpatrick alluded to the actions of the Soviet bloc in the region: 
My government has no other objective than to achieve authentic independence and self-
government for Namibia and indeed I believe that all the Western Contact Group has no 
other objective than this. We have no territorial objectives in Africa. We have no 
aspiration to station thousands of our troops in African countries. We have no desire to 
send armed surrogates to subvert the independence of th  new states of Africa. We have 
no desire to divide this body or to divert its atten ion from the problem of self-
government for Namibia to the creation of divisive decisions here.448 
 
 In addition to denying the charges levelled against the U.S. and other Western nations, 
Kirkpatrick opposed the resolutions’ calls for sanctions against South Africa. The ambassador 
maintained that the Reagan Administration did not view economic sanctions as an effective 
means of influencing political policy. Moreover, the administration did not see sanctions as a 
‘realistic alternative’ to future efforts to resolve the issue peacefully by negotiation. Kirkpatrick 
argued that sanctions had not been effective against Italy in the 1930s or Rhodesia in the 1970s; 
furthermore,  neither had American sanctions against the Soviet Union following its invasion of 
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Afghanistan.449Thus, given the historical ineffectiveness of sanctio s, the United Nations should 
cease in its efforts to force member nations to adopt them. 
 In 1984, the General Assembly passed several resolutions against South Africa and the 
practice of apartheid. The U.S. either voted against or abstained from voting for each resolution 
with the exception of one – The U.N. Trust Fund for South Africa which provided humanitarian 
assistance to those persecuted under the apartheid system.450 American opposition to these 
resolutions was widely criticized by U.N. member states. The ambassador declared that the U.S. 
deplored and condemned apartheid “as we condemn all denial of full citizenship and rights of 
full citizenship and of democracy to all citizens of all countries, unequivocally.”451  
Unfortunately, ‘excesses of language’ prevented the U.S. from supporting these resolutions; for 
example, the ‘direct, hostile, and unfair references’ to specific members of the United Nations. In 
particular, the U.S. opposed the phrase “on account f the veto of the United States” as it implied 
that aggression committed by South Africa against its neighbors was solely the result of the 
American veto in the Security Council.452 Such implications were preposterous, she declared. 
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Moreover, the language contained within the resolutions was calculated to discourage those 
engaged in the effort to bring independence to Namibia. 453 
Criticisms 
 The transition from college professor to policymaker was not an easy one for Kirkpatrick. 
She took a leave of absence from her job at Georgetwn in order to devote herself to her new 
position which required her to travel frequently back nd forth between New York and 
Washington, DC. Being a U.N. Ambassador and member of the NSC also required her to travel 
frequently around the globe. Inevitably, her new positi n forced her to spend more time away 
from her husband and children. Moreover, as the first female Permanent Ambassador to the 
United Nations from the United States and the firstwoman to sit on the National Security 
Council and the National Security Planning Group, Kirkpatrick faced special pressures and 
problems. In an interview with People Magazine in 1982, Kirkpatrick talked of the 
complications of being a woman in a high governmental position: 
A woman in high office is intrinsically controversial. Many people think a woman 
shouldn't be in high office. Kissinger is described as 'professorial.' I am described as 
'schoolmarmish.' Brzezinski is called 'Doctor.' I am called 'Mrs.' I am depicted as a witch 
or a scold in editorial cartoons—and the speed withhich these stereotypes have been 
used shows how close these feelings are to the surface. It is much worse than I ever 
dreamed it would be.454 
 
Her gender also placed her appearance under scrutiny. Dating back to her adolescence and her 
days at Stephens College, Kirkpatrick had never been int rested in fashion, make-up, or 
hairstyles. This ‘indifference’ regarding her appearance did not draw much criticism in academic 
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circles; however, it did land her on the worst dressed list of People Magazine in 1981. As a high 
profile diplomat and policy-maker, Kirkpatrick was required to look the part. She was given a 
make-over that included more make-up along with higlights and more fashionable clothing and 
jewelry.455  
 In addition to having to adjust to a new job, sacrificing time with her husband and 
children, and enduring difficulties due to her gendr, Kirkpatrick also had to withstand public 
and political scrutiny concerning her job performance.  Assessments of Kirkpatrick’s tenure as 
United Nations Ambassador, outside of conservative circles, have been generally critical. 
Notable U.S. Ambassadors Since 1775: A Biographical Dictionary provides a brief biographical 
sketch of Kirkpatrick, along with an overview of various important issues raised at the U.N. 
during her tenure there. In the work, Kirkpatrick is described as an outsider who was not fond of 
public and social functions. This, combined with her insistence on appointing her own team, 
created additional distance between the U.S. mission and the foreign affairs bureaucracy. Many 
career officers felt left out and resigned as Kirkpatrick and other ‘inexperienced outsiders’ took 
over.456The author praised Kirkpatrick for standing up for American interests at the United 
Nations, but also noted that the U.S. often stood al ne in its support for both Israel and South 
Africa, and in its opposition to disarmament issues and international agreements such as the Law 
of the Sea Treaty. Finally, the author observed, it was under Kirkpatrick’s watch that the United 
States government withdrew support from UNESCO (Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
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Organization of the U.N.) and had the voting records of countries recorded and passed on to 
Congress to be used in the assessment of future aid quests.457 
 Seymour Maxwell Finger offers a much harsher assessm nt of Kirkpatrick as U.N. 
Ambassador in his work American Ambassadors at the United Nations.458 According to Finger, a 
major issue affecting her performance as ambassador was her negative view of the institution. He 
criticized her both for repeatedly speaking ill of the United Nations and for exhibiting 
confrontational attitudes towards other nations. Furthermore, Finger maintained that Kirkpatrick 
had appointed persons to the U.S. mission based solly on their political views rather than their 
experience in international diplomacy. The lack of experienced professionals, he charged, 
handicapped the mission, its goals, and its relations with other national groups. Though he 
praised her for defending American interests and standing up to the Soviets, Finger’s overall 
analysis of her performance remained uncomplimentary.  According to him, Kirkpatrick’s 
ideological approach to international affairs, along with her frequent denunciations of the U.N., 
led to repeated unnecessary confrontations with Third World nations and resulted in diminished 
support for American policies. Moreover, her speaking style, lack of diplomatic experience, and 
inaccessibility hampered her effectiveness. 
 Both Gary Ostrower and Linda Fasulo offered negative assessments of Kirkpatrick’s 
tenure as United Nations Ambassador in their respective works – The United Nations and the 
United States and Representing America: Experiences of US Diplomats at he UN.459 Ostrower 
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described Kirkpatrick as confrontational, blunt, acerbic, and angry – the most ideological of 
Reagan’s foreign policy team. He accused her of alien t ng many at the U.N. and the State 
Department and blamed her for the U.S. decision to cu  funding from the U.N. and to withdraw 
from UNESCO. Ostrower was particularly critical of her decision to keep track of nations’ 
voting habits in the United Nations in order to determine whether or not the U.S. should 
acquiesce to future aid requests from them. Like Finger, Fasulo criticized Kirkpatrick for 
frequently speaking negatively of the United Nations a d for being confrontational. Her 
willingness to bypass normal diplomatic channels in order to speak to the President one-on-one 
was deemed ‘unprofessional’. Moreover, Fasulo points out that Kirkpatrick was not of the same 
public stature as previous representatives, noting that this might be an indication of how the 
Reagan Administration felt about the U.N. 
 The most positive assessment of Kirkpatrick’s performance as ambassador comes from 
Allan Gerson, an international attorney who served as legal counsel and special assistant to 
Kirkpatrick throughout her tenure at the United Nations. The Kirkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy 
without Apology 460focused on major issues that arose within the U.N. between 1981 and 
Kirkpatrick’s resignation in April of 1985 and, as such, provides valuable insight into the 
workings of the U.S. mission. Gerson does address an i sue that Ostrower, Fasulo, and Finger 
did not: Kirkpatrick’s influence over policy. He claimed that the political science professor had 
more influence over foreign policy than any previous United Nations Ambassador.461Though 
supportive of Kirkpatrick, Gerson’s descriptions of the workings of the United Nations were 
overwhelmingly negative. The lawyer noted how frequntly the U.S. was outnumbered and out-
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voted on numerous issues, never acknowledging any legitimacy in opposing viewpoints. This is 
not surprising given his belief that traditional theories of international law constituted “make-
believe universalism”462, a sentiment that is reminiscent of Kirkpatrick’s di trust of ‘rational 
utopianism’. Gerson maintained that with the creation of the U.N., international law was 
erroneously seen as being able to overcome the multiple varied conceptions of justice and world 
order held by different cultures. Indeed, international law was viewed as nothing less than a 
guide to a promised land of universal peace. Gerson believed that instead of following traditional 
theories of international law, the U.S. should have dopted a more national security oriented 
approach.463 This theme – that United States policy should reflect American interests rather than 
those associated with the United Nations Charter – was often repeated throughout the book, 
making it quite clear that neither Kirkpatrick nor Gerson had much faith in multinational 
institutions. 
 Keith Hindell, a British journalist, offers a more r cent critique of Kirkpatrick’s time as 
the American ambassador to the United Nations in his art cle “Madame Ambassador: An 
Appraisal of Jeane J. Kirkpatrick as U.S Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1981-
1985”.464Hindell’s article analyzed the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, her performance within the United 
Nations, and her influence on foreign policy. The reporter began by criticizing the Kirkpatrick 
Doctrine’s assumption that right-wing dictatorships were somehow less repressive than other 
dictatorial regimes. “In view of all the horrors infl cted by juntas in Argentina, Chile, Honduras, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru, Paraguay, and Brazil,” he wrote, “it was bizarre to speak up for 
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‘traditional autocracies’.”465 Hindell went on to point out the number of times Kirkpatrick did not 
know an answer during her confirmation hearing, implying that she was not qualified to be an 
ambassador.  Like Finger, Ostrower, and Fasulo, Hindell disapproved of Kirkpatrick and her 
staff’s inexperience. “Despite being exposed as being less than the master of her brief,” he 
asserted, “she scorned an induction proffered by the State Department and underlined her view 
by appointing three outsiders to key positions in the UN mission, rejecting candidates from the 
Foreign Service.”466 
 Hindell claimed that Kirkpatrick was at her best defending Israel at the United Nations, 
something she had to do quite frequently. The journalist also praised her energy, noting that she 
gave seventy speeches to the U.N. Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Third 
Committee (the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee), that she regularly testified 
before Congress, and that she wrote numerous articles during her tenure. However, Hindell 
asserted that Kirkpatrick’s speeches failed to have a marked effect on the voting patterns of 
member states, and he described her as more of an advocate than a diplomat.467Unlike Gerson, 
Hindell maintained that Kirkpatrick had little influence over the Reagan Administration’s foreign 
policies, after all, Reagan did not offer her a senior position in the government upon her 
retirement from the United Nations.468 
 Ann Miller Morin’s work, Her Excellency: An Oral History of American Women 
Ambassadors, offers a more balanced analysis of the political s ientist turned ambassador.469  
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Morin’s work in many ways mirrored Kirkpatrick’s own work with female legislators in 
Political Woman. Morin conducted interviews with 34 female ambassadors in an attempt to 
answer the following questions: What character/personality traits do these women have in 
common? How successful were female ambassadors? What effect did being a woman have on 
them? Did any of them influence foreign policy? At the time that Morin began her research in 
1984, only 44 females had served as ambassadors, the first of whom was Ruth Bryan Owen who 
was made chief of the diplomatic mission to Denmark in 1933. 
 Based on her position as United Nations Ambassador, member of the Cabinet, the NSC, 
and part of the NSPG, Morin credited Kirkpatrick with having more foreign policy clout than 
any woman in the United States history.470 Though she had a reputation for being confrontation l 
and lacking accessibility, Morin praised Kirkpatrick for taking down the ‘Kick Me’ sign on the 
back of the U.S. in the United Nations. Kirkpatrick sent letters to representatives who 
continuously voted against the United States, warning them that they could not repeatedly vote 
against American interests and then expect military and economic aid to continue. “From then 
on,” Morin noted, “those who wished to maintain friendly relations with the United States were 
much more careful of how they voted.”471 
 In interviews Morin questioned Kirkpatrick about a number of issues including her 
gender, her accessibility, her relations with other ambassadors and diplomats, and her overall 
assessment of the United Nations.  When asked about what role gender played in her treatment at 
the international institution Kirkpatrick told Morin, “I had no notion what a shock my gender 
would be. I was not only the first woman to head the U.S. mission to the United Nations. I was 
the first woman to ever represent a m jor power at the UN. I was the first woman to ever 
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represent a Western government at the United Nations. I was also the first woman to sit in the 
National Security Council on a regular basis.”472 Kirkpatrick was proud of her accomplishments, 
both for herself and for other women, noting “I have no doubt that my appointment and survival 
of those first two years in fact opened doors for wmen in career foreign service positions.”473 
Despite initial negative reactions towards her gender, Kirkpatrick maintained that she profited as 
much from being a woman as she suffered. The ambassador told Morin: “I think in macho 
cultures, like both Latin and Arab – and somebody said African – they’re much less likely to 
regard a woman as a competitor. And I think women ar  generally, including me, trained to be 
good listeners. I did an awful lot of listening and a lot of seeking of advice, and my colleagues 
liked that.”474 
 Kirkpatrick acknowledged that she did delegate quite a bit, but pointed out that the U.S. 
Mission had specialists for all areas of the world who were trained to work on issues affecting 
those regions. Thus, based on their expertise, she felt it would oftentimes be better for them to 
deal with regional issues. As for charges of inaccessibility, Kirkpatrick conceded that at times 
she was. This she blamed on her frequent travel between Washington and New York. The 
ambassador maintained that taking part in both the NSPG and NSC was “absolutely essential” 
for the U.S. Mission to function effectively. After all, attending policy meetings gave Kirkpatrick 
access to authoritative decisions from the highest level475.  Frequent travelling also increased her 
reliance on area specialists and delegating certain tasks to others at the mission. 
 In her conversation with Morin, Kirkpatrick described her relationships with fellow 
Security Council members as “very close”, noting that while she worked most closely with the 
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British and the French she managed to maintain “reason bly good relations” with the Chinese 
and Soviet ambassadors.476The ambassador noted that outside the Security Council, she was 
close with many of the Latin American ambassadors and some of the African diplomats. 
Kirkpatrick’s language skills – her fluency in both French and Spanish – were unique among 
American Ambassadors to the U.N. and allowed for her to work well with representatives of 
nations who spoke those languages477. 
 Perhaps the most common and germane critique of Kirkpatrick’s performance as U.N. 
Ambassador concerned her frequent denunciations of the institution. Critics wondered, rightly 
so, whether or not someone who did not believe in the efficacy of the United Nations was the 
best person to represent American interests there. In this vein, Morin asked Kirkpatrick about the 
effectiveness and the importance of the U.N. The ambassador described the institution as “a 
seriously bloated, overblown, international bureaucr cy with a lot of the worst aspects of many 
national bureaucracies combined.”478 In regard to its central responsibilities, namely the peaceful 
resolution of conflict, peacekeeping, and peacemaking she declared the U.N. to be ineffective. 
There were, Kirkpatrick acknowledged, certain programs affiliated with the U.N. that were quite 
effective including the UNHCR (High Commissioner foRefugees), UNICEF (Children’s Fund), 
and WHO (World Health Organization). Though overall critical of the institution, Kirkpatrick 
maintained that the United States should not withdraw from the U.N. because it was too 
important to many small, poor Third World countries.  “I don’t think it’s objectively important to 
them,” she relayed to Morin, “but it’s subjectively. I think what’s most important to Third World 
countries is that there be a place in which they can meet people, a lot of arenas, you know, in 
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which different kinds of problems are discussed and in which they can speak, just get a 
hearing.”479 
 Kirkpatrick elaborated on her views of the United Nations in Legitimacy and Force, a 
two volume set that included all of her speeches, testimonies, addresses, statements, and articles 
from her time as ambassador. The ambassador repeatedly deplored the relative impotence of the 
United States within the United Nations, observing that American influence had been in decline 
within the U.N. since the early 1960s, a time when European powers began giving up their 
empires. “There is no greater irony in our time,” she noted, “than that the decolonization process 
and the proliferation of former colonies as members of the United Nations should have been 
associated with the decline of U.S. influence”.480 As a former colony itself, the U.S. had declared 
itself in favor of decolonization in the immediate postwar era; however, it was the Soviet Union 
who was able to successfully seize upon the decolonization issue due to the capitalist nature of 
former imperial states. Kirkpatrick failed to acknowledge that American support for its European 
Cold War allies often placed Washington in oppositin to independence movements throughout 
the Third World.  
 As more and more nations gained admittance into the United Nations, the U.S. slowly 
became more isolated.481 Many of the new nations were former colonies whose entire national 
histories had been lived out since the end of WWII. Most were poor, weak, and unhappy, and 
very few were democracies. According to Kirkpatrick, these nations pushed two overriding 
agendas in the United Nations: decolonization and economic development; yet, despite the fact 
that decolonization, economic development, and development assistance were utterly consistent 
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with American national experience, values, and practices, the United States still  had major 
difficulties garnering support from these nations.482  
 Moreover, American impotence had to do with the structure of that U.N. General 
Assembly, specifically its emphasis on one nation, one vote. This method of representation, she 
charged, created a disjunction between power and responsibility; for example, the United States 
was responsible for 25% of the U.N. budget and had more responsibilities than other nations, but 
did not possess commensurate voting clout.483 In addition, Kirkpatrick blamed American 
diplomats for their longstanding lack of skill in practicing international politics in multilateral 
arenas. According to her, Americans had not been eff ctive in defining or projecting a 
conception of U.S. national purpose within international forums. In short, Americans had not 
practiced good politics at the United Nations. Kirkpatrick placed part of the blame for American 
political ineptitude with the rapid turnover of delegates (one reason she stayed at her post as long 
as she did). However, the major issue for Americans at the U.N. was that they ignored the 
political nature of the United Nations, and instead operated as though there were no differences 
between relations with its supporters or opponents, no penalties for opposing American views 
and values, and no rewards for cooperating with a superpower.484 
 According to Kirkpatrick, a political culture had developed within the institution that 
featured all of the elements of interest-based politics. For instance, the political blocs inside the 
U.N. functioned similarly to the political parties in a parliamentary system, and as such, sought 
to control the dynamics of legislative politics.  There were a variety of blocs: some were 
geographical blocs, such as the OAU (Organization for A rican Unity), and some consisted of 
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political and economic coalitions, such as the Soviet bloc. The most important and largest bloc 
during the 1980s was that of the non-aligned states,  bloc that claimed over one hundred nations 
that allegedly operated outside of the East-West confli t. The power of the blocs depended on 
their cohesion and their size; for example, Kirkpatrick noted that the African bloc was very 
cohesive while the Latin American one was not. Alliances are made among the blocs and these 
frequently determined outcomes. According to her, the Soviets had been very skillful in handling 
the blocs, especially the non-aligned group.485  
 Unlike the Soviets, the United States was a country without a party in the United Nations. 
The U.S. had never belonged to any bloc and because of this often ended up as a non-participant 
in key political decisions within the organization. Kirkpatrick maintained that American political 
isolation within the U.N. stemmed from its universali m, the very same universalism that led the 
U.S. to assist in the creation of a world assembly in which all the nations would be represented 
on the basis of one country, one vote. In keeping with their utopian, idealistic bent, Americans 
believed that a superpower should not become a part of ny bloc in order to not demonstrate 
favoritism for one group over another. Apparently, the United States continued to take George 
Washington’s warnings about ‘entangling alliances’ seriously, even in the United Nations. 
Therefore, the U.S. had influence within the U.N. only when the blocs failed to act like cohesive, 
disciplined parties; in all other cases, the American ambassador expended much time and energy 
in a fruitless effort to sway the major blocs and frequently had to exercise its veto power in the 
Security Council. Casting a veto meant, much to Kirkpatrick’s chagrin, acknowledging that 
one’s country did not have enough political clout to carry the day on the issue at hand.486   
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 Kirkpatrick believed that one way for the United States to become more effective within 
the United Nations was to be clear to other nations that the U.S. took the U.N. seriously – 
meaning that acts against the American interest within the U.N. by any nation would be taken 
into account in assessments of bilateral relationships. Consequently, she supported placing the 
voting records at the U.N. under congressional oversight. According to her, annual reviews of 
U.N. voting patterns and practices would provide Congress with a reliable, systematic basis for 
assessing the attitudes, policies, and decisions of member states. Thus, Congress could withdraw 
economic or military aid from nations that repeatedly voted against the United States in the 
United Nations.487 
  In addition, the United States could use its control over the international organization’s 
purse strings in order to increase its influence. Kirkpatrick testified before congress on more than 
one occasion that despite having signed the United Nations Charter that committed member 
nations to perpetual financial support, the United States did not have to continue paying a quarter 
of the total U.N. costs. She pointed out that other countries sometimes refused to pay their share 
and were not penalized; therefore, the U.S. could do the same. Moreover, the U.S. had complete 
control over its voluntary contributions to the United Nations’ specialized agencies. Kirkpatrick 
maintained that Congress should only favor those programs that were both supported by their 
constituents and consistent with American values. Conversely, U.N. programs that had 
succumbed to politicization or had strayed from their original purpose and task should be 
penalized by the withdrawal of American monetary support.488 
 Despite her numerous critiques of the international rganization, Kirkpatrick declared 
that it was, in some ways, important to the global community. In speeches and articles, she 
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repeatedly praised its work with refugees, children, and global health issues. The U.S. 
ambassador noted the importance of the organization s a global forum for small, Third World 
nations.  In addition, Kirkpatrick maintained that the United Nations was able to focus world 
attention on various issues, for the problems discus ed within the organization were publicized 
around the globe. Moreover, she charged, decisions made by the U.N. on various issues were 
often interpreted as reflecting global opinion, and s such, became endowed with moral and 
intellectual force.489 For these reasons, the United States should remain active within the U.N. 
while continuing to increase its influence therein. 
Conclusions 
 As the Permanent Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick was responsible 
for articulating and defending the Reagan Administration’s foreign policies to the global 
community. In this respect, her ambassadorial tenure can be deemed quite successful. Due to her 
inclusion within the National Security Council and the National Security Planning Group, along 
with her personal access to the President, the Georgetown professor was privy to the 
development of policies as they evolved within the State and Defense Departments. Such direct 
access to the machinations of foreign policies allowed Kirkpatrick to excel in her position as 
mouthpiece for the administration, and, in each of the issues discussed in this chapter – Israel and 
the Arab-Israeli Conflict, the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the Vietnamese 
occupation of Cambodia, and Namibian independence ad South Africa – the ambassador 
faithfully represented the goals and views of her country.  
 Kirkpatrick’s successful articulation of the Reagan Administration’s policies, however, 
did not necessarily sway global opinion, especially in the cases of Israel and South Africa. In 
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nearly every instance in which these issues were debated within the United Nations, the United 
States found itself as a country without allies, unable to amass support for its views. Within the 
domain of the U.N. Security Council, the U.S. was able to thwart majority opinions on the Arab-
Israeli conflict and the illegal South African occupation of Namibia via the use of the veto. 
Indeed, throughout Kirkpatrick’s tenure, the U.S. amb ssador was forced to employ the veto on 
nineteen occasions: five of these vetoes pertained to South Africa and Namibia, while ten of 
them concerned Israel and the situation in the Middle East.490 Outside of the Security Council, 
Kirkpatrick was unable to garner the support necessary to block General Assembly resolutions 
which criticized America’s allies. 
 As the U.S. appeared increasingly to stand alone against global opinion, Kirkpatrick’s 
disenchantment with the United Nations increased. Her disillusionment with the international 
body, especially in regards to its unceasing attacks on Israel, caused the ambassador to call for 
controversial changes in American policy towards the organization. For one, Kirkpatrick 
spearheaded the decision to place U.N. voting records before Congress in the hopes that House 
Representatives and American Senators could utilize hem in their assessments of aid requests 
from foreign nations. For another, the ambassador supported withdrawing U.S. funds from 
UNESCO due to its anti-Israel orientation. In both cases, Kirkpatrick hoped to utilize one of 
America’s greatest resources – money – in order to increase U.S. influence within the United 
Nations. With regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the South African occupation of Namibia, 
such tactics were ineffective as the majority of memb r states continued to support measures that 
went against American wishes. 
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 Though the U.S. frequently stood alone in its support for Israel and South Africa within 
the United Nations, American policies and goals concer ing the Soviet invasion and occupation 
of Afghanistan, along with the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, were widely supported by 
the majority of member states. In these instances, th  United States and the United Nations were 
in nearly complete agreement. President Reagan, who, like Kirkpatrick, was not the most ardent 
supporter of the international organization, publicly commended U.N. resolutions relating to 
Afghanistan and Cambodia.491 Though these issues were not debated as frequently as hose 
pertaining to Israel or South Africa, and resolutions passed against the Soviet Union and 
Vietnam were not, according to Kirkpatrick, as rhetorically ‘harsh’ as those that criticized Israel, 
the fact that the U.N. repeatedly passed resolutions c demning these actions constitutes 
evidence that the international organization was not completely dominated by the Soviet bloc 
and its aspirations as Kirkpatrick often implied. 
 Despite the passage of numerous resolutions vis-à- Israel, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and 
Namibia, none of these conflicts were resolved by the United Nations during Kirkpatrick’s 
tenure. Thus, her contention that the organization was ineffective in regards to its central 
responsibility which consisted of the peaceful resoluti n of conflicts, peacekeeping, and 
peacemaking may contain some truth. However, its inability to end these conflicts had much to 
do with both the veto power of the United States and the Soviet Union and the intransigence of 
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the Middle Eastern states. Neither the Reagan Administration’s policies nor the U.N. resolutions 
directed toward the Arab-Israeli conflict proved successful, as peace in the Middle East remains 
elusive even up to present day. Moreover, while the Soviet veto prohibited the Security Council 
from acting in Afghanistan and Cambodia, the American veto blocked U.N. efforts at realizing 
Namibian independence. In fact, these crises were not resolved until the end of the Cold War era 
– Soviet troops did not withdraw from Afghanistan until 1989, Vietnam did not withdraw its 
troops from Cambodia until 1989, and Namibia did not become independent until 1990. 
 East-West rivalry indeed played an important role in American support for South Africa 
and Israel. In her own analysis of Middle Eastern issues, Kirkpatrick had given first priority to 
the goal of preventing the Soviet Union from gaining an additional foothold in that region. 
President Reagan also named the ‘strategic threat posed by the Soviet Union and its surrogates’ 
as one of the most salient issues facing American interests there.492 Given Israel’s status as a 
democratic, anti-communist state, American support for Tel Aviv remained ironclad. 
Furthermore, though South Africa’s status as a democracy was questionable at best, its stance 
against communism was not. In her description of the issues complicating the independence of 
Namibia, Kirkpatrick had noted that a major goal of the U.S. was to prevent Namibia’s uranium 
deposits from falling into the hands of the communists. Given that communist-dominated 
movements had taken over Angola and Mozambique, states hat bordered on Namibia and South 
Africa respectively, the U.S. believed that it had to support South African activities geared 
towards rolling back communism in Southern Africa. Therefore, the U.S. supported South 
Africa’s refusal to grant Namibian independence until Cuban troops were taken out of Angola.  
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 The Reagan Administration’s foreign policies were centered on the containment of 
communism. Such an emphasis mandated that the administration protect and assist friendly, non-
communist nations, such as Israel and South Africa, do everything in its power to prevent the 
spread of Soviet influence in regions around the world, and provide aid to those freedom 
fighters, like the mujahidin in Afghanistan, who were resisting communist, totalitarian invasions 
and occupations. The administration’s determination to ot only contain, but also to rollback 
communism, though obvious in these particular cases, wa  even more apparent in its policies 
towards Central America. Faced with what it perceived as an expanding communist threat in its 
own front yard, the Reagan Administration, under th influence and guidance of the Kirkpatrick 
Doctrine, intensified its support for Nicaraguan “freedom fighters” and stepped up military aid to 















Chapter Five: Central America 
 Kirkpatrick’s long-standing interest in non-democratic regimes, her work on Peronist 
Argentina, her affiliation with the American Enterprise Institute and its focus on Latin American 
politics, and her critique of President Jimmy Carter’s foreign policies in “Dictatorships and 
Double Standards” fostered her reputation as a Latin American political expert. Thus, throughout 
her tenure as United Nations Ambassador, Kirkpatrick ook a special interest and played an 
important role in the formulation of the Reagan Administration’s Latin American policies. In 
January of 1981, just prior to her appointment as ambassador, Kirkpatrick’s critique of United 
States’ policies towards the region was published in Commentary magazine.493 The article, “U.S. 
Security and Latin America”, served, in many ways, as a complement to, and continuation of, her 
criticisms of Carter’s global development strategies, human rights policies, and alleged 
misunderstandings of Latin American politics found i  her “Dictatorships and Double 
Standards” article. 
 Kirkpatrick began by sounding the alarm over the spread of communism in the region, 
asserting that the Soviet Union had established itslf a  a major military power in the Western 
hemisphere, a fact that made the entire region at risk for a communist takeover. Along with 
Cuba, she maintained that Marxist-Leninist regimes had come to power in Nicaragua and 
Grenada, and the nation of El Salvador was on the brink of anarchy, a situation caused by 
communist guerillas whose “fanaticism and violence ar  reminiscent of Pol Pot”.494 In addition 
to Cuba, Nicaragua, Grenada, and El Salvador, Kirkpat ick proclaimed that Castroite forces were 
threatening the governments of the nations of Guyana, Martinique, and Guadeloupe. Thus, 
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according to the Georgetown political scientist, one f the most pressing tasks of the new 
administration was to review and revise the nation’s flawed policies towards these states and the 
region as a whole.495 
 Kirkpatrick maintained that prior to the Vietnam War, the United States had a special 
relationship with the nations of Latin America, one that emphasized national security and anti-
communism. However, the American defeat in Southeast Asia had prompted U.S. policymakers 
to reassess the objectives of Cold War policies around the globe based on ‘lessons’ learned from 
the war in Vietnam. According to her, such lessons included the following: the Cold War was 
over, therefore, East-West competition should be deemphasized; intervention in the affairs of 
other nations was immoral; the United States should not support autocrats faced with popular 
revolutionary movements; and the U.S. should make am nds for its ‘deeply flawed national 
character’ and past actions by restraining itself in international affairs.496  
Kirkpatrick disagreed with such conclusions and noted that these sentiments were 
strengthened by the increasing acceptance of developm nt theory by many members of the 
American foreign policy apparatus. She pointed to Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, and his work Between Two Ages, as a prime example of this new mode of thinking. 
In his work, Brzezinski claimed that global politics were in a state of flux: nationalism was 
waning and ideological competition was on the declin  as nation-states became increasingly 
interdependent. Kirkpatrick contended that such dismis al of ideology and the East-West conflict 
allowed for the regional ‘special’ relationship betw en the U.S. and Latin America to be 
subsumed into a global framework that deemphasized American national security interests in 
order to focus on economic and technological development within the Third World. Having 
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divested the region of its strategic importance and incorporated Latin American states into the 
‘Third World’, the Carter Administration was free to base its global policies on what Kirkpatrick 
deemed to be utopian and abstract ideals – developmnt and human rights.497  
 Having criticized Carter’s global approach to foreign policy, Kirkpatrick turned her 
attention to Latin America. The political scientist noted that many similarities existed between 
Latin American political systems, especially among the nations of Central America. All were 
small states and relatively poor. Despite various attempts made by the wealthy and ruling classes 
to modernize their nations’ economies, the majority of persons living in Central America were 
landless peasants who worked on large estates and pl tations and lived in poverty. Wealth 
remained heavily concentrated among the upper classes and the small middle classes. 
Throughout the region access to education, medical care, decent housing, proper nutrition, and 
political power remained limited. In the realm of politics and government, the Central American 
states exhibited characteristics similar to other Latin American political systems: disagreement 
on the means and ends of government, widespread distrust of authority, broad ideological 
spectrums, low levels of participation in voluntary ssociations, preference for hierarchical 
modes of association, and a history of military involvement and intervention in government. 
Each had experienced democratic interludes; however, democratic reforms had been undermined 
by the fraud, corruption, and intimidation that seem d endemic to the region. Thus, political 
competition took place in a variety of arenas by diverse groups, a fact that demonstrated that 
there was a lack of consensus regarding legitimate routes to power.498Such a lack of consensus 
allowed violence and military coups to remain legitimate avenues to power and ensured that 
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violence was an “integral, regular, and predictable” aspect of Latin American politics.499
 Following her description of the similarities shared by the nations of Latin America, 
Kirkpatrick offered a brief political history of Nicaragua and El Salvador. The Nicaraguan 
political tradition combined both autocratic and democratic elements. Throughout the 19th and 
early 20th centuries, Nicaraguan politics had been dominated by political factions controlled by 
the small, wealthy, ruling classes. These factions competed under a two party system in elections 
that were often decided by a very slim margin. Because of this, the United States was often 
called upon by various factions to assist in maintaining peace within the nation. This was the 
case until Anastasio Somoza García came to power in 1936. Somoza’s ability to maintain the 
loyalty of the National Guard, along with his political skills and ability to retain American 
support, made Nicaragua one of the most stable nations in Central America. Though he was a 
dictator, Kirkpatrick claimed that Somoza engaged in only ‘limited oppression’ and allowed for 
‘limited opposition’. He made no effort to control the church or to change Nicaraguan culture. In 
short, Somoza’s government, like those of other Latin American states, was moderately 
oppressive and moderately corrupt.500 
 During the 1960s and 1970s, the Nicaraguan governmnt was dominated by Somoza’s 
son – Anastasio Somoza Debayle, a West Point graduate m rried to an American woman. The 
younger Somoza, who had a reputation for womanizing and heavy drinking, continued the 
policies of his father and, according to Kirkpatrick, had every reason to believe that he would 
continue to receive American military and economic aid. He had no idea that his government 
would be brought down by the President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, and a group of 
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“Cuban backed terrorists”.501 By the time Carter entered office in 1977, a revoluti n against the 
Somoza regime had begun. The Nicaraguan dictator’s efforts to put down the revolution made 
him vulnerable to charges of human rights abuses. In an attempt to placate the Americans and 
continue to receive military aid, Somoza oscillated b tween repression and reconciliation in his 
dealings with revolutionary groups. According to Kirkpatrick, this vacillation demonstrated to 
the Nicaraguan people and the guerillas that Somoza c uld not perform the basic function of 
government – the maintenance of order – which delegitimized the regime.502 
Kirkpatrick contended that Carter brought about the fall of Somoza by cutting off 
military aid at a time when he needed it the most. By ignoring the violence brought about by 
guerilla revolutionary groups and focusing purely on Somoza’s attempts to curtail such violence, 
the administration helped bring down one of the most stable governments in Central America. 
Lack of military aid prevented Somoza from dealing with the opposition while it was still small 
enough to be taken out.503 Moreover, the ambassador claimed that Carter’s efforts at mediation 
between Somoza and his opposition within the Organization of American States (OAS) brought 
legitimacy to the revolutionaries. Furthermore, in the mistaken belief that progress and 
democracy could not come to Nicaragua if Somoza remained in power, the State Department 
demanded that Somoza resign.504 Eventually, due to the increase of revolutionary violence and 
the withdrawal of American military aid, Somoza was forced out and the Nicaraguan 
government was taken over by what Kirkpatrick characterized as a communist, totalitarian, 
terrorist group with ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union – the Sandinistas.505  
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Meanwhile, revolution was brewing in the neighboring state of El Salvador. As in other 
Latin American countries, military coups were a normal part of the political landscape in the 
small nation. Indeed, Kirkpatrick described El Salvador as a caricature or prototype of a Central 
American republic; its political history regularly featured oligarchy, violence, revolution, and 
militarism.506 Similar to Nicaragua, 19th and early 20th century politics were dominated by the 
wealthy Salvadoran elite who competed with each other in a two party system for political 
power. Over time, other factions of Salvadoran society became politically active, either in 
electoral politics as the franchise was extended, or in ther political arenas typical of Latin 
American systems.  
Though the nation had experienced periods of stability, such eras were short-lived. 
Kirkpatrick noted that the political system in El Salvador was chronically weak and unstable, 
even in comparison to other Central and Latin American states. Its political history was 
characterized by numerous constitutions and military coups. Indeed, there was a lack of 
agreement amongst the Salvadoran citizens as to thelegitimate means and ends of government 
which, according to Kirkpatrick, left all holders of power vulnerable to the charge that they were 
usurpers.507 In such systems, government lacks legitimacy, and without legitimacy there is no 
authority; instead, there is only power and the habit of obedience to whomever successfully 
claims power.508Such governments, Kirkpatrick claimed, were especially vulnerable to 
revolutionary violence and terrorist subversion.509  
According to Kirkpatrick, had the Carter Administration understood the distinctive 
characteristics and problems inherent in the political structure of El Salvador, and other Latin 
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American nations for that matter, then it might nothave been so quick to embrace the overthrow 
of Romero. The administration had indeed greeted Romer ’s overthrow as the dawn of a new era 
and a watershed event in Salvadoran history. “A more prudent appraisal of politics in Central 
America,” Kirkpatrick wrote, “would have left policymakers a little less enthusiastic about the 
destruction of any semi-constitutional ruler, not because they approve the ruler, but because they 
understood that authority in such systems is weak, st bility fragile, and order much easier to 
destroy than reconstruct.”510  
Though a change in government had occurred, revolutionary activity by Salvadoran 
guerilla groups continued, prompting Carter to offer military and economic aid to the new junta. 
In return for weapons and money, American policymakers insisted that the new government 
institute land reforms. Washington hoped that the transfer of land to the peasants would 
vaccinate the masses against the appeals of the communist guerillas and give them a stake in the 
new government. Kirkpatrick remained highly critical of these and other reform measures 
instituted by the Carter Administration and believed they would not be successful. She 
maintained that revolution sprang not from the resentm nts of landless peasants, but in the 
bosom of the middle classes. “Revolutions in our time,” she wrote, “are born in the middle class 
and carried out by sons of the middle class who have become skilled in the use of propaganda, 
organization, and violence.”511 Therefore, a greater understanding of revolution and Salvadoran 
politics would have allowed American policymakers to be less sanguine about the contributions 
of reforms to political stability.  
Despite the advent of a new regime and the initiation of land reform policies, leftist 
guerilla groups with ties to the Nicaraguan Sandinistas stepped up their revolutionary activities 
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causing the Salvadoran government to crack down on the opposition. As in the case of Somoza 
in Nicaragua, the U.S. viewed these efforts as human rights violations. Kirkpatrick wrote, “State 
Department supporters have consistently emphasized the anger from the Right – that is, from 
authoritarian, intensely anti-Communist defenders of the status quo”; however, the political 
scientist maintained that El Salvador was more likely in the long run to fall to a coalition of 
revolutionaries “trained, armed, and advised by Cuba and others.”512 A clear comprehension of 
the problem of order in El Salvador, she asserted, would have made American policymakers 
more sympathetic to the inability of the government to control the situation, and less anxious to 
inhibit the use of force against violent revolutionaries.513 
Kirkpatrick concluded that Carter’s Latin America policies were failures. She wrote, 
Because it failed to take into account of basic characteristics of Latin American political 
systems, the Carter administration underestimated th  fragility of order in these societies 
and overestimated the ease with which authority, once undermined, can be restored. 
Because it regarded revolutionaries as beneficent agents of change, it mistook their goals 
and motives and could not grasp the problem of governm nts which become the object of 
revolutionary violence. Because it misunderstood the relations between economics and 
politics, it wrongly assumed (as in El Salvador) that economic reforms would necessarily 
and promptly produce positive political results. Because it misunderstood the relations 
between ‘social justice’ and authority, it assumed that only ‘just’ governments can 
survive. Finally, because it misunderstood the relations between justice and violence, the 
Carter administration fell (and pushed its allies) into an effort to fight howitzers with land 
reform and urban guerrillas with improved fertilizers. Above all, the Carter 
administration failed to understand politics. Politics is conducted by persons who by 
various means, including propaganda and violence, seek to realize some vision of the 
public good…. When men are treated like ‘forces’ (or the agents of forces), their 
intentions, values, and world view tend to be ignored. But in Nicaragua the intentions and 
ideology of the Sandinistas have already shaped the outcome of the revolution, as in El 
Salvador the intentions and ideology of the leading revolutionaries create intransigence 
where there might have been willingness to cooperate and compromise, nihilism where 
there might have been reform.514 
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 Kirkpatrick’s assessment of the situation in El Salvador in “U.S. Security and Latin 
America” was, to say the least, flawed. Her political history of El Salvador was incomplete. In 
1980, the tiny Central American nation boasted a population of approximately 4.75 million 
persons. The state itself comprised 8,236 square miles, an area roughly the same size as the state 
of Massachusetts. With an annual population increase of 3.5%, El Salvador was the most densely 
populated nation in the region. Nearly half of its citizens consisted of illiterate peasants who 
depended on working the land for their livelihood. Approximately150,000 families worked as 
agricultural laborers while another 150,000 families were tenant farmers or sharecroppers. 
Altogether, about 1.8 million Salvadorans were landess peasants in a nation whose per capita 
income was $680.00 U.S. dollars per year. The economy of El Salvador was based primarily on 
agricultural exports, along with economic aid from foreign nations.  
 As was the case with other Central and Latin American nations, El Salvador had 
experienced the harshness of Spanish colonial rule. Vestiges of colonialism remained following 
the nation’s independence in the 19th century as the wealthy landowning classes continued to 
exploit the indigenous masses just as the Spanish had before. Over 60% of the arable land in the 
nation was owned and controlled by the wealthiest 2% of the population – the ‘Fourteen 
Families’.515 Terror, which had served as a useful tactic for the Spanish in their domination of the 
native peoples of El Salvador, continued to be utilized by the Salvadoran oligarchy, making 
violence a primary political tool throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. In addition to violence, 
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the Salvadoran political system was characterized by a combination of rigged elections, military 
coups, oligarchical rule, and direct political actions such as strikes and demonstrations.  
 In December of 1931, members of the Salvadoran military staged a coup against the 
newly elected government and installed General Maximilian Hernández Martínez as President. 
Beginning in 1932, Salvadoran peasants, primarily those from the coffee- growing regions where 
economic conditions were the worst, began protesting against the new regime. These peasants 
were hit hard by the declining prices of coffee on the global market, and this, along with their 
dissatisfaction with the new political leadership, caused them to join socialist and communist 
parties. Augustin Farabundo Martí, a communist party leader, led the peasants and other 
Salvadoran dissidents in numerous strikes and demonstrations across the nation. The Salvadoran 
military responded with extreme force, killing betwen ten and thirty thousand Salvadorans, 
primarily peasants, and executing Martí. The military’s crackdown on dissidents in 1932 was 
successful in the short-term, but memories of the uprising, as well as the injustices that spawned 
from it persisted. Many of the revolutionaries of the 1970s and 1980s claimed to be continuing 
the revolution began by the peasants and Martí in 1932, naming themselves the Farbundo Martí 
Front for National Liberation, or the FMLN, after the famous revolutionary.516 In her own 
analysis of the 1932 uprising, Kirkpatrick discounted he 10-30,000 Salvadoran revolutionaries 
executed by Martínez and the Salvadoran military and instead praised the government for 
restoring stability to the nation. “It is sometimes said that 30,000 persons lost their lives…” she 
wrote, “the violence of this repression seems less important than the fact of restored order and 
the thirteen years of civil peace that ensued.”517 
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 When Martínez overthrew the elected government of El Salvador in 1931, the United 
States was at first reluctant to acknowledge him as the legitimate ruler. However, once 
communists began leading revolts against the new regime, Washington began to change its 
stance, offering official recognition of the Martínez government in 1934.Thus, long before the 
advent of the Cold War or the articulation of the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, the United States showed 
that it preferred dictatorship and stability over rvolution in Central America. The American 
acceptance of and support for autocracy in the region only increased in the postwar era as Cold 
War tensions escalated. The mastermind of containment, George F. Kennan, agreed with the 
American penchant for authoritarianism, noting in 1950 that “It is better to have a strong regime 
in power than a liberal government if it is indulgent and relaxed and penetrated by 
communists.”518 
 The coup that placed General Martínez in power in El Salvador ushered in an era of 
military dominance over Salvadoran life. Between 1931 and 1944, the military became the 
primary source of political authority as it was theonly institution that could guarantee stability 
and maintain order. Consequently, the traditional agrarian oligarchy drifted into the background 
of Salvadoran political life. This was part of a general trend; the phenomenon of dictatorships 
headed by generals and dependent upon the military for survival had become common 
throughout Central America. Indeed, with but two exceptions, from 1930 to the 1979 Nicaraguan 
revolution, every single extra-constitutional change in government within the region had required 
the acquiescence, support, and participation of the existing military establishment.519  
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 The newfound wealth and power of the Salvadoran military gave it a large stake in 
preserving the status quo; reform of the existing political, social, and economic system became 
ever more difficult. Occasionally, elements within the military, specifically junior officers who 
felt far removed from power, would express the desire to improve the conditions of the poor; 
however, they were unsure how to simultaneously promote social justice while preserving the 
power of the military.  Overall, the military was unable to resolve the many contradictions 
inherent in the effort to combine modernization with s ability: How could the economy be 
modernized without the concomitant political and social mobilization becoming a destabilizing 
element? How could political coalitions be broadened while maintaining the hegemony and 
support of the oligarchy? How could the military allow political competitiveness without losing 
its authority?520 Unable to reconcile such contradictions, the Salvador n military continued to 
repress its citizens and stifle efforts at reform. 
 In the 1970s, the political, social, and economic conditions within El Salvador worsened 
due to the eruption of war with Honduras, overpopulation issues, and the oil crisis. In 1969, El 
Salvador and Honduras went to war. Sparked by a qualifying match between the nations for the 
1970 World Cup, the war was a result of long-standing border disputes and the increasing 
number illegal Salvadoran immigrants that had been flooding into Honduras. Economic 
conditions within El Salvador had caused many of its c izens to seek refuge in neighboring 
states. While the nations were at war, approximately 25,000 Salvadoran immigrants illegally 
working in Honduras were sent back to their homeland. This influx of people exacerbated the 
economic woes of the nation and caused many Salvadorans to suffer from starvation and 
malnutrition.  Moreover, external factors, such as the 1973 oil embargo, conspired to make 
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matters worse. By the end of 1973, the combination of war, overpopulation, and oil crisis had 
brought about inflation levels of sixty percent in El Salvador.521 
 In the midst of this social and economic turmoil, pposition to the government grew. 
Many Salvadorans joined the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) led by José Napoleón Duarte, a 
Notre Dame educated engineer, former mayor of San Salvador, and acquaintance of Kirkpatrick. 
In 1972, Duarte ran against the military candidate, Colonel Arturo Molina, for the presidency. 
The military rigged the election and Molina was declared the winner. The outcome of the 
election angered some of the junior officers of the Salvadoran military who seized Molina and 
attempted to install Duarte as president. However, th  majority of the military supported Molina 
and came to his aid. Nicaragua’s leader – Somoza – sent his National Guard to thwart the 
attempted coup. Duarte was severely beaten and forced into exile. Meanwhile, as the military 
took measures to severely weaken the PDC, leftist revolutionary groups, including the FMLN, 
became more active.522 
 Throughout the 1970s, violence from both the right (military) and the left (FMLN) 
escalated. Those suspected of union activities or communist sympathies either disappeared, or 
they were arrested, and sometimes executed by the military’s death squads. Leftist guerillas 
kidnapped members of the oligarchy and held them for ransom in order to raise money to buy 
arms. In the midst of this ongoing civil war, elections were held in 1977. Again, thanks to fraud 
on the part of the military, the will of the people was thwarted and General Carlos Humberto 
Romero was installed as president. Popular protests followed and with Romero’s approval the 
military gunned down the protestors. Decrying this blatant disregard for human rights, the Carter 
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Administration threatened to suspend military and economic aid to El Salvador. Romero 
subsequently proclaimed that El Salvador did not want U.S. aid and proceeded to crack down 
harder on the opposition.523 
 Despite widespread government violence, protests against Romero’s regime increased 
throughout 1977. Accordingly, Romero decreed the Law for the Defense and Guarantee of 
Public Order which made it illegal to oppose the government in any fashion. The law instituted 
full censorship of the press, outlawed strikes, banned public meetings, and suspended normal 
judicial proceedings.524 Political activities and violence only increased. By 1979, reports from 
Amnesty International, the Organization of American States, and the U.S. State Department were 
condemning the Salvadoran government and military for their systematic torture, murder, and 
persecution of political dissidents. Government violence brought about an increase in new 
recruits to the radical left which in turn stepped up its bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations 
of government officials.525 
 In October of 1979, Romero was overthrown in a coup led by junior military officers who 
accused the regime of corruption, electoral fraud, and human rights violations. Pledging to 
reform the nation’s economic, social, and political structures in many ways, they offered to work 
with the leftist revolutionary forces in order to negotiate an end to the civil war, to initiate land 
reform so as to better the economic situation of the peasants, and to control the right-wing death 
squads. Though serious about instituting reforms, the young men were unable to deliver on their 
promises. Reform initiatives were consistently blocked by the military and the Salvadoran 
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oligarchy. With the new regime increasingly paralyzed, violence began to escalate yet again.526 
Throughout 1980, the Salvadoran government was battered by attempted coups on the part of the 
right wing of the military and increasing violence from leftist revolutionary groups. In response 
to events in neighboring Nicaragua, the Carter administration resumed military aid to El 
Salvador in hopes that the government would be able to put down the communist revolutionaries 
and prevent the extreme right from taking control of the government. 
 During 1980, more than eight thousand Salvadorans were killed, the majority slain by the 
government’s security forces and the paramilitary right-wing death squads associated with the 
Salvadoran military. On March 24, 1980, the Archbisop of San Salvador, Oscar Arnulfo 
Romero, was assassinated by agents of the death squads while in the midst of giving mass. 
Romero had repeatedly called for social and politica  reforms, the end of repression by the 
government and military, and a negotiated settlement with the leftist guerillas.527 In November, 
leaders of the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), a coalition of left-wing civilian opposition 
parties, were tortured, killed, and mutilated by a paramilitary death squad. The following month, 
four American nuns who had been working with the poor in El Salvador were raped and killed 
by a right-wing paramilitary group.528 
 In response to these assaults on the basic human right of ‘life’, President Carter 
temporarily suspended military aid and demanded that the Salvadoran military control its death 
squads. Carter discussed this decision in his memoirs: 
I was insisting that the Salvadoran leaders protect the rights of their own people. The 
situation there was terrible: the murder of four American nuns, we believed by 
Salvadoran soldiers was another incredible act the country’s officials were trying to 
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ignore… I was determined that the murderers of the nuns be brought to justice, that 
elections be scheduled, that some equitable system of justice be established, and that 
promised land reforms be carried out. We had to convince the Salvadorans that brutal 
persecution of their own people was the major obstacle to their economic and political 
stability.529 
 
With the death tolls rising, Carter sent envoys into El Salvador to assess the situation. American 
representatives visited the site where the nuns were killed and held talks with Duarte, the 
administration’s choice as president of the nation. Reports from American emissaries prompted 
the president to describe the situation there as a bloodbath. Carter noted in his memoirs that 
right-wing death squads had killed approximately nine thousand persons in the last year. “They 
don’t have anyone in jails,” he wrote, “they’re alldead. It’s their accepted way of enforcing the 
so-called law.”530 
 At the time, Kirkpatrick was working as a foreign policy advisor for Reagan’s 
presidential campaign. Due to her professed concern with order and the fragility of the 
Salvadoran political system, she viewed the situation quite differently. The professor maintained 
that the military and their so-called ‘death squads’ were merely responding to the violence of the 
leftist guerilla groups. In regards to the murder of the American nuns, Kirkpatrick claimed that 
the nuns were not just nuns, but also political activists on behalf of the FMLN. Since the nuns 
had traveled to Nicaragua before going to El Salvador, she asserted that they had ties to the 
Sandinistas, and as such, were rightly perceived by the Salvadoran military as working on behalf 
of the revolutionaries.531  
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 In the weeks following the rape and murder of the American nuns, the civil war in El 
Salvador continued and violence from both the military and the guerillas again escalated. In 
January, two Americans working for the American Institute for Free Labor Development were 
gunned down by assassins while having dinner with the head of the Salvadoran Institute of 
Agrarian Transformation. The men responsible for the deaths claimed that the deputy director of 
intelligence of the Salvadoran National Guard had ordered to the killings. Shortly thereafter, the 
FMLN, the FDR, and other leftist groups embarked upon a ‘final offensive’ against the 
Salvadoran government. Though the military offensive failed, ties between the guerillas and the 
Nicaraguan Sandinistas caused the Carter Administration to reverse its policies towards El 
Salvador. The administration feared that the Salvadoran guerillas were communists that, once in 
power, would ally El Salvador with Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union. Thus, Washington 
increased military aid to El Salvador via emergency provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act.532 
Such was the situation inherited by the Reagan Administration. 
 
Kirkpatrick’s writings on Latin America and American foreign policy enhanced her 
reputation as a Latin American political expert and made her a major player in the development 
of the Reagan Administration’s Central American policies.533 In an NSC meeting in February of 
1981, the president echoed Kirkpatrick’s views on human rights and American foreign policy, 
noting that the U.S. had failed to establish good relations with its southern neighbors. “We must 
change the attitude of our diplomatic corps so that we do not bring down governments in the 
name of human rights,” Reagan said. “None of them are as guilty of human rights violations as 
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are Cuba and the USSR. We don’t throw out our friends just because they cannot pass the ‘saliva 
test’ on human rights.”534 Throughout Kirkpatrick’s tenure as Permanent Ambassador to the 
United Nations, the Reagan Administration’s policies, specifically, its unconditional support for 
the Salvadoran government, its opposition to a negotiated settlement to the Salvadoran Civil 
War, its unwavering defense of the Nicaraguan Contras, and its unceasing hostility towards the 
Sandinistas and the Cubans, adhered nicely to Kirkpat ick’s prescriptions for regional security 
and stability.  
 Upon assuming office, President Reagan made Central America a top priority. 
Kirkpatrick was pleased with this move for she believed it represented efforts by the 
administration to both revitalize the special relationship between the U.S. and the nations of the 
region and reinforce American national security. “In foreign affairs, geography is destiny” 
Kirkpatrick declared.535 Situated at the southern-most tip of North America, the U.N. 
Ambassador designated the area as the ‘fourth border’ of the United States, making any 
expansion of communism in the region a threat to American national security.536 Though she was 
pleased that the administration recognized the importance of Central America to American 
national security interests, Kirkpatrick bemoaned the fact that Americans and many American 
allies seemed to not understand this. When critics of the administration expressed doubt 
concerning the importance of the region, the political scientist pointed out that the Soviet Union 
viewed Central America as an area of high strategic si nificance. NATO relief troops and 
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equipment would be shipped overseas via the Caribbean Basin. In addition, raw materials 
travelling from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa to the United States passed through the Gulf 
and Caribbean region. Finally, American oil was refin d in areas of the Caribbean.537 Thus, 
Kirkpatrick claimed that the area must remain out of communist hands in order to not only 
protect American national security, the security of Western Europe and Israel, but the security 
and independence of the nations of Central America as well.538 
 Though Central America was high on the administration’s foreign affairs agenda, 
members of Reagan’s National Security Council were at odds as to which particular situation in 
the region was of the utmost importance. In an NSC meeting in November of 1981, Secretary of 
State, Al Haig, maintained that the Sandinistas and the Cubans constituted the greatest threat to 
the region and to American national security. Kirkpatrick disagreed. She argued that El Salvador 
should be the first priority for the United States as the government of El Salvador would collapse 
if the guerrillas were allowed to continue in their destruction of the Salvadoran economy. Once 
El Salvador was stabilized, the U.S. could turn its at ention more fully towards Nicaragua. In the 
meantime, covert action and proxy forces would “do the work for us” in fighting the 
Sandinistas.539 
 Reagan’s NSC did agree that the threat to American national security in Central America 
was unprecedented in severity, proximity, and complexity. National Security Advisor William P. 
Clark observed that the weak economies and political nstitutions invited subversion from the 
Soviet Union, Cuba, Nicaragua, Grenada, Vietnam, Libya, and the PLO. Kirkpatrick argued that 
the real problem was the projection of Soviet military power in the region. “At a minimum, they 
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may neutralize us,” she said, “at a maximum, they can threaten us.”540 Kirkpatrick was adamant 
in her insistence that there was a communist conspiracy to take over Central America; the U.S. 
must prevent yet another domino from falling in its own front yard. President Reagan agreed, 
noting that American credibility was at stake in the region and a victory for the Salvadoran 
guerrillas would signal a defeat for the United States in the Cold War.541 
In early 1981, the Reagan administration began increasing military aid to El Salvador in 
order to bolster anti-communist forces in the region. Unlike its predecessor, the administration’s 
support for the Salvadoran government did not hinge upon land reform or the improvement of 
the regime’s human rights record.542Washington’s determination to provide aid to the 
government of El Salvador despite its lack of progress in the curtailment of human rights abuses 
by its military led to much criticism. One of the most compelling statements of opposition to 
American aid to the government of El Salvador came from a man who was assassinated by the 
Salvadoran military – the Archbishop of San Salvador, R mero. Prior to his death in 1980, the 
prelate had written to President Carter, begging him to withhold aid to the Salvadoran military 
and to refrain from intervening in the civil war. Romero maintained that the struggle was an 
indigenous movement and thus not a part of the East-West conflict. “It would be unjust and 
deplorable if the intrusion of foreign powers were to frustrate the Salvadoran people,” he wrote, 
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“to repress it and block its autonomous decisions about the economic and political path that our 
country ought to follow.”543 Romero then chastised the Salvadoran government, its mil tary, and 
its security forces for reverting to repression andviolence.544 The Catholic Archbishop of 
Washington, James A. Hickey concurred. He maintained that due to their work with the poor, 
members of the church in El Salvador were labelled as communists, a designation that resulted in 
their deaths by the hands of the government.545 “For attempting this renewed Christianization of 
their country,” the Archbishop said, “they have been called communists, subversives; and they 
have suffered persecution, even death… An Archbishop, eleven priests, thousands of lay people, 
and now four American missionaries are dead in that effort.”546 
 Both Romero and Hickey spoke of the importance of understanding the history of the 
Catholic Church and its role in Salvadoran society. Though historically the Church had 
maintained a socially conservative stance, the Second Vatican Council of the Medellin in 1968, 
the Puebla Conferences of Latin American Bishops in 1979, and the teachings of Pope John Paul 
II had brought about a change in the Church’s policies. Indeed, rather than supporting the status 
quo, the Church had become the leading voice for rem and social change. Essential elements 
of the new dogma included the defense of human dignity a d the promotion of human rights, a 
position which Romero had died for in El Salvador. Ki kpatrick criticized the new role of the 
Church and associated its tenets with socialism. Moreover, the U.N. Ambassador accused the 
‘Catholic Left’ of disrupting the traditional patterns of political participation in Central America. 
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“As for the Catholic Left,” she wrote, “its interest in revolution on this earth has waxed as its 
concern with salvation in heaven has waned.”547 
 The Catholic Church was not the only religious organization that objected to American 
support for the government and military of El Salvador. Representatives from the American 
Baptist Churches claimed that members of the Baptist As ociation within the small nation had 
suffered from government sponsored terrorism. Some had been arrested and tortured, while 
others had either been killed or had disappeared. In testimony before the U.S. Senate, the 
Reverend Robert W. Tiller maintained that Salvadoran government forces were responsible for 
violence against Christians, not the FMLN, and thatose persecuted by the government were 
not guerillas, but ordinary persons. In addition, the reverend claimed that there was a government 
hit list of Salvadoran Baptists. “The Government of El Salvador has established a telephone 
number for reporting subversives who should be eliminated,” he testified, “All you need to do is 
call up and report that a certain person is carrying out subversive activity and that person will 
soon be executed. The process works swiftly and is ot complicated by anything like verifying 
the initial report or investigating the person reported or holding a trial.”548The Baptist minister 
insisted that it was immoral for the U.S. government to provide support for a regime that had a 
habit of violating the human rights of its citizens.549 
 Human rights groups, congressmen, and various nations around the world joined 
religious organizations in their protest against the administration’s support for the Salvadoran 
regime. Amnesty International condemned the Salvadoran military for its human rights abuses, 
noting that several thousand Salvadorans who had no proven affiliation with the leftist 
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insurgency had died at the hands of the military and its death squads.550 Democratic 
Congresswoman Barbara Mikulski (D – MD) claimed that it was morally wrong for the U.S. to 
“lavish arms on a government that cannot or will not st p its own troops from making war 
against its own people.”551 Kirkpatrick’s U.N. predecessor, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D 
– NY), a fellow neoconservative, also opposed the administration’s Central American policies. 
His assertion that the Salvadoran conflict was internal, and therefore not a threat to national 
security, caused many of his fellow neoconservatives, including Kirkpatrick, to accuse him of 
selling out to the left.552 
 In response to congressional criticism, the administration reiterated the importance of the 
region to American national security. In an address before Congress in April of 1983, President 
Reagan proclaimed that both national security and American credibility was at stake in Central 
America. The president implied in his speech that sould Congress fail to provide the money and 
materials requested for the region then it would be responsible for losing El Salvador, and 
subsequently, Central America.553 Kirkpatrick maintained that there were certain persons in 
Congress who did not approve of the administration’s efforts to “consolidate the constitutional 
government of El Salvador and who would actually like to see the Marxist forces take power in 
that country.”554Her statement angered many members of the House and Senate who demanded 
to know to whom she was referring. Kirkpatrick refused to answer, insisting that she had been 
quoted out of context. 
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On top of domestic opposition, the administration’s policies failed to find favor with 
many American allies. France, Mexico, Venezuela, Sweden, West Germany, and other Western 
European nations all maintained that the civil war in El Salvador was indigenous and that the 
U.S. should refrain from intervening in the war unless it wished to foster a negotiated political 
solution between the government and the leftist guerillas.555Moreover, Europeans questioned 
why the United States was placing such a large emphasis on the tiny nations located in Central 
America.556 Kirkpatrick responded to such condemnation of American policies in two ways. 
First, she proclaimed that many of the foreign nations who opposed the administration’s Central 
American policies were socialists. “A number of socialist leaders… unable to win popular 
support for peaceful revolution in their own countries,” she wrote, “have grown progressively 
enthusiastic about revolution elsewhere and less fastidious about the company they keep and the 
methods utilized.”557Second, the U.N. Ambassador instructed Europeans to take a closer look at 
their maps. Given the region’s strategic location in the Gulf area and near the Panama Canal, she 
maintained, it was vital to both American and European security. “If the Soviets can distract us 
here at home in our own front yard,” she noted, “they can prevent us from supplying aid to our 
European allies.”558 
Due to advocacy of the Reagan administration’s Central American policies, Kirkpatrick 
became a “lightning rod for campus protests”.559 In several instances, the political scientist was 
either prevented from speaking due to concerns about her security in the face of student 
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demonstrations, or booed off stage.560 The Georgetown professor viewed these protests in the 
same light that she had viewed student protests by he New Left in the 1960s. “Frankly, I do not 
know what the critics of our Central American policy want,” she wrote, “I fear they are charter 
members in the ‘blame America first club’ which is prepared to give everybody, except the 
United States, the benefit of the doubt about almost everything in the world.”561 
Though the administration acknowledged that the human rights situation in El Salvador 
was not ideal, it continued to provide support for the Salvadoran military in its struggle against 
the FMLN. When questioned about the Reagan administration’s support for the ‘bad, corrupt’ 
Salvadoran regime, Kirkpatrick stated: “The truth is that most of the governments in the world 
are, by our standards, bad governments. They are not democratic, never have been.”562Moreover, 
the ambassador insisted that the government was merely r sponding to the violence created by 
the guerillas. Because the insurgents hid among the people, it was only natural that violence 
would spill over into Salvadoran society.563 “The essence of their strategy is provocation,” she 
noted of the guerillas, “through persistent attacks which disrupt society and make ordinary life 
impossible, such revolutionaries challenge authority and force repressive countermeasures in the 
expectation that such repression will undermine the legitimacy of the regime.”564 
In addition to blaming the guerillas for the violenc  perpetrated by the Salvadoran 
military upon its own citizens, Kirkpatrick refused to see the FMLN as anything other than a 
communistic, terrorist organization. The ambassador viewed the guerillas as the Salvadoran 
counterpart to the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and describ d them as a well-armed Marxist 
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insurgency, a professional guerilla group directed from command centers in Nicaragua, armed 
with Soviet bloc weapons, and intent upon establishing a one party dictatorship.565 Thus, the 
administration refused to consider a negotiated settlement between the guerillas and the 
Salvadoran government. After all, Kirkpatrick declared, the Carter administration’s attempts to 
include the Sandinistas in negotiations had led to a c mmunist take-over in Nicaragua and the 
Reagan administration was determined not to make the same mistake. According to her, there 
were only two possible solutions for ending the civil war in El Salvador: either the guerillas 
surrendered their weapons, renounced violence, and p rticipated in elections, or the war 
continued until the government achieved a military victory.566 
Kirkpatrick and the Reagan Administration refused to allow the guerillas to shoot their 
way into power. Though the Salvadoran military had been able to fend off the guerilla’s ‘final 
offensive’ in January of 1981 without much assistance from the United States, Reagan and 
company opted to dramatically increase military aid. Moreover, though the Salvadoran peasants 
had refused to take part in the insurrection, a fact utilized by the administration to prove that the 
guerillas lacked a mass following, the administration claimed that the danger of communist 
subversion had actually increased. Kirkpatrick insisted that the U.S. could not stand by “while a 
small nation, under-equipped and unsophisticated, succumbs to well-armed and well-trained 
guerilla forces.”567 The well-armed and well-trained guerillas she referr d to numbered 
approximately 6,000 in 1980, with only 3,000 taking part in the final offensive due to a weapons 
and ammunitions shortage. FMLN numbers peaked at between 10 and 13,000 in 1983, falling to 
approximately 5,000 by 1985 due to desertions. By contrast, the Salvadoran military in 1980 
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numbered 7,000 with an additional 5,000 men in its security forces. In 1985, thanks to American 
military aid, the Salvadoran army had expanded to include 40,000 men. Furthermore, its security 
forces, which included the Treasury Police, the National Police, and the National Guard, claimed 
13,000 men, giving the Salvadoran government approximately 53,000 men under arms. In 
addition to increasing the size of the Salvadoran military, the U.S. provided training, boots, 
uniforms, weapons, ammunitions, trucks, jeeps, and artillery. Moreover, in order to interdict 
arms shipments to the guerillas, the Salvadoran military was given a navy and a new air force 
base.568 
Kirkpatrick’s staunch support for the Salvadoran government and resistance to a 
negotiated settlement between it and the FMLN was mtched by her relentless opposition to the 
Nicaraguan Sandinistas and unwavering advocacy on behalf of the Contras. Though the U.N. 
Ambassador had argued in NSC meetings that El Salvador should have first priority in the 
administration’s Central American policies, she consistently argued for more support for the 
Nicaraguan Contras and increased pressure on the Sandinistas. Indeed the two nations were 
considered by government officials to be opposing sdes of the same coin. In the minds of 
Kirkpatrick and other foreign policymakers, the American failure to thwart the Nicaraguan 
revolution had resulted in the birth of a communist regime allied with Cuba and the Soviet Union 
which then exported revolution to the neighboring state of El Salvador. Therefore, in order to 
stabilize El Salvador, the United States must provide not only military aid to the Salvadoran 
government, but also attempt to rollback communism in Nicaragua by supporting the Contras. 
According to Kirkpatrick, failure to provide assistance to El Salvador and to the Contras 
would make the United States the tacit enforcer of the Brezhnev Doctrine which viewed 
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communist revolutions as irreversible.569 The ambassador maintained that the Kennedy 
Administration had already enforced this doctrine through its unwillingness to support the anti-
Castro forces in the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 and she frequently compared the situation 
facing the Reagan administration in Nicaragua to that of Cuba and Kennedy. Kirkpatrick 
contended that in both cases a broad coalition overthrew a dictatorship in the hopes of 
establishing democracy and progress. Following the coups, the communists “dissembled, hiding 
their identity, confusing the issues until they had driven democrats out of the government and 
into prison or exile”.570 At this point, both Castro and the Sandinistas had established political 
and economic relations with the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, well-meaning Western liberals turned 
a blind eye to their communist beliefs until it was too late. Nicaragua, she argued, was on the 
verge of being fully integrated into the Soviet empire just as Cuba had been two decades earlier. 
Should the U.S. stand idly by and let this happen, then Nicaragua would become part of the 
Castroite effort to take over the hemisphere – providing military bases for the Soviets in an area 
of high strategic importance, troops for communist in urgencies in Latin America and Africa, 
training for guerillas intent on overthrowing neighboring regimes – basically, wreaking havoc 
throughout Central America.571  
Had Kennedy acted more decisively, Kirkpatrick maint i ed, then the Bay of Pigs may 
have been successful and Castro would never have com to power. If Castro had been defeated, 
Cuba would be free and thousands of Cuban troops would not be stationed abroad causing 
problems in Africa. Moreover, if Castro had not been allowed to consolidate power, then Cuba 
would not be arming and training guerillas throughout Latin and Central America. In addition, 
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Central American nations would have been spared much of the bloodshed and destruction of the 
previous two and a half decades and there would have been peace and economic development in 
the region. Finally, the Soviets would not be able to threaten American national security in its 
front yard without Cuba. Unfortunately, the U.S. abandoned Cuba and was paying for it with 
increased security, military, and defense costs. According to Kirkpatrick, these costs would only 
increase if the U.S. abandoned the Nicaraguan freedom fighters or failed to adequately support 
the government of El Salvador.572   
During and after her tenure as U.N. Ambassador, despite numerous allegations of 
wrongdoing on the part of the Nicaraguan freedom fighters and congressional opposition to 
funding their activities, the political science professor repeatedly defended the Contras and U.S. 
policy towards Nicaragua. When questioned about U.S. support for this mercenary group, 
Kirkpatrick responded with vitriol: “I think that calling the Contras mercenaries is like calling 
the mujahedeen in Afghanistan mercenaries… I think they are freedom fighters and anybody 
who calls them mercenaries is engaging in a really quite brutal and heartless kind of propaganda 
attack.”573Moreover, Kirkpatrick identified the withdrawal of aid to the Contras by the U.S. 
Congress as part of the ‘tradition of abandonment’ in the region and again cited the Bay of 
Pigs.574 “If we don’t find the money to support the Contras,” the ambassador claimed, “it will be 
perceived as our having abandoned them, and this will lead to an increase in refugees in the 
region and it will permit Nicaragua to infiltrate thousands of trained forces into El Salvador.”575 
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Should the U.S. fail to get the funds needed for the Contras from Congress, the ambassador was 
adamant that the administration “find the money elsewhere.”576 In the meantime, Kirkpatrick 
maintained that the government should consider using the Contras in other areas, for example, in 
El Salvador to help defend against the guerillas there.577 Such support for the Nicaraguan 
freedom fighters resulted in the Contras naming a battalion after her – The Jeane Kirkpatrick 
Brigade.578 
The Reagan Administration’s backing of the Contras, along with its support for covert 
operations against the Sandinistas, caused many to question whether or not the U.S. would send 
troops into Nicaragua should the Contra effort fail. In early meetings of the NSC, members were 
divided on that issue. Secretary of State Al Haig warned about the dangers of creating an 
insurgency in Nicaragua if the administration was not prepared to go all the way. The 
Department of State was at odds with the Department of Defense, with State initially supporting 
the use of unilateral force in Central America while the DOD stood in opposition. All members 
of the NSC, including the President, were worried that the introduction of American troops 
would result in a second Vietnam. Kirkpatrick rejected the Vietnam analogy, claiming that 
unlike Central America, Vietnam had not involved vital U.S. national security interests. Despite 
differing opinions on whether to put boots on the ground, NSC members agreed that covert 
operations should be a large part of the administrat on’s policies toward the Sandinistas, 
including the mining of Nicaragua’s harbors. Presidnt Reagan’s greatest concerns were whether 
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or not covert operations could be traced back to the United States and what kinds of operations 
would inflict more than just ‘flea bites’ onto the Sandinista regime.579 
Though supportive of covert operations against the Sandinistas, Kirkpatrick repeatedly 
expressed her opposition to the dispatch of American troops. The ambassador claimed it was 
neither desirable nor necessary for the U.S. to becm  directly involved in the region. “I think 
that the Contras, who are Nicaraguans after all, and who believe in democracy for their country 
will be quite capable of bringing the kind of struggle to Nicaragua that may perhaps persuade the 
government of Nicaragua to do what the government of El Salvador has already done,” she said, 
“and that is offer dialogue, open the processes of government to all the citizens of Nicaragua.”580 
Kirkpatrick maintained that the Contras could win as long as they were given the same amount 
of support that the Sandinistas were given by the Soviet Union and Cuba, and that the 
introduction of American troops should serve as a last resort. “I am against military solutions of 
problems,” she said, “Military intervention would only be a last resort in a situation where we 
judge the security of the U.S. and our most sacred values to be at stake.”581 
The political scientist’s ongoing criticism of the Carter Administration’s policies towards 
Nicaragua and El Salvador, along with her emphasis on American national security interests at 
stake in the region and her support for the Contras, c used many to doubt her professed 
opposition to military involvement. In an effort to clarify her stance, Kirkpatrick published an 
Op-ed piece in the Washington Post on June 20, 1983 entitled “Pardon Me, But Am I That H rd-
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liner the Anonymous Sources are Talking About?” Kirkpatrick begins by noting that the media 
had created a political melodrama in which the administration’s ‘good guys’, or the moderates, 
were pitted against its ‘bad guys’, or the hardliners, over Central American policy. According to 
the media, the good guys supported political solutins, negotiations, regional dialogue, and 
bipartisan consensus. Meanwhile, the bad guys opposed these good strategies and instead 
advocated military solutions and preferred political polarization. Because her name was 
frequently associated with the ‘bad guys’, Kirkpatrick wrote that she had decided to make clear 
what advice she had given the president. She wrote, 
I have recommended humanitarian and economic assistnce; bipartisan participation in 
developing a new policy; support for the Contadora process and regional dialogue. I took 
a very hard line on hunger, malnutrition, infant mortality, illiteracy, and economic 
underdevelopment. I have argued that the US should not stand in the way of Contadora 
and if the nations involved want us out of it, we should stay out. No one has proposed 
sending US troops into the region and no one has proposed abandoning them either.  I 
have also argued for continued military assistance at l vels adequate to meet and match 
guerilla arms. Above all, I have argued that the peopl  in the region are important to the 
US. Our security and history bind us to the Americas just as it does to Europe. I have 
insisted that the fact that our neighbors have suffered under dictatorships is no reason to 
consign them to dictatorships affiliated with the Soviet Union, rather we should help 
them escape to freedom.582 
  
 Fears that American assistance to the Contras might lead to the involvement of the U.S. 
military in the region prompted the Nicaraguan government to file a complaint against the United 
States with the United Nations Security Council in 1982. Nicaragua claimed that the U.S. had 
violated the U.N. Charter by intervening in its internal affairs. Moreover, the Sandinistas claimed 
that the United States was preparing to launch a full-scale military attack upon their country. 
Nicaragua demanded that the U.S. desist in its attempts to destabilize its government, withdraw 
its financial and military support of the Contras, cease its utilization of Honduras as a training 
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area for anti-Sandinista paramilitary groups and as a base of armed aggression against Nicaragua, 
withdraw American naval vessels from the coastal waters of Nicaragua, and end overflights by 
spy planes which violated Nicaraguan air space.583  
 Nicaragua brought its complaints against the U.S. before the United Nations forcing 
Kirkpatrick to defend American actions in the region. In an address before the U.N. Security 
Council in 1982, she claimed that it was ridiculous f the Nicaraguans to think that the U.S. was 
going to invade their country.584The ambassador admitted that the U.S. had sent unmanned 
planes over Nicaragua in order to verify reports of Nicaraguan intervention in El Salvador, but 
maintained that these flights did not represent a threat to regional peace and security. Moreover, 
Kirkpatrick pointed out that the United States had not opposed the Sandinista rise to power, nor 
had it attempted to prevent their consolidation of p wer. In fact, the U.S. under President Carter 
had provided more money to them in their first two years in power than it had to the Somoza 
regime throughout the 1970s. “Despite this aid,” she aid, “the Sandinistas still claim the U.S. is 
the Yankee enemy of mankind.”585 Moreover, the ambassador stated that the U.S. had 
“repeatedly attempted to explore ways with the government of Nicaragua in which we could 
cooperate in alleviating tensions in the area.”586 Her government, she claimed, wanted only peace 
in Central America.587 
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 According to Kirkpatrick, it was Nicaragua, not the United States, who sought to subvert 
neighboring regimes. “Nicaragua has accused the United States of the kinds of political behavior 
of which it is guilty,” she asserted, including “large-scale interventions in the internal affairs of 
neighbors, persistent efforts to subvert and overthrow by force and violence the governments of 
neighboring states, aggressive actions which disrupt the ‘normal conduct of international 
relations’ in the region.”588 The ambassador maintained that Nicaragua’s complaints gainst the 
U.S. were “an interesting example of projection, a psychological operation in which one’s own 
feelings and intentions are simultaneously denied and attributed… to someone else.”589 
Moreover, she claimed that such charges were typical of communist states: “The familiar 
totalitarian assertion that they are surrounded by enemies internal and external has been heard 
again and again to justify the elimination of opponents and the concentration of power in a tiny, 
one-party elite.”590 Kirkpatrick concluded that Nicaragua’s assertions were part of the familiar 
pattern of doublespeak where “totalitarians assault rea ity in an attempt to persuade us that 
making war is keeping peace, that repression is liberation, etc.”591 
 The American ambassador maintained that the major issue confronting the Sandinista 
regime was not the United States, but the Nicaraguan people. “It is a fact that there is very 
widespread unhappiness, even misery, in Nicaragua,” the ambassador stated, “Nicaragua’s 
problem is thus with Nicaraguans. In Nicaragua today, Nicaraguans fight other Nicaraguans for 
control of their country’s destiny.”592 The ambassador insisted that U.S. interests in Central 
America were only to help poor, small, helpless, powerless peoples to resist being incorporated 
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into totalitarian regimes by violent minorities, trained and armed by remote dictators.593She 
concluded that the most that the United States could be charged with was providing arms and 
advice to Nicaraguans fighting for their right to national self-determination against a pawn and 
proxy of Cuba and the Soviet Union.594 
 The deployment of American troops into Grenada in October of 1983, an act which, 
according to Nicaragua, demonstrated that the U.S. would utilize military force to overthrow 
leftist regimes in its front yard, only intensified the fears of the Sandinistas. On October 24, 
1983, just one day after 271 American Marines were kill d by a suicide bombing in Beirut, 
Lebanon, President Reagan and his NSC team opted to send U.S. troops into Grenada to rescue 
American nationals and stabilize the government of the small Caribbean nation. That same day, 
Nicaragua called for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council in order to 
introduce a resolution condemning American action in Grenada as an act of aggression.595Once 
the issue was broached at the U.N. it became Kirkpat ick’s task to defend the administration’s 
actions. 
 Allan Gerson, an international lawyer and Kirkpatrick’s legal counsel at the United 
Nations, was charged with assisting the ambassador in drafting the United States’ defense against 
charges of aggression. According to Gerson, both he and Kirkpatrick viewed U.S. actions in 
Grenada as justified under international law and the law of the U.N. Charter as an act of 
collective self-defense in response to an armed attack. Though there had not been an actual 
‘armed attack’ on the U.S. or on any of the other states of the Caribbean, Gerson maintained that 
Operation Urgent Fury was a preemptive strike similar to the Israeli bombing of an Iraqi nuclear 
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reactor in 1981.596 In addition, both Gerson and Kirkpatrick viewed the situation as being 
important to American national security. Since 1979, Grenada had been under the control of 
Maurice Bishop, a leftist who had forged ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union. The construction 
of a large airport on the small island, along with the presence of Cuban troops, had been a cause 
for alarm for the United States as the government blieved that the air strip could be (or was 
being) used to funnel weapons to leftist revolutionaries in Central America. Following Bishop’s 
overthrow and murder, the tiny island descended into chaos causing many American 
policymakers to fear that the island would fall under Soviet control thanks to the presence of 
Cuban troops and the power of the communists within the Grenadian military. Thus, U.S. 
national security interests were at stake in the region, as the United States could not afford to 
have another Cuba or Nicaragua in the Caribbean.597 
 According to Gerson, the State Department opposed u ing American national security 
interests as an argument to defend American actions in Grenada. The department feared that if 
the U.S. claimed an expanded notion of self-defense to justify preemptive strikes, then others 
might do so in order to justify their own preemptive ‘military adventures’. In short, should the 
U.S. endorse self-defense as the rationale behind te Grenada action, it would be enlarging an 
exception to the U.N. Charter’s prohibition on the use of force to the point that armies could 
‘march right through it’.598 Instead, State advised that Kirkpatrick argue that t e U.S. acted due 
to a unique set of circumstances, including the need to protect American nationals living abroad 
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and the desire to protect members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) who, 
feeling themselves threatened by the situation, had requested American intervention.599 
 Though Kirkpatrick acquiesced to the demands of the State Department, she did not shy 
away from mentioning Grenada’s ties to the communist world. In a speech before the U.N. 
Security Council, the political scientist denied the charges that Operation Urgent Fury was a 
classic example of the invasion of a small country by an imperial superpower, or a case of 
intervention in the internal affairs of an independt nation. She pointed out that Grenada had 
been ruled over by Maurice Bishop, a man with strong ideological convictions that allied him 
with Cuba and the Soviet Union. Thus, Grenada’s internal affairs had already fallen under the 
permanent influence of one neighboring and one remot  tyranny.600 Moreover, Kirkpatrick 
maintained that the prohibitions against the use of force within the U.N. Charter were contextual, 
not absolute. “They provide ample justification forthe use of force against force in pursuit of the 
other values also inscribed in the Charter – freedom, democracy, peace,” the ambassador 
declared. “The Charter does not require that people submit supinely to terror, nor that their 
neighbors be indifferent to their terrorization.”601 
 Kirkpatrick acknowledged that such words might be dismissed as cynical by members of 
the U.N. who had grown accustomed to hearing similar justifications for the Soviet Union’s 
invasion of Afghanistan and Vietnam’s invasion and occupation of Cambodia. However, there 
was an easy way to test the differences between U.S. actions in Grenada and communist actions 
elsewhere based on ‘what came after’. She assured the council that unlike the communists, who 
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claim they will leave an area once order had been rsto ed, the U.S. would leave Grenada as soon 
as law and order had been reinstated, and as soon a democratic rule had been put into place. “It 
should not be difficult for any people, especially ny democratic people, which has ever suffered 
a reign of terror from either foreign or domestic tyrants, to discern the difference between the 
force that liberates captive people from terror,” she aid, “ and the force that imposes terror on 
captive peoples.”602 
 Kirkpatrick declared that a unique combination of circumstances in Grenada and the 
Caribbean that had led the U.S. to deploy troops. The American government was concerned for 
the safety of U.S. nationals, specifically, American medical students who were living in Grenada. 
‘Madmen’ had overthrown and killed Bishop, wiped out the Grenadian government, and 
imposed a 24 hour, shoot-on-sight curfew. With the airport shut down and American citizens 
denied the right to exit the country, the U.S. government was afraid that the American medical 
students might be taken hostage.603 In addition, there was a vacuum of power in Grenada with no 
responsible government. Terrorists were in control of the bureaucracy, in charge of the military, 
and had access to Cuban troops, all of which threaten d neighboring states whose militaries were 
practically nonexistent. Finally, members of the OECS had asked the U.S. for help and had 
invoked their own regional collective security agreements.604 
 Kirkpatrick’s spirited defense of U.S. actions in Grenada fell on deaf ears in the United 
Nations. On October 28, 1983, the U.N. Security Council voted to condemn the American and 
OECS intervention in Grenada as a flagrant violation of international law and a transgression 
against the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Grenada. Only Kirkpatrick’s 
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veto prevented the resolution from passing. A few days later, the General Assembly adopted a 
similar resolution. The Eastern Caribbean states, Israel, El Salvador, and the United States were 
the only nations that voted against the resolution.605 
In an article written for the Council on Foreign Relations entitled “The Reagan Doctrine, 
Human Rights, and International Law”, Kirkpatrick and her U.N. legal adviser, Allan Gerson, 
provided further justification for U.S. intervention in Latin America and in other areas of the 
world and elaborated on the significance, intentions, and historical tradition of the Reagan 
Doctrine. Although both the former U.N. Ambassador and the international lawyer argued that 
American action in Grenada did not fall under the purview of the Reagan Doctrine’s assertion 
that support for freedom fighters constituted self-d ense, both agreed that Reagan 
Administration policies towards El Salvador and Nicaragua did. The article began with a quote 
from John Stuart Mill which nicely summarized their view of American involvement in 
international affairs throughout the Reagan Era: 
The doctrine of non-intervention, to be a legitimate principle of morality, must be 
accepted by all governments. The despots must consent to be bound by it as well as the 
free States. Unless they do, the profession of it by free countries comes but to this 
miserable issue, that the wrong side may help the wrong, but the right must not help the 
right. Intervention to enforce non-intervention is always rightful, always moral, if not 
always prudent.606 
 
According to Kirkpatrick and Gerson, the Reagan Doctrine was rooted in the moral 
legitimacy of American support, including military aid, for insurgencies under specific 
circumstances. Such circumstances included instances wh re indigenous forces were opposed to 
a government maintained by force rather than by consent, where such a government relied upon 
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arms supplied by the Soviet bloc, and where the people were denied a choice regarding their 
government and their future. The Reagan Doctrine expressed America’s solidarity with the 
struggle for self-government against one-party dictatorship and incorporation by force into the 
Soviet socialist world system. Though the doctrine allowed for the use of force, Kirkpatrick and 
Gerson maintained that armed revolt was only justified as a last resort in instances where the 
rights of citizens are systematically violated. According to them, the Reagan Doctrine did not 
require that the U.S. offer armed assistance to freedom fighters; it permitted such assistance 
under certain circumstances.607 Moreover, the policy mirrored American constitutional 
principles, namely that legitimate government depends on the consent of the governed and on its 
respect for the rights of citizens; the doctrine stood in opposition to traditional isolationism and 
post-Vietnam assumptions regarding the illegitimacy of U.S. intervention.608 
 The Reagan Doctrine was a response to changes in the global environment, namely the 
Soviets’ objective of a establishing a global empire and its efforts at incorporating Third World 
countries into the socialist world system. The authors noted that nine new communist 
dictatorships had been established between 1975 and 1981: South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, 
Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, Grenada, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan. In each nation where 
communism had spread, resistance movements had develop d. In establishing the moral and 
legal right to provide aid to such indigenous resistance movements, Kirkpatrick and Gerson 
contended that the Reagan Doctrine constituted a form of ‘rollback’, a Cold War policy first 
articulated by the Eisenhower Administration.609 
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 Both Gerson and Kirkpatrick argued that the Reagan Doctrine was not at odds with the 
U.N. Charter and international law. Though one article of the U.N. Charter called on all members 
to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, the U.S. maintained that this had to be viewed within the context of the entire 
Charter. Article 51acknowledged the right to indiviual and collective self-defense and allowed 
for the use of legitimate force. Moreover, numerous ther articles guaranteed human rights to all 
citizens of member states. President Truman, they maintained, had recognized this in 1947 when 
he had declared that the policy of the United States must be to support free peoples who were 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures. Truman chose not to 
speak of ‘direct military attacks’; rather, he chose to place the issue within the “values of the 
Charter and of the Declaration of Independence.”610  
 In addition to not violating international laws, Kirkpatrick and Gerson placed the Reagan 
Doctrine squarely within the American domestic and foreign policy tradition: commitment to the 
promotion of democracy, they argued, had served as the primary purpose of American foreign 
policy for decades. Thus, the Reagan policies were a continuation of the values expressed in the 
Declaration of Independence, in the American Constitution, in the Atlantic Charter signed 
between FDR and Churchill, and in the Truman Doctrine. Moreover, the American commitment 
to the promotion of democracy continued on throughot the following decades with the signing 
of the Rio Treaty, the Charter of the Organization of American States, and in the actions of 
American presidents from Truman to Johnson.611  
 Critics of the Reagan Doctrine charged the administrat on with appropriating the methods 
of the Soviet Union, but this, Kirkpatrick and Gerson argued, could not be further from the truth. 
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There was no ‘moral equivalence’ between American aid to freedom fighters and Soviet aid to 
national liberation movements. “The latter countenances expansion of Soviet power,” they wrote, 
“the Reagan Doctrine permits assistance in self-defense. The Brezhnev Doctrine preserves 
foreign influence. The Reagan Doctrine restores self-government. It countenances counter-
intervention, not intervention.”612Furthermore, the Soviets intervened to deny the fre expression 
of self-determination, making the only political, social, and economic choice a variation of 
socialism and the institution of one-party rule. The U.S. intervened to preserve and promote 
freedom.613Kirkpatrick and Gerson cited the philosopher Immanuel Kant, who suggested that 
republican government was necessary in order for perpetual peace to be established. According 
to them, in Kant’s view, intervention to bring down a despotic government should always be 
encouraged. Though the Reagan Administration did not go this far, its policies had the same 
philosophical underpinnings.614  
Conclusions 
 Upon assuming office, President Reagan and his foreign policy team were determined to 
both rectify the damage they believed had been inflicted upon the special relationship between 
the U.S. and Latin America by Jimmy Carter’s adherence to modernization theory, emphasis on 
human rights, and misunderstanding of Latin American politics and halt the spread of 
communism in its own front yard. As a Latin Americanist and part of the Reagan 
Administration’s National Security Council and National Security Planning Group, Kirkpatrick’s 
criticisms of Carter’s policies, along with her recommendations for the restructuring of American 
strategies towards the region, became official administration policy. The administration’s 
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unconditional support for the Salvadoran government, its steadfast defense of the Nicaraguan 
Contras, and its resolute hostility towards the Sandinistas and the Cubans were all endorsed by 
the U.N. Ambassador. 
 Such policies were based on the administration’s emphasis on containing communism 
and buttressed by the Kirkpatrick Doctrine which sanctioned U.S. support for authoritarian 
regimes in the name of stability and anti-communism. The Doctrine’s defense of 
authoritarianism grew out of Kirkpatrick’s contention that such regimes were less oppressive and 
more open to reform than their non-democratic, totali arian counterparts. Though authoritarian 
dictators sometimes infringed upon the human rights of heir citizens, the ambassador maintained 
that such violations were minor when compared to those committed by totalitarians. Moreover, 
the ambassador claimed that in the cases of Nicaragu  nd El Salvador in the late 1970s, those 
acts which Carter regarded as human rights abuses were taken out of context as both states were 
under attack by communist guerillas whose terrorist actions required that the regimes utilize 
force in order to counteract the violence of the revolutionaries. 
Consequently, the Reagan administration ignored the human rights abuses committed by 
the Salvadoran government and provided it with large amounts of military aid to put down the 
leftist insurgency that threatened its power, while continuously criticizing the human rights 
abuses of the communist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. According to Kirkpatrick, communist 
totalitarian regimes, whose desire to create socialist utopias led them to control and transform all 
aspects of society, culture, and politics, were by definition the governments with the worst 
human rights records. Therefore, Reagan administration policies directed towards containing or 
rolling back communism were based on the desire to protect the human rights of peoples around 
the world.  
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Though often couched in terms of human rights and the American moral obligation to 
support freedom fighters such as the Nicaraguan Contras or the Afghan mujahidin in their 
struggles against communist totalitarianism, the administration’s policies were heavily 
influenced by national security interests and the East-West conflict. This was especially true of 
Central America, an area considered by Kirkpatrick to be the fourth border of the U.S. The 
Soviets already had a foothold in the region and should the U.S. fail in its efforts to save El 
Salvador and overthrow the Sandinistas, American natio l security, along with the security of 
Western Europe, would be seriously compromised. In conclusion, Reagan policies that provided 
support for friendly regimes and freedom fighters, whether El Salvador or South Africa, the 
Contras or the mujahidin, not only served to reinforce national security, but, thanks to the 
Kirkpatrick Doctrine’s distinctions between authorita an and totalitarian regimes, they were 
elevated to the status of human rights strategies, th reby freeing the government from any 














Kirkpatrick’s position as a member of the Reagan foreign policy team allowed her to 
impart her own foreign policy ideas to a much wider audience. For example, after becoming 
U.N. Ambassador more persons read her article, “Dictatorships and Double Standards”. Though 
her article was more widely circulated, political pundits tended to focus solely on her distinctions 
between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, or the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, and how such 
distinctions might affect American policies towards non-democratic states within the context of 
the Cold War. Such a narrow focus overlooked other components of the article including her 
astute appraisal of the difficulties inherent within the development of democracy, her critique of 
modernization theory, and the context from which her vi ws had developed, reducing her 
doctrine to the simplistic dichotomy of ‘authoritaran is acceptable, totalitarian is not’. Moreover, 
historians and commentators have largely ignored works that outlined the political scientist’s 
comprehensive view of America’s role in global politics.  
As the product of a liberal, democratic tradition grounded in individual liberty and 
freedom, Kirkpatrick maintained that the United States was an extraordinary nation with a strong 
moral purpose dedicated to the preservation of democracy and the protection of human rights. 
Dating back to the signing of the Declaration of Independence in the late 18th century, the 
justification of the American government has been, according to Kirkpatrick, a doctrine of 
universal human rights. The conviction that the United States has a moral mission that flows 
from its identity and guides it policies was the very ssence of American Exceptionalism.615Prior 
to World War I, this notion of American Exceptionalism had served as the foremost justification 
for an isolationism foreign policy; however, by the early 20th Century it became the primary 
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pretext for intervention and internationalism as President Woodrow Wilson and many others 
came to believe that an ‘exceptionalist America’ had both a moral duty to extend its superior 
political system to others and a mission to lead all of mankind to a new international society in 
the future.616   
The idea that Americans should transform and improve the world, that American foreign 
policy should serve universal, altruistic goals, had resulted in the creation of international 
organizations such as the League of Nations and the Unit d Nations, along with American 
adherence to moral doctrines, such as containment and human rights, in U.S. foreign relations. 
According to Kirkpatrick, though a foreign policy that sought to expand and protect human 
rights was as American as the Declaration of Independence itself, the implementation of such a 
policy was not without difficulties. For one, there was a lack of consensus on which specific 
rights constitute ‘human rights’ and which rights should have priority over others. For another, 
American policymakers could not agree on which methods might be utilized to promote human 
rights abroad.617 Moreover, in order to extend human rights throughout the world, the U.S. would 
have to engage with governments that were not democratic and whose practices were often not 
humane, a fact with which many Americans were uncomfortable with.618  
 Should we try to change repressive regimes or should we dissociate ourselves from 
them? Do we ‘dirty our hands’ by supporting regimes that violate human rights or not? The 
political scientist pointed out that though isolationism might protect the U.S. from being 
involved with undesirable governments, it also precluded Americans from helping those in need. 
She maintained that denying aid to the least developed countries simply because they were 
                                                           
616 Ibid, 148. 
617 Ibid, 149-50. 
618 Ibid, 152. 
244 
 
governed by autocracies and dictatorships that violated human rights prevented the U.S. from 
assisting the people who needed help the most. Should America deny food and other resources to 
a people suffering under a bad government just because they already suffer under a bad 
government, she queried? Should the U.S. deprive those already denied self-government of 
material independence by withdrawing American aid? Kirkpatrick’s answer to these questions 
was a resounding ‘no’, especially as the withdrawal of aid might result in a communist takeover 
which would only increase the misery of a people alr ady suffering under ‘inefficient, home bred 
autocracies’.619  
Despite her insistence that the United States serve as the champion of human rights, 
Kirkpatrick was quite critical of the Carter Administration’s human rights based foreign policies 
which she considered to be seriously flawed. For one, the ambassador maintained that the 
administration’s conception of human rights was so broad, ambiguous, and utopian that it could 
serve as the grounds for condemning nearly any society. According to her, Carter’s human rights 
policies lacked specific content except to demand that societies provide all the freedoms 
associated with constitutional democracy, all the economic security promised by socialism, and 
all the self-fulfillment featured in Abraham Maslow’s theory of human needs.620  Furthermore, 
Kirkpatrick maintained that Carter demonstrated a reluctance to criticize totalitarian, communist 
regimes for their massive human rights abuses, but was not reticent to criticize right-wing 
authoritarian regimes, especially those who received economic or military aid from the United 
States. Carter made an operational distinction betwe n authoritarianism and totalitarianism, she 
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proclaimed, and preferred the latter. Moreover, Kirkpatrick charged the Carter Administration 
with hypocrisy. Though the president claimed to have n ‘absolute’ commitment to human 
rights, the U.N. Ambassador pointed to several insta ces where such policies were selectively 
applied. For example, based on the annual human rights reports required by the 1976 Foreign 
Assistance Act, Carter had withheld economic and military aid from various right-wing 
authoritarian regimes including Chile, Argentina, Praguay, Brazil, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. 
In addition to withdrawing aid from these American llies, Kirkpatrick charged, the 
administration “accompanied these decisions with a policy of deliberate slights and insults that 
helped delegitimize these governments and rendered them less susceptible to US influence.”621 
Meanwhile, despite their rather poor human rights reco ds, Carter justified the continuance of aid 
to the nations of South Korea and the Philippines as erving the national security interests of the 
U.S.622  
As further evidence of the biased nature of Carter’s policies, Kirkpatrick maintained that 
South American military regimes were judged much more harshly than African ones, while 
‘friendly autocrats’ were treated less indulgently than hostile ones. Why was this? Kirkpatrick 
claimed that part of the reason for such policies wa the administration’s exclusive concern with 
violations of human rights by governments. According to her, the administration refused to 
acknowledge the various violations of human rights by revolutionary guerrilla groups attempting 
to overthrow autocratic regimes. In the mind of the administration, she charged, the murders and 
terrorist actions executed by national liberation fronts and guerrilla groups failed to qualify as 
violations of human rights. Meanwhile, a beleaguered government’s efforts to eliminate such 
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terrorism and to fight off revolutionary violence qualified as repression and abuse and resulted in 
loss of aid.623  
According to the ambassador, certain distinctions mu t be made in order for the United 
States to have an effective human rights policy. These included the distinctions between ideas 
and institutions, recognition of the differences between rights and goals, and distinctions between 
intentions and consequences. Kirkpatrick noted that ideas and words were more easily 
manipulated than were institutions for ideas have only to be conceived in order to exist. The idea 
of a right was very easy to conceive; however, not everything that could be conceived of could 
be created. The ambassador utilized the unicorn as a  example of the imagined versus the reality. 
A unicorn can be imagined and described in great detail, and mankind can destroy forests in an 
attempt to find it, but the unicorn will never be found.624 The belief that anything that can be 
conceived can be brought into being disregards the distinctions between ideas and institutions 
and leads to the expectations that declarations give rights existential reality. Unlike ideas which 
are easily envisaged, institutions are stabilized patterns of human behavior that involve millions 
of real people. They are shaped by experience and composed of habits and internalized values 
and beliefs. Because of this, institutions are extremely resistant to change. Yet in order for a right 
or idea to move from the imagined into reality, it must be translated through institutions into the 
reality of daily lives.625 
In addition to recognizing the differences between ideas and institutions, Kirkpatrick 
maintained that policymakers must distinguish betwen rights and goals. One factor that had 
increased the difficulty in discerning between the two was the fact that rights had proliferated at 
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a very fast pace in the mid to late 20th century. Kirkpatrick pointed out that the old 18th century 
rights of life, liberty, security of persons and pro erty still existed, but had been joined by many 
more rights such as the right to privacy, equal rights in marriage, the right to an education, the 
right to leisure, the right to the full development of one’s personality, the right to self-
determination, and the right to adequate standards of living. According to her, such declarations 
take on the character of a letter to Santa Claus.626 The plethora of rights or, as Kirkpatrick 
described them, the ‘lists of entitlements’, that hd been conceived of in the postwar era 
consisted of goals rather than rights. She argued that treating goals as rights was grossly 
misleading about the way in which goals were actually achieved in real life – through hard work 
over time.627  
Finally, Kirkpatrick claimed that distinctions must be made between intentions and 
consequences. According to her, there were theories in political philosophy that emphasized 
motives and there were those that emphasized consequences. Political purists, such as President 
Carter, tended to be preoccupied with motives or intentions. For such persons, doing what one 
knows is right becomes more important than producing a y desirable results. In human rights 
and foreign policy, the Carter Administration’s focus on intentions caused a great deal of 
concern over the purity of American motives rather t an the various consequences that might 
result from the implementation of such policies. In other words, because Carter believed his 
motives to be good, he failed to see how his human rights strategies might result in the loss of 
American allies like Nicaragua and Iran. According to Kirkpatrick, a human rights policy that 
emphasized intentions rather than consequences functioned only to make us feel good about 
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ourselves and she questioned whether or not ‘feeling good about ourselves’ was an appropriate 
goal for a foreign policy.628 
Unlike the previous administration, Kirkpatrick claimed that the President Reagan and his 
government would take all of these distinctions under consideration in order to create a human 
rights policy that was both fair and based on global political realities. According to her, the 
Reagan Administration had a more accurate idea of the relationship between force, freedom, 
morality, and power, along with a more adequate conception of the relationship between abstract 
rights and concrete societies. Consequently, the administration would implement human rights 
policies that were less sweeping than those of its predecessor with the expectation that such 
programs could produce more progress in the arena of human rights.629 Thus, the Reagan team 
refused to criticize South Africa too strongly for its dismal human rights record in the 
expectation that over time, such restraint, combined with the continuance of American military 
and economic aid, might encourage Pretoria to end its racist apartheid policies.  
According to Kirkpatrick, in addition to an emphasis on human rights, the protection and 
dissemination of democratic systems have constituted th  core of American foreign policies. Due 
to this historic emphasis on ‘making the world safe for democracy’ the Georgetown professor 
spoke often about both the nature of democratic states, long with the many obstacles that 
hindered their establishment, and the role of the United States, a democratic superpower, in the 
world. Though in favor of promoting democratic ideals round the world, the political scientist 
remained a realist when it came to global politics, noting that autocratic systems were the 
political norm while democratic states remained relatively rare. According to Kirkpatrick, the 
paucity of democracy was due to the heavy demands placed upon a population by such a system. 
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For one, most societies lacked the appropriate pattrns of social and political behavior that 
allowed for majority rule, opposition, accountability, and the protection of minority rights. She 
maintained that the establishment of a democratic political system was dependent upon certain 
social and cultural prerequisites, such as a citizenry which views itself as political participants 
rather than subjects, a population which has the ability to form voluntary associations based on 
shared interests and cooperation, leaders from various social groups who are willing to renounce 
violence and the threat of violence in politics, and the acceptance by the entire population of the 
legitimacy of the democratic processes for determining who should rule and to what broad 
ends.630 Her repeated emphasis on the various conditions necessary for democracy to thrive 
cautioned Americans against expecting instantaneous p litical change in nations around the 
world, even in those states, such as El Salvador and South Africa, that were American allies and 
recipients of U.S. economic and military aid.  
In comparison with the plethora of non-democratic states, democratic political systems 
were scarce, and as such, required protection. The ultimate defense of democracy, according to 
Kirkpatrick and her fellow neoconservatives, was the maintenance of American power. Military 
supremacy was absolutely vital for the preservation of the political institutions and values of 
American democratic society and Western Civilization, especially in the face of communist 
expansion.631 Throughout the 1970s, Kirkpatrick had bemoaned the decline of American military 
power in the face of Soviet expansion and criticized efforts towards achieving détente. The 
ambassador placed the blame for American decline on the New Left’s assault of American 
political, social, and cultural domestic values and the attitude of defeatism that accompanied the 
American withdrawal from Vietnam. In order to counter he effects of these experiences, in 
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particular, the notion that the two superpowers were morally equivalent, Kirkpatrick maintained 
that Americans must recognize who they were, especially in comparison to the Soviet Union. By 
understanding who they were, Americans could then understand why American power was 
necessary for the survival of liberal democracy in the modern world.632 
The citizens of the United States were, she pointed out on numerous occasions, the heirs 
of a long struggle against arbitrary power and partof a tradition that recognized that people have 
natural rights and that the central purpose of governm nt was to protect those rights. Thus, as the 
inheritors of a liberal, democratic tradition rooted in freedom, Americans must preserve and 
protect these values. Such endeavors constitute the core of American national interest and the 
guiding purpose of the foreign policy of the United States. Identification with, and respect for, 
the American tradition and Western Civilization, along with understanding that the strength of 
the U.S. was crucial for the defense of democracy and freedom, would, according to Kirkpatrick, 
enable Americans to understand that it was morally legitimate to be concerned about the military 
power of the United States. Moreover, by acknowledging the exceptional nature of the United 
States and its role in the world, Americans could un erstand that it was both legitimate and 
important for the United States to be concerned with, and involved in, events that occurred in 
many remote regions of the world. Finally, an appreciation of American Exceptionalism would 
allow the American people to be more wary of democracy’s greatest adversary – communism.633 
Facing who the Soviets were – the nature of their government, their relations with other 
communist regimes, and their interactions with states outside of the Soviet bloc – was, according 
to Kirkpatrick, an “extremely unpleasant task.”634 For unlike the liberal, democratic tradition that 
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fostered the American political system, the Soviet system was structured by tsarist autocracy and 
imperialism. Despite their “artful manipulation of symbols and language”635 which often clouded 
Americans’ abilities to assess the true nature of communism, the Soviets had continued the work 
of their tsarist predecessors by expanding their totali arian empire through the uninhibited and 
skillful use of violence, subversion, terrorism, and guerilla warfare. Kirkpatrick asserted that it 
was only through deception, violence, and subjugation that the Soviet Union was able to spawn 
governments based on one-party dictatorships. “The patt rn is familiar,” she wrote, “choose a 
weak government, organize a national liberation frot, weaken an already weak economy, and 
then intensify the violence.”636 Having come to power through violence, the new communist 
leaders sought to remain in power via military assistance from members of the communist bloc. 
Thus, resources and personnel from all over the Soviet bloc were brought to bear on ‘small, 
helpless countries’ of the Third World and their indigenous political rivalries. Meanwhile, due to 
concerns of interfering the in the internal affairs of others, or fears of being bogged down in a 
quagmire, Americans stood “passively by while another small, relatively helpless people 
succumbs to Marxist-Leninist tyranny and is ruthless y incorporated into the Soviet empire.”637  
As a democratic superpower, it was the duty of the United States to help prevent the 
incorporation of additional states, democratic or otherwise, into the Soviet Empire and to assist 
those nations under attack by the forces of communism. Kirkpatrick maintained that rather than 
worrying about quagmires or intervening in the inter al affairs of others, Americans should act 
to help people trapped in tyranny to disengage themselves from the world’s only colonial empire. 
Unlike many of her fellow neoconservatives, the ambssador was opposed to the dispatch of 
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American troops in most cases, but she approved of sending the kinds of aid that the Soviets 
were delivering to their clients: helicopters, accurate missiles, intelligence, and logistical support. 
Moreover, she maintained that the United States should offer these people solidarity by letting 
the world know that America stands with those who stand for freedom. “Standing with freedom 
fighters,” she wrote, “is the only policy consistent with our values and our interests.”638 
Furthermore, Kirkpatrick was adamant in her assertion that American aid to freedom fighters did 
not make the U.S. the ‘moral equivalent’ to the Soviet Union, noting that the force that liberates 
was not ‘morally equivalent’ to the force that subjugates.639She wrote, 
If client rulers have the ‘right’ to ask for foreign assistance to maintain themselves in 
power, citizens deprived of their rights can ask for external aid to reclaim them…A 
government which takes power by force, and retains power by force, has no legitimate 
grounds for complaint against those who would wrest power from it by force. So let us be 
clear about it: helping the contras, helping UNITA, helping the Afghans…is not only 
morally and politically permissible. It is morally and politically – and strategically – 
necessary.640 
 
Woven throughout her foreign policy views, whether on the spread of democracy, human 
rights, or American support for freedom fighters was an emphasis on limitations. Though 
Kirkpatrick envisioned the U.S. as the protector of liberal democracy, she maintained that there 
were limits to the United States’ ability to spread democracy. Likewise, though she saw the 
American government as the champion of human rights, t e ambassador pointed out that there 
were limits as to which rights a government could an should provide for their citizens, along 
with limits to the ability of the United States to successfully export human rights abroad. 
Moreover, though she advocated American aid to freedom fighters around the world, such aid 
should be limited and not involve the dispatch of American troops except in those instances 
                                                           





where vital national security interests were at stake. Furthermore, the ambassador’s stress on 
limitations can be found in her defense of authoritarian regimes – unlike totalitarian regimes, 
authoritarian governments are limited in power and llow limited contestation and opposition, 
and such limitations rendered them open to politica evolution and change. 
This emphasis on ‘limits’ can also be found in Kirkpatrick’s view of domestic social 
policies. She held that the government’s efforts to bring equality to women and minorities should 
be limited to the establishment of political equality. Once political equality was guaranteed by 
law, individuals’ ambition and hard work would eventually bring social and economic equality to 
disadvantaged groups. The importance of limitations, along with distinctions between both ideas 
and institutions and rights and goals, caused Kirkpatrick to oppose the New Left’s demands for 
radical social and cultural changes.  
Of course, Kirkpatrick’s hostility towards the New Left was not just a product of its 
domestic platform: the ambassador could not countena ce its attacks on American foreign 
policy, specifically the New Left’s rejection of the inherent morality of the Cold War. Indeed, 
rising criticisms of American actions in the name of anti-communism had forced Washington to 
adjust Cold War policies. The Nixon administration attempted to lessen the moral content and 
ideology in foreign affairs in its embrace of realpolitik. Meanwhile, Nixon and Kissinger hoped 
to relax tensions between the two superpowers by engagi g in détente. In an effort to both bring 
back morality into foreign affairs and offset charges from the left that the U.S. supported 
dictators in the name of anti-communism, the Carter administration based its Cold War policies 
on human rights. Accordingly, the administration withdrew aid from autocratic regimes that 
failed to improve their human rights records. In the case of Nicaragua, the withdrawal of aid 
resulted in a communist takeover. The spread of communism along America’s borders caused 
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Carter to embrace the morality of containment at the expense of human rights. His decision to 
increase military aid to El Salvador, an authoritarian regime battling against a leftist insurgency 
with ties to the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, resulted in a considerable amount of domestic criticism. 
The right claimed his human rights policies had facilit ted the spread of communism and feared 
that American aid to El Salvador might be too little, too late. Meanwhile the left charged him 
with vacillating hypocrisy. 
Ronald Reagan, a fervent anti-communist, believed that the containment of communism 
was morally correct; thus, the Great Communicator and his staff rejected détente due to its lack 
of ideological zeal. The administration maintained that the Soviet Union was the “Evil Empire”, 
and as such, Washington could not broker deals with Moscow. Moreover, America should do 
anything and everything in its power to prevent the spread of communism around the world, 
especially in its own front yard.  However, by the ime Reagan entered the White House, the 
president could no longer rely upon Congress and the American public to support Cold War 
policies, such as the backing of authoritarian dictators, based solely on the presence of the 
communist boogieman. Thus, Reagan was forced to do something that previous Cold War 
presidents had not: provide moral justification for the support of dictators and non-democratic 
regimes that had nothing to do with anti-communism. Jeane Kirkpatrick provided this with her 
distinctions between authoritarian and totalitarian egimes. By investing authoritarian regimes 
with political legitimacy and presenting them as transformative systems, the political scientist 
moved away from the notion that the U.S. could only be safe if surrounded by like-minded 
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